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L
atecomer countries in econom-
ic development have the poten-
tial to grow faster than ‘fore-
runner’ or already developed 
economies. Latecomers do not have 
to re-invent the wheel. They can imi-
tate, adopt or modify the production 
methods, technologies, organizations 
or institutions of  forerunner countries 
to climb the ladder of  economic and 
technological development relatively 
quickly. Such imitation or emulation 
often results not in just replication but 
also in innovation (whether techno-
logical, institutional or organizational) 
leading to a relatively quick transition 
in national comparative advantage 
from labour-intensive to capital and 
technology-intensive industries.
However, catching up does not hap-
pen automatically. Put diferently, 
economic development is not inevi-
table. It is contingent upon a num-
ber of  factors which include national 
‘policy choices’, institutional capabili-
ties and/or bureaucratic competence 
(i.e. leadership and governance). A 
country must develop capacity to ab-
sorb new technologies, accumulate 
or attract capital, and participate in 
global markets. Writing in the Jour-
nal of  Economic History in 1986, 
Moses Abramovitz put it this way: 
‘‘Countries that are technologically 
backward have a potentiality for gen-
erating growth more rapid than that 
of  more advanced countries, provided 
their social capabilities are suiciently 
developed to permit successful exploi-
tation of  technologies already em-
ployed by the technological leaders’’. 
With the exception of  Britain which 
led the way in the First Industrial 
Revolution, every single country that 
has industrialized since has deployed 
some form of  a catching up strategy. 
This includes latecomer countries in 
Europe, Asia and Latin America. Dif-
ferent countries have evolved difer-
ent institutions to play diferent roles 
in their catching up strategies. The 
catching up strategies of  Germany, 
Russia, Japan and to a lesser extent 
South Korea, focused on harnessing 
the most technologically dynamic 
industries of  the day (e.g. iron, steel, 
heavy and chemical industries, auto-
mobiles and electronics) and leapfrog-
ging the forerunners in size of  plants, 
enterprises and investments. This was 
essentially a ‘catch up and overtake’ 
strategy. 
The catching up strategies of  Singa-
pore, Taiwan and Malaysia focused 
less on direct competition with fore-
runners but on harnessing globaliza-
tion by attracting foreign capital in 
the form of  multinational companies 
(MNCs) and then upgrading MNCs’ 
products and services through iscal 
and labour policies, human capital 
development and irst class infrastruc-
ture. Germany, then a ‘moderately 
backward country’ in a schema used 
by Alexander Gerschenkron, used 
‘universal banks’ to inance its indus-
trialization programme. In the same 
schema, Russia, then ‘an extremely 
backward country’ with virtually no 
private sector, the state took the lead in 
the formulation, implementation and 
inancing of  the catching up industri-
alization strategy.  In Japan and South 
Korea, the ‘developmental state’ in 
conjunction with the Keiretsu (Japan) 
and the Chaebols (South Korea) took 
charge of  the strategy. The ‘develop-
mental state’ also led the catching up 
strategies in Singapore, Taiwan and 
Malaysia. 
While the Japanese catching up strat-
egy was mostly inanced through 
domestic resource mobilization, the 
South Korean strategy was partly i-
nanced through foreign debt. 
Virtually every successful latecomer 
country started from an ‘initial condi-
tion’ characterized by a relative lack 
of  capital or skilled labour or both. 
But each found ways to overcome 
these obstacles. All successful late-
comer countries were determined to 
go after ‘dynamic comparative advan-
tage’. They were not content to play 
second iddle in terms of  industrial 
development. Once they embarked 
on the catching up strategy, each, with 
laser-like single mindedness, directed 
all their national resources, energy 
and talent towards this sole objective. 
They would acquire whatever ‘capa-
bilities’ they needed to, through what-
ever means necessary, but this goal 
had to be achieved.
There was a lot at stake. Economic 
backwardness is a threat to national 
security. This was particularly the case 
in the 19th century and the early part 
of  the 20th century, as nearly all Afri-
can countries found out through the 
encounter with colonialism. The more 
industrialized a country, the more like-
ly it wielded greater military strength. 
Similarly, the more industrialized a 
country, the more likely it was capable 
of  combating the impacts of  poten-
tially devastating health and natural 
hazards. Catching up was a matter 
of  social progress, human wellbe-
ing and the survival of  nation-states. 
National prestige, economic or even 
military jingoism were certainly part 
of  the equation in some countries, but 
these were secondary rather than pri-
mary motivations. It is easy to forget 
now that apart from water, Japan has 
hardly any natural resources. Taiwan 
is a tiny Island, Singapore is a tiny 
city-state, and until the early 1960s, 
South Korea was not only an agricul-
tural based economy, but one of  the 
poorest in the world.
Arguably, the world has been rela-
tively more peaceful since 1945. Nev-
ertheless, economic backwardness 
remains a threat to national security, 
human welfare and social progress 
in the 21st century. The devastating 
impact of  the recent Ebola outbreak 
A fundamental development problem in Africa is the widespread lack 
of  credible ‘catching up’ economic development strategies. A majority of  African 
countries lack the ‘institutional capabilities’ (i.e. policy, managerial or administrative 
capacities) needed to harness the continent’s ‘latecomer advantages’ for accelerated 
development. 
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in West Africa made this obvious. Not 
that a reminder was necessary.  Mil-
lions of  lives lost to recurrent famines, 
droughts, loods, Malaria, HIV/Aids, 
tuberculosis, cholera and any number 
of  easy-to-control disease epidemics in 
Africa over the last ifty years should 
have made this obvious a long time ago. 
Yet 47 percent of  the African popula-
tion lives in extreme poverty, 23 million 
of  Africa’s primary school-age children 
attend classes hungry, and one in four 
Africans is undernourished. (All these 
igures refer to Sub Sahara Africa).  620 
million people in Africa lack access to 
grid electricity and 730 million rely on 
ineicient forms of  cooking. More than 
one-third of  the continent’s population 
lacks access to safe drinking water.
These facts and igures alone suice to 
make economic development a mat-
ter of  the highest national urgency in 
every African country. Consider that 
Africa has 60 percent of  the world’s 
uncultivated arable land and suicient 
energy resources (in the form of  un-
tapped hydro-electric, solar and wind 
power, for example) to meet its energy 
needs. Moreover as Prof  G.B.A. Okello 
writes in this Magazine, existing medi-
cal applications could prevent up to 
63 percent of  all infections in Africa. 
The natural resources and technolo-
gies needed to solve many of  Africa’s 
development problems (i.e. food, nutri-
tion, energy and water insecurities; poor 
public health, etc.) already exist. Many 
countries had long solved many of  the 
development challenges currently fac-
ing Africa by harnessing fewer natural 
resources and relatively more ‘rudimen-
tary’ technologies and institutions than 
are currently available or potentially 
available (through import, adoption, 
imitation, or modiication) to many Af-
rican countries. Africa’s primary ‘devel-
opment deicit’ lies in its limited ‘social 
or institutional capabilities’ (i.e. compe-
tent administration, leadership or gov-
ernance) to efectively harness available 
natural resources, technologies and in-
novations (institutional, organizational/
managerial, etc.) for accelerated devel-
opment.
Climate change threatens to make things 
worse for the continent. If  the rise in the 
average global temperature remains ef-
fectively unconstrained by 2050, the 
impacts of  climate change might make 
the African development efort much 
harder from that point onwards. Given 
its current ‘development conditions’ 
(the best in a generation) and potential 
‘ecological conditions’ from 2050 on-
wards (potentially the worst in several 
generations), the next 30 year window 
is probably Africa’s last best chance for 
development. This is much earlier than 
anticipated by Africa’s collective long 
term economic blueprint, the African 
Union’s Agenda 2063.
African countries could still develop 
even if  global temperature rises remain 
efectively unconstrained by 2050. But 
who is the African leader or citizen who 
is willing to gamble the continent’s fu-
ture on this slim chance? Why would 
they choose the worst of  all possible 
development conditions over the best 
of  all possible ones? Rhetorically speak-
ing, African leaders of  all stripes claim 
the pursuit of  national development 
as their topmost priority. In practice 
though, the ‘policy choices’ or ‘devel-
opment strategies’ embraced by many 
of  them amount to betting their coun-
tries’ futures on the worst of  all possible 
development conditions over the best. 
Few African countries have the neces-
sary ‘development strategies’ to seize 
this once in a generation opportunity 
to achieve economic or even sustainable 
development. 
Unsurprisingly, these are the countries 
with the most interesting development 
stories out of  the continent over the last 
three decades. The ambition, scope and 
scale of  efort in each country has var-
ied. Mauritius and Botswana have been 
the most ambitious and most success-
ful. A democratic developmental state 
has led the efort in both countries. The 
state has also led the catching up efort 
in South Africa although the charac-
ter of  that state is complex. South Af-
LACKING IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, LET 
ALONE CATCHING UP DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
AFRICA
In spite of  the need for a ‘ierce urgency of  now’ in African development, 
and despite the preponderance of  catching up strategies in global economic 
development, only ive African countries (Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa 
and to a lesser extent Ethiopia and Rwanda) can claim to have formulated and 
implemented credible catching up development strategies. 
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rica has been a democratic state since 
1994 but the country has a long history 
with industrial policy dating back to the 
apartheid regime. 
A diferent type of  ‘state’, increasingly 
labelled as the ‘Kigali/Addis Ababa 
Consensus’ is leading the efort in Ethio-
pia and Rwanda. There is not enough 
space here to unpack this ‘Consensus’ 
but for the purposes of  this argument, 
it has taken the form of  state led invest-
ments in infrastructure and ‘mega’ pro-
jects (Ethiopia) and enhancing ‘social 
capabilities’ in Rwanda: by strengthen-
ing institutions, ighting corruption, re-
ducing bureaucratic red tape, attracting 
foreign capital, investments in human 
capital and enhancing the country’s 
‘absorptive capacity’ with speciic refer-
ence to information and communica-
tion technologies (ICTs).
The recent spate of  (‘mega’) infrastruc-
ture development in Africa while laud-
able, should be viewed with caution. 
Much of  it exists outside clear or coher-
ent national development frameworks. 
It is not clear to what extent this is 
geared towards simply making resource 
extraction and shipment out of  the con-
tinent relatively cheaper and faster and 
cheaper for today’s largest consumers of  
Africa’s raw materials. African countries 
would still beneit from this, but there 
are limits to factor driven economic de-
velopment of  this kind - predicated on 
little if  any value addition. (There are 
still limits to factor driven development 
even with value addition, but coupled 
with technological and other innova-
tions, this can work: see the experiences 
of  Australia, USA, Norway or even 
the UK). As Prof  Sangmpan argues 
elsewhere in this Magazine, Africa has 
experienced a version of  infrastructure 
induced factor driven development be-
fore. Colonial investment in infrastruc-
ture was principally aimed at reducing 
the costs of  resource extraction from Af-
rica. Nevertheless, it did catalyse some 
level of  development in countries such 
as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nige-
ria. Ultimately, this approach to devel-
opment doesn’t work. It does not lead to 
the creation of  ‘dynamic national com-
parative advantage’.
It is a measure of  the lack of  a ‘ierce 
urgency of  now’ in African develop-
ment that not only are there only ive 
countries with credible catching up 
development strategies, but a majority 
of  African countries lack development 
strategies in the irst place. What passes 
for development ‘strategies’ in many Af-
rican countries are wish lists of  worthy 
goals, with no clear ways and means or 
‘capabilities’ to bring about their reali-
sation. A number of  African countries 
have pursued a raft of  ‘development 
strategies’ since independence. These 
include: Health for All by the year 2000; 
Universal Access to Safe Water and 
Sanitation for All by the year 2000; In-
dustrialization by the year 2000; Poverty 
Reduction by the year 2015; and Struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).
For the most part, these were merely 
wish lists of  worthy goals or in the case 
of  SAPs, some unworthy goals too (e.g. 
weakening state capacity; under invest-
ments in public education and health). 
Few countries marshalled the ‘social or 
institutional capabilities’ needed to re-
alize these goals. Consequently, few of  
these ‘strategies’ achieved their aims. In 
the history of  global economic devel-
opment, Africa has had an un-usually 
high rates of  failure of  ‘development 
strategies’. Many of  the now developed 
countries made ‘mistakes’ en route to 
their ‘development’. Austria and Italy 
(among latecomers in Europe); China 
(Great Leap Forward of  1958-1962); 
and Brazil (import-Substitution indus-
trialization of  the 1950s through the 
1970s) all made ‘mistakes’. However, 
they were able to learn from their ‘mis-
takes’ (i.e. ‘policy experimentation’). All 
ably re-oriented their strategies to ulti-
mately achieve their desired goals.  With 
the exception of  Botswana, Mauritius 
and South Africa, this is not the case in 
much of  Africa.
Strategy, understood in its Greco-
Roman sense (stratēgía/strategia/
stratēgēma/stratagem), is the art of  
planning and mobilising resources to 
eiciently and efectively bring about 
a desired end, objective or solution to 
a problem. A catching up development 
strategy can be deined as a national 
economic ‘game plan’ that allows a 
latecomer country to develop relatively 
quickly by emulating, learning from 
and capitalizing on the economic con-
ditions created by forerunner countries. 
A catching up development strategy is 
based on the proposition that the pro-
cess of  national economic development 
for latecomer countries interacts with, 
and partially derives from, advanced 
economies. Akamatsu Kaname, a lead-
ing Japanese economist in the 1930s 
through the 1970s, maintained that it 
was impossible to study the economic 
growth of  developing countries without 
looking at the mutual interactions be-
tween developing and developed econo-
mies.
In the classic case of  the Japanese and 
East Asian economies, increasingly ex-
plained (somewhat controversially) by 
Akamatsu Kaname’ Flying Geese de-
velopment theory, the latecomer devel-
oping country starts the ‘catching up’ 
process by adopting from the developed 
country ‘strategic’ labour intensive in-
dustries (through foreign imports, local 
or foreign capital, infant industry pro-
tection and other forms of  state sup-
port) which it initially produces for its 
own domestic market. As soon as it per-
fects this, the latecomer country begins 
to produce these same products for the 
export market (ultimately with national 
capital, some of  which is used to pro-
vide state support such as export subsi-
dies, which are gradually phased out as 
the industry matures or attains global 
competitiveness).
In this game of  ‘catching up’, any state 
support or protection is ofered to those 
industries that are viewed as capable of  
acquiring comparative advantage (i.e. 
‘sunrise industries’ or ‘leading sectors’). 
It is seldom given to industries incapa-
ble of  attaining comparative advantage 
(i.e. ‘sunset industries’). (It is important 
to note that the phrase ‘industries inca-
pable of  achieving comparative advan-
tage’ does not necessarily refer to ‘old’ 
industries. As Cambridge economist 
Ha-Joon Chang has argued in much of  
his writing on industrial policy, in Japan 
for example ‘SDI cartels’ or cartels for 
structurally-depressed industries’ were 
granted to declining industries on condi-
tion that they upgraded their technolo-
gies and phased out obsolete capacities. 
Chang also argues that the Industrial 
What passes for development ‘strategies’ in many 
African countries are wish lists of worthy goals, with 
no clear ways and means or ‘capabilities’ to bring 
about their realisation
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Development Law in South Korea ena-
bled some declining industries such as 
textiles to receive temporary support 
(e.g. subsidies for equipment upgrad-
ing and exemption from anti-trust law) 
as long as they achieved technology 
upgrading targets). Through this pro-
cess, a latecomer country improves the 
quality of  its products to the extent that 
it becomes a global leader, sometimes 
displacing the original producer of  the 
product or technology. The latecomer 
country then adopts the next suitable 
industry or technology and repeats the 
same process over and over again to 
create a rapid process of  national eco-
nomic development.
To simplify a complex story (and sev-
eral diferent but often interrelated 
strategies), this overall strategy or ‘set 
of  strategies’ might be called import-
substitution-cum-export promotion-
cum-structural-upgrading. It entails a 
sequence of  structural changes in in-
dustrial development from consumer to 
capital goods and/or from ‘‘crude and 
simple goods to complex and reined 
goods” in the words of  Akamatsu Kan-
ame. The Flying Geese theory describes 
a catching up strategy whereby coun-
tries gradually move up in technological 
and economic ‘ladder’ by following in 
the pattern of  those just ahead of  them. 
Much like a group of  geese lying in an 
inverted ‘V’ formation that reportedly 
achieve up to 70 percent energy saving 
over a goose lying solo, this strategy al-
lows latecomer countries to develop rel-
atively quickly relative to forerunners.
The lead goose in this theory is the 
most technologically and economically 
advanced country. Since at least the 
Second World War, that has been the 
United States. African countries keen 
to follow in the footsteps of  the more 
recently successful Asian countries, 
might do well to remember this. There 
is a lot to learn from China for example, 
but African countries should not forget 
that China itself  is emulating the ‘Lead 
Goose’. The Flying Geese Theory is 
far from static or linear. Its entire logic 
is predicated on the dynamic interac-
tions between latecomer and forerunner 
countries. The model does not dictate 
that latecomer African countries must 
of  necessity ‘follow’, ‘emulate’ or capi-
talise only on the economic conditions 
created by the ‘geese’ nearest to them.
There are very good reasons why Af-
rican countries might want to emulate 
development strategies of  the newly de-
veloped economies in Asia. Approached 
strategically, there can be more to 
‘South-South’ cooperation than the 
quaint but materially worthless rhetoric 
of  ‘political solidarity’ and ‘moral sup-
port’ (usually against democracy and 
human rights). One advantage that 
latecomers have over forerunners is the 
ability to avoid the mistakes of  forerun-
ners. The South Korean, Taiwanese, 
Singaporean and Malaysian develop-
ment models may have succeeded in 
their ultimate aims but they were not 
lawless. ‘Crony capitalism’ and a ‘de-
velopment irst, democracy later’ men-
tality constituted two of  their most com-
mon mistakes, at least in the early years. 
There is no compelling reason why 
African countries must replicate these, 
although, generally speaking, these ap-
pear to be two of  the features of  these 
development models that have found 
most favour in a number of  African 
countries. Not that African countries 
needed to transplant or to import these 
from Asia - many of  them long ago per-
fected these instincts themselves.
There is also much that African coun-
tries can learn from the early ‘fore-
runner’ economies including the UK, 
Germany, US, France, Japan, Australia, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Den-
mark. Such lessons might include how 
to harness natural resources for eco-
nomic development or how to ‘develop’ 
without them. They might also include 
how to create innovation or knowledge 
based economies, or generally, how to 
efectively play the catching up game. 
Nowadays, some of  these countries 
recommend diferent strategies from 
the ones they employed during their 
industrialisation process. The key to 
learning from ‘forerunner’ countries is 
to focus on the strategies they deployed 
at the time of  their industrialisation or 
currently employ and not necessarily on 
what they say. For reasons of  ideologi-
cal and disciplinary hegemony, some 
of  the forerunner countries are likely 
to recommend a raft of  ‘free market’ 
or ‘neoliberal’ approaches which, in 
the context of  catching up speciically 
or economic development generally, 
amount to a ‘Relax, Kick Back and Do 
Nothing Strategy’. 
CONFLATING ECONOMIC 
THEORY OR IDEOLOGY WITH 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
H
owever, no successful latecomer country in Eu-
rope, North America or Asia took this advice seri-
ously. For the better part of  the last three decades, 
however, this has been the overriding principle of  
development policy and practice in Africa. With the excep-
tion of  Mauritius and Botswana – and to a lesser extent, 
South Africa, Ethiopia and Rwanda - few African coun-
This was not the strategy that many 
of  the forerunner countries followed 
when they were developing. The original 
Lead Goose, Britain, did render this 
misleading advice to early latecomers, 
most notably to America. 
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tries have made a decisive break from 
this approach to development. Often, 
this approach is presented as ‘techni-
cal’, ‘neutral’ or ‘non-ideological’. The 
implication is that this approach is prov-
ably and unquestionably superior to 
alternative approaches to development. 
Firstly, there is nothing non-ideological 
or apolitical about economic choices or 
priorities. Attempting to divorce eco-
nomic policy from ethics is problematic 
because economic policy impacts the 
well-being of  diferent groups of  people 
(and the environment) diferently. Eco-
nomic choices, including this approach, 
are inherently value laden and ideologi-
cal. More importantly, the goal of  de-
velopment policy is to achieve desired 
social, economic and ecological ends. 
It is not to beatify economics as a value 
free science. The beatiication of  eco-
nomics as a value free science cannot be 
the goal of  development policy. If  this 
is a worthy exercise at all, (and I am not 
sure that St. Matthew, the Patron Saint 
of   accountants, bankers, tax collectors, 
inancial analysts, stockbrokers and pre-
sumably economists, would agree that 
it is), it belongs in university economics 
departments, not African ministries of  
inance and economic planning or cen-
tral banks.
Secondly, this approach is fundamen-
tally lawed. Capital accumulation 
can be an efect or result of  economic 
growth, rather than its cause. Struc-
tural change or economic transforma-
tion, as Joseph Schumpeter argued way 
back in the 1930s, is brought about by 
technological, organizational/institu-
tional and managerial innovations or 
breakthroughs that result in brand new 
products and services which replace 
older ones. The state can, and has done 
a lot to catalyse these types of  innova-
tions in any number of  now developed 
countries. The Chinese development 
experience is just the latest in a long list 
of  examples to demonstrate that while 
there are many successful paths to de-
velopment, a superior one is rooted in 
learning technological capabilities and 
co-evolving best-it organizations and 
institutions. It is also the latest demon-
stration that industrial policy matters in 
economic development. Diferent tech-
nologies, sectors and products matter 
because they entail diferent learning 
opportunities, diferent income elastic-
ity of  demand, diferent opportunities 
to innovate, and diferent opportunities 
to contribute to economic development. 
Therefore, prioritization matters. Time 
matters. Social capability or national 
commitment matters.
The dominance of  neoclassical eco-
nomic thinking in African develop-
ment primarily explains the continent’s 
lacklustre approach to development 
strategy. A development strategy en-
compasses three things: priority setting 
(i.e. strategic choices); timeframe; and 
national commitment or ‘social and in-
stitutional capabilities’ (ways and means 
of  mobilizing resources to bring about 
its intended aims, goals or objectives). 
Few development strategies in Africa 
possess these ingredients. Often (a) eco-
nomic theory or ideology is conlated 
with development strategy; (b) a wish 
list of  goals or aspirations is given a per-
functory timeframe; and (c) governmen-
tal backing is mistaken for ‘institutional 
capabilities’. Is it any wonder that very 
few of  these strategies have succeeded? 
An underlying theory or ideology is a 
necessary but an insuicient ingredi-
ent in a national development strategy. 
Clear ways and means of  mobilizing 
resources needed to bring about de-
sired outcomes must be established. A 
theory or ideology must be un-packed 
into strategic choices that are backed up 
by requisite policies, institutional com-
petencies and inancial, technological, 
human and other resources.
 
In a speech on ‘Rethinking Leadership 
for Development’, Tony Blair - perhaps 
unwittingly - put his inger on the fun-
damental development problem in Af-
rica. Firstly, he correctly notes that few 
‘development strategies’ in Africa entail 
much priority setting. ‘‘Development 
plans will have 150 priorities.  Actu-
ally only ive can realistically be done 
in a term’’. (http://www.tonyblairoice.
org/speeches/entry/tony-blair-speech-
rethinking-leadership-for development). 
Blair then goes on to make a far more 
interesting and revealing statement 
when he attributes Africa’s lack of  de-
velopment prioritization to a ‘lack of  
capacity’. ‘‘Prioritisation is hard when 
resources are scarce. And with capacity 
around them so low, they end up trying 
to do everything themselves. With the 
additional demands of  diplomacy, in-
ternational meetings and social/politi-
cal events, with precious little time spent 
on priorities. Their governments do not 
have the capabilities to support them as 
they need. The capacity to implement, 
track and monitor performance isn’t 
there’’.
This statement is more loaded, mislead-
ing and revealing than it irst appears. 
The statement reveals a number of  
laws in the general mind-set in African 
development. Blair is blinded by the 
same ‘Kick Back, Relax and Do Noth-
ing’ theoretical framework that has gov-
erned much of  the development policy 
discourse in Africa over the last three 
decades. Prioritization might be hard, 
but surely, by necessity, it must be the 
irst order of  business when resources 
are scarce. Economics, by deinition, is 
about scarcity and choice. Lionel Rob-
bins deined the subject as ‘‘the science 
Attempting to divorce economic policy 
from ethics is problematic because 
economic policy impacts the well-being 
of different groups of people (and the 
environment) differently.
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which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between given ends and 
scarce means which have alternative 
uses.”  Paul Samuelson deined eco-
nomics as the “study of  how societies 
use scarce resources to produce valu-
able commodities and distribute them 
among diferent people.”  
Blair’s identiication of  lack of  capac-
ity as a serious constraint to economic 
development in Africa is not in dis-
pute. It is his sympathetic approval of  
the deployment of  this limited capacity 
all over the place, rather than on a few 
strategic priorities, that is contentious. 
Blair’s sympathetic attitude reprises an 
old argument in development policy 
debate. The debate reached its ‘climax’ 
with the publication of  the World Bank’s 
East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth 
and Public Policy in 1993 and the coun-
terarguments that followed it.  This 
World Bank publication, in attempting 
to diminish the role of  industrial policy 
in the economic development of  East 
Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore) made a num-
ber of  questionable claims. 
Firstly, the report claimed that while 
industrial policy might have been prac-
ticed widely in East Asia, empirically, it 
made little diference to the production 
structure or the productivity perfor-
mance of  these economies. Secondly, 
the report argued that notwithstanding 
its impacts in East Asia, industrial pol-
icy would not be helpful to developing 
countries of  today because of  changed 
domestic and international conditions. 
Thirdly and more crucially for the 
purposes of  our argument, the report 
argued that developing countries lack 
efective domestic institutions (i.e. com-
petent, relatively incorruptible bureau-
cracies) needed to implement industrial 
policy as was practised 
in East Asia.  Blair’s 
sympathies appear to 
mirror this general line 
of  argument.
The problem with this 
argument, as many 
opponents of  the East 
Asian Economic Mira-
cle have long observed, 
is not that many de-
veloping countries, in-
cluding those in Africa, 
lack competent bureau-
cracies. Few would 
challenge that claim. 
Rather, the problem is 
two-fold: Firstly, ‘ca-
pabilities’ whether technological, insti-
tutional or organizational (i.e. bureau-
cratic) are acquired and acquirable (and 
destructible), often faster than so called 
development or economic experts ex-
pect. They are not handed down by 
divine providence or guaranteed by his-
tory or tradition. An important part of  
‘capabilities acquisition’ occurs through 
‘learning by doing’.  As Eleanor West-
ney demonstrated in Imitation and 
Innovation: The Transfer of  Western 
Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan, 
there is (a) learning-by-doing in admin-
istration as in production and (b) tech-
nologies, institutions and organizations 
are all subject to imitation and innova-
tion. Emulation itself  produces innova-
tion, not just replication. Countries are 
just as subject to, and perhaps some-
times need, ‘organizational revolution’ 
(i.e. bureaucratic transformation of  the 
institutions of  public life) as they might 
need technological revolution. West-
ney argues that Meiji Japan not only 
adopted and adapted Western industri-
al machines but also emerging Western 
organizational models (e.g. legal, edu-
cation and banking systems; a national 
police force, navy and army; the postal 
service, political parties, professional so-
cieties and newspapers). The Japanese 
even had a slogan for this technological 
and organizational adoption and adap-
tation: ‘Japanese spirit, Western tech-
nology’. 
Responding to this ‘capabilities’ argu-
ment in the late 1990s, Ha-Joon Chang 
reminded everyone that the South Ko-
rean bureaucracy was infamous for 
its incompetence and nepotism as re-
cently as the 1950s. Chang noted that 
until the late 1960s, South Korea was 
sending its bureaucrats to be trained 
in Pakistan and the Philippines. It was 
‘‘only through continuous eforts at civil 
service reform, and not as a result of  
history and tradition’’ that the country 
managed to create a competent and 
relatively clean civil service.  
The problem with Blair’s sympathetic 
posture is that it reinforces the assump-
tion that whatever level of  capacity Af-
rica happens to have is used relatively 
more efectively when spread over ‘eve-
rything’ as opposed to when directed at 
selective national priorities. To be sure, 
Blair does not go as far as to endorse the 
argument in the East Asian Economic 
Miracle report which implied that the 
closer an economic system was to a lais-
sez faire ideal, the easier it was to run. 
That is what an economy without any 
prioritization at all would look like. But 
he doesn’t explicitly reject this argument 
either, which leaves his position at least 
from this single speech relatively closer 
to the position embodied in the East 
Asian Economic Miracle report. 
That would be problematic. As Ha-
Joon Chang has argued in a series of  
devastating critiques of  the East Asian 
Economic Miracle report ‘‘more mar-
ket-oriented economic systems are not 
necessarily easier to construct and run 
than more interventionist systems’’. 
For one thing, well-functioning markets 
also require institutional prerequisites 
as much as well-functioning policies 
although the institutional prerequisites 
might be diferent (e.g. eicient capital 
markets and contract law and efective 
dispute resolution mechanisms without 
which market transactions costs would 
be high).  For another, successful free 
market economies ‘‘will require highly 
capable private sector bureaucracies 
that can successfully manage large and 
complex irms’’. (See Chang, H-J. 1993. 
The Political Economy of  Industrial Policy in 
Korea, Cambridge Journal of  Economics, vol. 
17, no. 2. 41 Chang, H-J. 
1994. The Political Econ-
omy of  Industrial Policy, 
London and Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. Chang, H-J. 
1995. Explaining ‘Flexible 
Rigidities’ in East Asia in 
T. Killick (ed.), The Flexi-
ble Economy, London, Rout 
ledge. Chang, H-J. 1997. 
Luxury Consumption Con-
trol and Industrialisation 
in East Asia, mimeo. a 
background paper prepared 
for Trade and Development 
Report, UNCTAD)
Inadequate capacity 
is one reason African 
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NOT RECOGNIZING 
TIME AS A ‘SCARCE’ 
RESOURCE 
A strategy should be time bound. Its desired objectives should be achieved or achievable within 
a speciic time frame. This is partly be-
cause a strategy is built on fundamen-
tal assumptions (e.g. technological and 
demographic trends) that are sensitive 
to time. In spite of  this, time is seldom 
treated as a ‘limited’ or ‘scarce’ resource 
in African development. Since 2000, 
one would be hard pressed to ind an 
African country with a ‘Five-Year Na-
tional Development Plans’. ‘Develop-
ment Planning’ went out of  fashion 
with the triumph of  the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ in the 1990s. Nowadays, 
in a triumph of  wishful thinking over 
hard-nosed development strategiz-
ing, one is more likely to come across 
countries should engage in serious de-
velopment ‘strategizing’ or priority set-
ting. While few will dispute that many 
African countries lack competent bu-
reaucracies, as I will argue momentarily, 
Africa’s capacity problems are some-
times overrated and self-inlicted. After 
all, one seldom hears of  these types of  
problems within private and civil soci-
ety sectors in Africa or among the cadre 
of  African professionals who work with 
global inancial institutions such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, the UN system 
and all manner of  aid agencies.  A num-
ber of  ‘graduates’ of  these institutions 
have gone on to lead their countries (e.g. 
Allasane Ouattara of  Cote D’Ivoire, El-
len Johnson Sirleaf  of  Liberia, Mbingu 
Wa Mutharika of  Malawi and Cheick 
Modibo Diarra of  Mali) or key critical 
ministerial dockets (e.g. Ngozi Okonjo-
Iweala of  Nigeria, Goodall Gondwe of  
Malawi, Akinwumi Adesina of  Nige-
ria, etc.). Not to mention the vast tal-
ent pool of  the African diaspora.  Tony 
Blair himself  alludes to this in the same 
speech: ‘‘There’s a new generation of  
African leaders – in politics, business 
and civil society who are anxious to take 
the destiny of  their nations into their 
own hands. We should encourage and 
support them. That’s the challenge for 
the international community’’. 
That there are African governments 
with 150 priorities in their develop-
ment plans speaks to the paucity of  
proper development strategies on the 
continent. Sure, institutional capacity 
is a problem. So is the dominance of  
the ‘Relax, Kick Back and Do Noth-
ing’ neoclassical mentality in much of  
what constitutes ‘the establishment’ in 
African development: ministries of  i-
nance and economic planning, central 
banks, bilateral and multilateral devel-
opment institutions, many economics 
departments and parts of  the private 
sector.  Following the triumph of  the 
‘Washington Consensus’, many African 
countries bought into – or were forced 
to buy into -  the (neoclassical) economic 
theory and ideology that the state need 
not ‘intervene’ in pursuit of  economic 
development since this process hap-
pens quasi automatically through au-
tomatic increases in a country’s capital 
to labour ratio. According to this school 
of  thought, long term growth is input-
driven incrementally and marginally. 
In this mind-set, national prioritization 
or ‘development strategizing’ is either 
superluous or counterproductive: the 
invisible hand of  allegedly eicient mar-
kets is a superior mechanism for sorting 
out competing development priorities. 
All a country needs to do is undertake 
efective macroeconomic management 
and ‘good governance’ or a series of  
political and legal measures that would 
ensure both social peace and economic 
stability – a key mandate of  Blair’s own 
Africa Governance Initiative.
While the idea that Africa lacks capacity 
to prioritize its development goals might 
be preposterous, it is not unique to Tony 
Blair. It is widely shared within the de-
velopment establishment in Africa and 
beyond. Otherwise, why would Africa 
outsource much of  its policy making to 
regional and international development 
banks and/or bilateral and multilateral 
development and aid agencies? Notice 
the diference between ‘outsourcing’ 
of  economic policy making function 
in some African countries and the ap-
proaches to ‘capabilities acquisition’ 
strategies employed by Japan and South 
Korea. While both went for nothing less 
than ‘technological revolution’, Meiji 
Japan went so far as to seek ‘organiza-
tional revolution’. It is not that outsourc-
ing of  policy making does not work or 
that ‘good governance’ based initia-
tives such as those promoted by Blair’s 
Africa Governance Initiative are not 
helpful. Both strategies might or might 
not work depending on individual cir-
cumstances. The fundamental problem 
is that notwithstanding their merits, 
these initiatives are simply not adequate 
to the task. The development challenge 
facing many African countries requires 
technological and organizational, if  not 
institutional, revolutions. While these 
will require the participation of  many 
agents both within and outside Africa, 
ultimately, they will not succeed without 
strategic priority setting and national 
commitment on the part of  African 
countries.
Tony Blair sufers from the same ideo-
logical blind spot that alicts many 
African leaders and technocrats. Blair 
assumes that Africa has the right devel-
opment agenda. ‘‘Assume good faith; 
usually the correct assumption nowa-
days. Assume the right vision; often the 
case’’. Blair goes on to make this claim: 
‘‘Many of  the leaders I know in Africa – 
and elsewhere – will work 18 hour days, 
7 days a week’’.  I hate to disagree with 
Tony Blair. I spent more than a decade 
in Blair’s Britain and witnessed irst-
hand not only his skilful transformation 
of  the UK into a ‘kinder, gentler coun-
try’, but also his personal commitment 
to international development.  Let’s just 
say that many African citizens I know 
would probably request Mr Blair to pass 
along this message, courtesy of  Tracy 
Chapman: ‘‘I’d like to please give Mr Presi-
dent my honest regards. For disregarding me’’. 
This was not the strategy that many 
of  the forerunner countries followed 
when they were developing. The original 
Lead Goose, Britain, did render this 
misleading advice to early latecomers, 
most notably to America. 
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national and continental development ‘Vi-
sions’ with much longer time frames than 5 
years:  20, 30 or even 50 (e.g. AU Agenda 
2063; AU Mining Vision 2050; any number 
of  National Vision 2020s, 2030s or 2040s). 
The temporal boundedness of  a 5-Year Na-
tional Development Plan had an implicit 
‘developmental social contract’ between 
government and citizen embedded in it. A 
government could still promise what it could 
not deliver, but at some risk to its legitimacy, 
prestige, credibility or mandate. The newly 
fashionable ‘national visions’, awash in long 
lists of  worthy goals, have little, if  any, in-
built accountability mechanisms. This is not 
to criticise long term planning (very much 
needed in Africa) or to claim that such ‘vi-
sions’ don’t work (Malaysia’s Vision 2020 
worked just ine). The point is to highlight 
the diference between a ‘substantive na-
tional vision’ and a wish list of  worthy goals 
with an arbitrary timeframe attached to it.
To be successful, a development strategy 
must enjoy some level of  national consen-
sus, broad-based support or degree of  na-
tional legitimacy and ownership that tran-
scends theory, ideology presidential term 
limits and other nationally polarising issues. 
This is likely to ensure that long term stra-
tegic development goals are pursued to their 
desired ends regardless of  changes in gov-
ernment or ideology. This was the case with 
the catching up strategies of  many latecom-
er countries (Germany, USA, Russia/Soviet 
Union, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South 
Korea, China, Malaysia, etc.). In spite of  
internal diferences, these countries rallied 
around their catching up development strat-
egies, often drawing from their ‘best and 
brightest’. By contrast, many African devel-
opment strategies, policies or practices have 
been predicated on excluding entire regions, 
ethnic groups and especially, Africa’s ‘best 
and brightest’. Many political regimes in 
Africa have been too insecure and too ob-
sessed with regime survival to put national 
development priorities irst.  The lack of  a 
competent civil service in much of  Africa 
is partly a deliberate creation of  politically 
weak and insecure regimes, who then have 
the chutzpah to use the ‘lack of  capacity’ ar-
gument as a reason for why their countries 
are poor.
With the exception of  Mauritius and Bot-
swana, national consensus or commitment 
to development priorities has been rare in 
Africa. Commitments by governments of  
the day are often conlated with national 
commitment or broad based consensus. In a 
continent mostly governed by ‘governments 
of  the few, by the few and for the few’ or pa-
tron-client politics based on an ideology of  
ethnic competition, governmental backing 
and national commitment can mean two 
diferent things. While regime stability and 
longevity has ensured some level of  policy 
consistency in some countries, as the expe-
riences of  Felix Houphouet-Boigny’ Cote 
D’Ivoire and Mobutu’s Zaire (Democratic 
Republic of  Congo) have shown, regime 
stability or longevity is a poor substitute for 
national consensus or commitment.
Africa-wide development policy making 
through the African Union/NEPAD (e.g. 
AU Agenda 2063, AU Mining Vision 2050 
etc.) and the internationalization of  devel-
opment policy making (e.g. Millennium De-
velopment Goals/Sustainable Development 
Goals) was supposed to solve for some of  
these problems. Unfortunately, sometimes 
they reinforce these same problems by (a) 
sharing in the listing of  ‘worthy goals’ in-
stead of  hard-nosed development strate-
gizing (b) conferring legitimacy on govern-
ments that cynically embrace the rhetoric 
rather than the substance of  these agenda. 
Before the continent defaults to another 
long list of  worthy goals and long term vi-
sions for which its leaders have neither the 
intentions, will, nor wherewithal to achieve 
– and for which its citizens have no ability, 
inclination or the necessary life expectancy 
to hold governments to account, it might 
do well to critically relect on its substantive 
development opportunities and challenges 
over the next 30 years. 
The national, continental and international 
visions might as well be the right ones. How-
ever, it is going to take more than a wish list 
of  goals or visions for Africa to achieve eco-
nomic development. Africa faces a unique 
set of  opportunities and challenges over the 
next 20-30 years. The opportunities include 
the conditions created by the most recently 
developed economies, including most nota-
bly, China: the inluence of  its un-orthodox 
economic development model; its demand 
for (African) natural resources; its search 
for new destinations of  its ‘outward’ foreign 
direct investment, etc. They also include 
conditions created by forerunner econo-
mies, especially the conluence between glo-
To be successful, a development strategy 
must enjoy some level of national consensus, 
broad-based support or degree of national 
legitimacy and ownership that transcends 
theory, ideology presidential term limits and 
other nationally polarising issues.
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balization, the information revolution, 
and a number of  technologies whose 
applications have the potential to yield 
signiicantly large social, economic and 
ecological dividends in Africa: informa-
tion and communication technologies 
(ICTs); biotechnology and bioinformat-
ics; biomedical sciences and biomedical 
engineering; materials, nanotechnol-
ogy; ‘green’ and ‘low carbon’ technolo-
gies, et cetera. Over the next 20 to 30 
years, Africa faces not only a ‘youth 
bulge’ but also an increasingly educated 
and technologically savvy population. 
If  harnessed efectively, the information 
revolution and the youth bulge could 
result in a ‘double development divi-
denWd’: demographic and digital.
The continent also faces a number of  
challenges. Perhaps the most signiicant 
of  these is the expected impacts of  cli-
mate change. Many African countries 
will confront an economic development 
imperative that has to be met within 
a context of  rising temperatures and 
uncertainty about trends in precipita-
tion. The implications of  all of  this on 
water supplies, crop productivity, food 
security, disease incidence and the re-
silience of  physical and social infra-
structure could be considerable. While 
many economists hold that climate 
change is unlikely to substantially slow 
overall economic growth in Africa over 
the next two decades, most agree that if  
global greenhouse gas emissions remain 
unconstrained by 2050, the impacts of  
climate change are going to become 
more pronounced as a factor in African 
development from that point onwards. 
The implication of  all of  this is that Af-
rican countries have a very small win-
dow of  opportunity within which to 
develop and also to make the necessary 
investments in climate smart and adapt-
able agriculture, energy, cities and resil-
ient infrastructure needed to cope with 
the impacts of  climate change.  Both 
adaptation and mitigation can be costly 
(see Munang and Mgendi in this Maga-
zine). Robert Mendelsohn, examining 
the entire global economy, argues that 
the greatest threat that climate change 
poses to long‐term economic growth 
is from potentially excessive near‐term 
mitigation eforts. (See Robert Mendel-
sohn, 2009. Climate Change and Eco-
nomic Growth, Commission on Growth 
and Development, Working Paper No. 
60). One need not agree with this as-
sessment to recognize that economic 
development within the context of  cli-
mate change entails additional costs and 
warrants national strategic thinking and 
prioritization.
The second challenge to African eco-
nomic development is a changing de-
velopment landscape. Some of  the tools 
used rather efectively by many of  the 
now developed countries might not be 
available to African countries due to 
changes in international trade rules and 
the impacts of  climate change. As Jean 
Claude argues elsewhere in this Maga-
zine, even technology can be a double 
edged sword in African development. 
The same technologies that have the 
potential to catalyse economic growth 
and transformation in Africa, might 
also, under diferent circumstances, 
work against the interests of  the con-
tinent in this respect. Information and 
communications technologies and ‘big 
data’ could be harnessed to accelerate 
economic development in the continent 
or they could be harnessed to impede 
such development. For example, by ena-
bling conspicuous consumption or con-
sumption of  luxury goods, they might 
displace local production and destroy 
local manufacturing capabilities. (South 
Korea did impose controls on the con-
sumption of  luxury goods when it was 
‘developing’ not only to save foreign ex-
change but also to preserve social peace 
and harmony – something the Chinese 
Communist model also practised in dif-
ferent ways until fairly recently).
China is both an opportunity and a 
challenge in terms of  Africa’s devel-
opment. The opportunities it presents 
have been highlighted. There is not 
enough space here to go through the 
potential challenges it poses to Africa’s 
development. Suice it to say that the 
current structure of  trade relations be-
tween China and Africa might not be 
conducive to Africa’s long term devel-
opment, especially the continent’s ef-
forts aimed at economic diversiication. 
Low cost Chinese exports to Africa, 
especially in clothing, apparel, textiles 
and other labour intensive sectors, have 
been depressing or displacing African 
production, in the very sectors that 
some African countries have been try-
ing to develop a comparative advantage 
in. Because of  the many Chinese indus-
trial ‘clusters’ and the numerous (cumu-
lative) beneits that clustering confers, 
many labour intensive businesses are 
unlikely to divest out of  China even if  
labour costs (i.e. wages ) were to rise in 
China. Africa would have to be a lot 
more creative, innovative and strategic 
to wrest the control of  labour intensive 
industries from China. Overall, Africa 
needs a more sophisticated China en-
gagement policy. It would be naïve for 
African countries to view China simply 
as an ‘opportunity’. China is both an 
opportunity and a challenge. A serious 
catching up development strategy in Af-
rica would seek to harness China’s rise 
for Africa’s development whilst mitigat-
ing the negative impacts of  that rise. 
A clear eyed look at both advanced 
economies and recently successful late-
comers would give African countries 
a comprehensive picture of  potential 
opportunities and challenges. Develop-
ment is not linear. There is no compel-
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hat requires countries to set strategic priorities, treat 
time as a limited resource and make the most of  all 
of  Africa’s human, natural and inancial resources. 
African governments need to look ‘inward’ as much 
as they look ‘outward’.  They should stop their obsession with 
what others can do for Africa and preoccupy themselves with 
the question of  what Africa can do for itself. African citizens 
might do well to heed the advice of  John F. Kennedy to Amer-
icans: ‘‘ask not what your country can do for you, ask what 
you can do for your country’’. Thabo Mbeki put this best in 
African terms: ‘‘Surely, there must be politicians and business 
people, youth and women activists, trade unionists, religious 
leaders, artists and professionals from the Cape to Cairo, from 
Madagascar to Cape Verde, who are suiciently enraged by 
Africa’s condition in the world to want to join the mass cru-
sade for Africa’s renewal’’. Thabo Mbeki SABC, Gallagher 
Estate, 13 August 1998.
Ultimately, Africans – leaders, academics, peasants, scien-
tists, teachers, nurses, artists, traders, engineers, lawyers, 
businesspersons, whatever - bear a moral, legal and political 
responsibility for the continent’s development. That is the es-
sence of  independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Ceding the role of  development policy making and practice 
to a select group of  people  - economists, ‘technocrats’, politi-
cians, international development banks, ‘development part-
ners’ or NGOs - is an abdication of  moral, civic and political 
responsibility. It constrains national innovation. It does not 
engender national commitment. Individual African citizens 
– scientists, economists, lawyers, academics, businesspersons 
and philanthropists – are beginning to realize this. Some have 
founded their own mathematical schools or engineering uni-
versities to nurture and unleash the continent’s scientiic, engi-
neering and technological talent. Others have started ‘African 
Schools of  Economics’ or public policy think tanks to open 
up the continent’s policy space to intellectual, methodological 
and ideological contestation. 
While these initiatives are laudable, they are far from sui-
cient. What is needed is a new social contract anchored in 
economic development. It is time for the continent to for-
mulate and implement credible catching up development 
ling reason why African countries must 
not seek to harness high technology and 
knowledge intensive industries for their 
development. This is the fastest growing 
sector of  the global economy today. It 
is the most dynamic technology of  the 
day in the context of  Africa’s develop-
ment. The leading ‘geese’ in many of  
the knowledge or technology sectors are 
still ‘forerunner’ economies.
Efective applications of  some of  these 
technologies could have far reaching 
impacts on some of  Africa’s long run-
ning development challenges: agricul-
tural productivity, food and nutrition se-
curity; water security; access to energy; 
public health, disaster risk preparedness 
and resilience; climate change adap-
tation and mitigation. Many African 
countries have already identiied some 
of  these technologies as ‘strategic’ to 
their development: 
• Information and communications 
technologies (ICTs)
• Biotechnologies and bioinformatics
• Energy technologies
• Biomedical technologies
• Materials, Nano science and nano-
technologies
• Nuclear technologies
As Gabrielle Hecht warns in her arti-
cle elsewhere in this magazine though, 
some of  these technologies, especially 
nuclear, might be ‘yesterday’s future’, 
with considerable costs and challenges 
even in the 21st century. Whatever lead-
ing sectors or technologies that indi-
vidual African countries might ‘select’, 
they would do well to remember that 
technological innovation is a necessary 
but insuicient condition for economic 
development. For it to be successful, it 
needs to be accompanied by compatible 
organizational and institutional innova-
tion. Governance matters. Organiza-
tions also matter. 
THE AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
CLOCK IS TICKING
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strategies. Nothing less would yield 
the many worthy goals embedded in 
many of  the continent’s development 
documents. Millions of  people cannot 
continue to die of  easily preventable 
and curable diseases. Nobody should 
die of  hunger and famine in the 21st 
century. This generation of  Africans 
must not die and leave the continent 
underdeveloped. Enough already. 
50 years of  independence should be 
worth at least this much. 
Economic development is possible. 
Country after country has demon-
strated this over and over again, in 
region after region, over the last 150 
years. In almost every case, it always 
seemed impossible until it was done 
(hence the ‘German Economic Mira-
cle, ‘East Asian Miracle’, ‘Miracle on 
the Han River’, ‘Mauritius Miracle’, 
etc.). In many ways, the history of  the 
world over the last 150 years is a his-
tory of  economic development.  This 
is a point worth emphasizing in Afri-
ca, a continent long plagued by wide-
spread cynicism and an ‘impossibility 
complex’ mentality – notwithstanding 
occasional bouts of  Afro-optimism 
such as the current ‘Africa rising’ nar-
rative. It is also important to note that 
with the exception of  Britain, every 
single country that has industrialized 
has faced its share of  sceptics and 
naysayers. Africa commands no mo-
nopoly here. 
There are no ‘miracles’ in economic 
development. Economic development 
is an entirely rational and practical 
process. It is driven by technological, 
organizational and institutional in-
novations. There is a reason Ha-Joon 
Chang keeps saying that the South 
Korean development experience was 
led by engineers - not economists. It is 
engineers who build the products and 
services (e.g. infrastructure, equip-
ment, tools, machines etc.) whose ap-
plications ultimately lead to food, en-
ergy and water security; public health 
and sanitation; waste disposal and 
environmental clean-up; sustainable 
transport, climate adaptation and 
mitigation, etc. Arguably, no profes-
sion has made greater contribution 
to global economic development and 
poverty reduction than engineering. 
However, as engineers such as Ber-
nard Amadei have warned, ‘good 
engineering’ needs ‘good policy’ for 
development to work. ‘Good engi-
neering’ cannot substitute for ‘bad 
policy’. In the absence of  ‘good pol-
icy’, engineering can exacerbate the 
impacts of  ‘bad policy’. For example, 
engineering solutions that do not take 
into consideration underlying social, 
economic and political conditions are 
ultimately unsustainable. The process 
of  economic development requires 
economists, engineers, doctors, soci-
ologists, anthropologists, et cetera. In 
many African countries, economists 
(typically of  the neoclassical school 
of  thought) tend to have an out-
sized role in this process. This might 
be counterproductive. At any rate, it 
does not amount to making the most 
of  a country’s ‘best and brightest’.
In spite of  considerable and often 
heated and ideologically tinged de-
bates, we know quite a bit about the 
process of  economic development. As 
examples of  all successful latecomer 
countries show, economic develop-
ment requires the creation of  ‘dy-
namic comparative advantage’. Any 
country can acquire any ‘capabilities’ 
by invention, innovation, imitation, 
difusion, transfer, evolution or crea-
tive destruction. 
The state, markets, civil society, poli-
tics and culture (or collectively, insti-
tutions) as well as policy, technology, 
innovation, and leadership (i.e. politi-
cal will) all play a central role in this 
process. As Irma Alderman has ar-
gued: ‘‘The development process en-
tails continual, coordinated change in 
many aspects of  the economy, society 
and polity: production patterns and 
technology; social development; eco-
nomic, social and political institutions; 
and patterns of  human development. 
Creative evolution, redirection and 
destruction constitute the essence of  
successful economic development’’. 
http://www.un.org/esa/fd/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2007/11/20071116_
IrmaAdelman.pdf
It follows from the foregoing that eco-
nomic development is not inevitable. 
The African (sustainable) develop-
ment clock is ticking. The time for the 
continent to put in place its develop-
ment strategies is now. The time for 
leadership in African economic devel-
opment is now. The time to harness 
science, technology and innovation 
for accelerated sustainable develop-
ment in Africa is now. This is no time 
to Kick Back, Relax and Wait for the 
Invisible Hand of  the Market to Work 
its Magic for African Development. 
There are no 
‘miracles’ in 
economic 
development. 
Economic 
development is 
an entirely rational 
and practical 
process. It is driven 
by technological, 
organizational 
and institutional 
innovations. 
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GETTING AFRICA READY 
FOR THE “DIGITAL” SDGS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
United Nations
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Africa has made great progress in the past decade, saving and 
improving lives on an unprecedented scale. The United Nations has 
supported the African development agenda in a number ways, including 
by working closely with the African Union and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
A
frican leaders have been 
strong proponents of  using 
science, technology and in-
novation as one of  the pillars 
of  their eforts to achieve the Millenni-
um Development Goals, the framework 
that has guided us since the year 2000. 
It was Liberian President Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf  and the co-Chairs of  the Post-
2015 High Level Panel that irst stated 
the need for a “data revolution” in sus-
tainable development. Last year, my 
Independent Expert Advisory Group 
on the Data Revolution -- with strong 
representation from Africa -- highlight-
ed various ways in which new technolo-
gies can assist (www.undatarevolution.
org), and noted that “Data are the life-
blood of  decision-making and the raw 
material for accountability. Without 
high-quality data providing the right 
information on the right things at the 
right time to the right people; designing, 
monitoring and evaluating efective pol-
icies becomes almost impossible”. The 
work of  the Committee of  Experts on 
the African Data Consensus, supported 
by the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa, has also been a further impor-
tant contribution (www.uneca.org/da-
tarevolution).
As a result of  the eforts to monitor the 
MDGs, we know much more about 
the state of  the world and of  Africa in 
particular.  But huge data and knowl-
edge gaps remain. With the imminent 
adoption of  a post-2015 development 
agenda, including a set of  Sustainable 
Development Goals, investments in 
data systems must be a priority as Africa 
and the world pursue economic trans-
formation for inclusive development. 
And given the breadth and depth of  the 
new agenda, traditional statistics will 
need to be complemented by and, even-
tually, integrated with non-traditional 
statistics.
Some claim that the data revolution will 
only increase the digital divide between 
developed and developing countries, 
since the latter do not have the neces-
sary technology to beneit. Others argue 
that the revolution will happen mainly 
in continents like Africa, which has ex-
perienced an exponential increase in 
the use of  information and communi-
cations technologies and is not bound 
by traditional ways of  generating and 
using data. Research conducted by the 
UN Department for Economic and So-
cial Afairs for the Global Sustainable 
Development Report 2015 (http://sus-
tainabledevelopment.un.org/globals-
dreport.html) shows that African coun-
tries are already using ICTs to collect 
and disseminate data in ways not seen 
in wealthier countries: birth registra-
tions through mobile phones and SMS; 
the monitoring of  medicine stocks; the 
mapping of  water points; the assess-
ment of  land potential and vulnerabil-
ity; and reporting on disease outbreaks 
such as Ebola.  
Geospatial technology is also part of  
the picture, and has been used to take 
agricultural and population censuses, to 
compile land information and to moni-
tor the low of  the River Nile.  Several 
African countries have launched their 
own satellites. 
The potential of  big data – massive data 
sets from satellite images, social media, 
online commercial transactions and cell 
phone records, among others – has gen-
erated much discussion. Africa is lagging 
behind in this area, but not necessarily 
for lack of  availability of  big data, as cell 
phone records are becoming a massive 
data source across the continent. Some 
of  the applications are showing prom-
ising results. Cell phone records have 
been used to produce estimates of  pov-
erty, literacy rates and food expenses; 
to determine travelling patterns to bet-
ter manage public transportation; for 
malaria prevention and for estimating 
population lows to inform the Ebola 
response in West Africa.  Privacy con-
cerns and conidentiality issues must be 
addressed as African countries take ad-
vantage of  these new possibilities.
These and other novel approaches are 
laying the basis for efective monitoring 
of  the Sustainable Development Goals 
in Africa. It will be crucial to move from 
mostly ad-hoc exercises implemented in 
one or a few African countries, to more 
systematic undertakings. In addition, 
many of  the applications have been pro-
duced by researchers and experts from 
developed countries, and it is unclear if  
enough knowledge is being transmitted 
and capacity is being built for African 
countries to continue these applications 
on their own in the medium and long 
term. 
For a successful monitoring of  the 
SDGs in Africa, two factors will be key. 
First, each country will have to make a 
frank assessment of  what its data needs 
are and identify which innovations can 
better respond to those needs. Second, 
strong domestic political commitment 
will be needed to bring together the 
necessary inancial, human and tech-
nological resources. Countries will also 
need access to independent advice on 
new technologies and tools and their 
relative strengths and drawbacks. The 
international community should be 
encouraged to create a catalogue of  in-
novations with users’ reviews to inform 
countries on diferent alternatives. Such 
a catalogue could also provide informa-
tion on the extent to which freely avail-
able innovations are an adequate substi-
tute for commercial ones. 
My Global Pulse initiative has been 
helping the United Nations improve 
data literacy since 2009.  Global Pulse 
brings together partners from academ-
ia, public sector and business to explore 
new ways to monitor and plan devel-
opment programmes by leveraging big 
data. The Global Pulse innovation lab 
in Kampala models new approaches to 
better monitor the efects of  epidemics, 
natural disasters and other problems 
that afect the people of  Uganda and 
elsewhere.  Kampala is just one of  sev-
eral booming data, technology and in-
novation communities in Africa, among 
which are the UNICEF Innovation 
Hub and the iHub in Nairobi. Indeed, 
many mobile technology innovations, 
including mobile money, were born in 
Africa, and have global potential.
Access to the latest science, technology 
and innovations will be crucial to moni-
tor and achieve the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals.  The United Nations 
looks forward to supporting the people 
of  Africa in realizing our shared goals 
of  peace, development, human rights 
and lives of  dignity for all. 
*Ban Ki-Moon is the Secretary General of  the 
United Nations
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LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA 
FOR AFRICA’S ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION
Dr Elsje Fourie
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 
University of Maastricht
W
ith increasing fre-
quency, policymakers 
from states as diverse 
as Nigeria, South Af-
rica and Senegal are mooting plans 
to draw lessons either from individual 
countries in East and Southeast Asia 
or from the region as a whole.  Often, 
the developmental state in particular 
is evoked as a model that can be ab-
stracted from its geographical origins 
and implemented in a new locale. 
When Rwandan President Paul Kag-
ame recently referred to his coun-
try as the ‘Singapore of  Africa’ and 
pledged to emulate the late Lee Kuan 
Yew’s eforts to transform Singapore 
into one of  the world’s wealthiest 
and most modern states in the space 
of  two generations, he was therefore 
echoing similar pronouncements 
from leaders across the continent.
In the midst of  such discourses, it is 
often di cult to understand what 
these East Asian models actually look 
like when they ‘land’ on African soil. 
What inluence do they actually have 
on policy and practice? Why are cer-
tain models chosen over others? In 
attempting to answer these questions, 
my own research has focused on two 
very diferent cases, namely Kenya 
and Ethiopia.  Drawing on analysis 
of  key policy documents, as well as 
on over 90 interviews with business 
leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and 
community representatives, I found 
that certain groups of  inluential 
Ethiopians and Kenyans have indeed 
attempted to draw concrete lessons 
from East Asia’s own history of  rapid 
and transformative economic devel-
opment. Despite signiicant difer-
ences between the two cases, leaders 
from both countries view this region 
as the best contemporary example of  
state-guided modernisation, in which 
technocratic elites insulated from 
societal and political pressures were 
able to use rapid economic growth, 
physical infrastructure and market-
friendly industrial policy to drive for-
ward an ambitious project of  societal 
transformation.  The result has been 
policies such as Kenya’s Vision 2030 
and Ethiopia’s Growth and Trans-
formation Plan, both of  which aim 
to adapt elements of  East Asia’s ‘suc-
cesses’ to local contexts.
East Asian lessons can, if  suitably 
indigenised, have a positive impact 
in countries such as Ethiopia and 
Kenya.  However, my indings have 
also indicated a number of  gaps and 
misunderstandings in the lesson-
drawing process. The development 
stories of  most high-performing 
Asian economies centre on the struc-
tural transformation that both fuelled 
and lowed from these countries’ eco-
nomic growth. In countries like South 
Korea, Taiwan and China, many 
scholars agree, investment in the ag-
ricultural sector and reform of  the 
land tenure system led to spill overs 
in technology and labour that facili-
tated the creation of  a manufacturing 
sector. In turn, this industrialisation 
created the revenue and widespread 
employment that enabled investment 
in public goods such as universal edu-
cation and healthcare.
Despite this emerging scholarly con-
sensus, many African policymakers 
seem to believe that they can circum-
vent this step in their emulation of  
East Asia.   The late Meles Zenawi 
expressed great interest in loosely fol-
lowing the East Asian experience of  
structural transformation, and, as my 
research has demonstrated, was able 
to successfully disseminate this mes-
sage throughout the ruling party. To 
this end, Ethiopia’s strategy of  Ag-
ricultural Development Led Indus-
trialisation (ADLI) was formulated 
in the 1990s with the experiences of  
South Korea and Taiwan in mind. As 
in these countries, ADLI has entailed 
signiicant investments in agricultural 
extension, deined by the World Bank 
in 2004 as “the delivery of  informa-
tion inputs to farmers”; it has also 
entailed a prioritisation of  rural in-
frastructure and smallholders that has 
Keen observers of  sub-Saharan Africa will have lately noticed a 
marked increase in expressions of  interest in East Asian ‘models’ of  
development among the region’s policymakers.  
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been unusual in Africa.  Yet ADLI is be-
ing increasingly abandoned in favour of  
a new policy of  large-scale commercial 
agriculture, in which foreign investors 
lease large tracts of  land and produce 
commodities for the export market. Ac-
cording to the Oakland Institute, an 
area roughly the size of  France has al-
ready been leased in this manner, with 
an area twice this size earmarked for 
future investment.  Instead of  creating 
the kind of  smallholder-oriented, pro-
poor development that will free labour 
and technology for the creation of  an 
industrial sector, this is likely merely to 
lead to the displacement of  peasants 
and the growth of  a precarious informal 
sector.  Structural transformation works 
best when the domestic agricultural and 
industrial sectors are closely linked, and 
such developments sever that link.
One argument in favour of  commer-
cial farming in Ethiopia holds that 
it was only permitted to occur once 
ADLI had been shown to be inefec-
tive. And indeed, Ethiopia’s rural pro-
ductivity is still woefully low, more than 
two decades after the introduction of  
ADLI.  In Ethiopia, however, all land 
remains state-owned, depriving farmers 
of  incentives to invest in the land on a 
long-term basis.  In addition, the ruling 
party maintains a tight grip on farmers 
through the kebele system, making ex-
tension services and access to resources 
such as fertiliser conditional on politi-
cal support. This again is contrary to 
the East Asian experience: in both 
South Korea and Taiwan, agricultural 
development really took of only once 
rural reforms allowed smallholders to 
purchase and cultivate their own plots 
of  land.  This has not, of  course, been 
the case in China, but even there those 
peasants from Xiaogang village who fa-
mously inspired Deng’s reforms in 1978 
by breaking free from party strictures 
were rewarded, not punished, for their 
eforts. This strongly suggests that small-
holders need land, investment from the 
government, and the freedom to decide 
how best to use these resources in order 
to aid structural transformation.
Kenya, too, is missing an opportunity 
in its emulation of  East Asia.  Virtually 
all of  the foreign advisors who sat on 
Mwai Kibaki’s elite advisory body, the 
National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC), hailed from East Asia. It was 
this region that NESC used as inspira-
tion in putting together Vision 2030, 
which aims to transform Kenya into 
a middle-income country much in the 
same way that Malaysia’s Vision 2020 
was held to have done since 1991.  But 
Kenyan technocrats’ two preferred 
models in East Asia—Malaysia and 
Singapore—are hardly the region’s best 
examples of  structural transformation 
and pro-poor agricultural development. 
As a tiny port city, Singapore never had 
to face the challenge of  incorporating 
a large, poor, rural population into its 
economy.  This stands in marked con-
trast to Kenya, where, according to the 
World Bank, three-quarters of  the pop-
ulation makes at least some part of  their 
living from agriculture.  Relying on 
Singapore as a model carries the risk of  
exacerbating the urban bias from which 
Kenya has been sufering since the colo-
nial era; it also threatens to privilege a 
service sector in which economic growth 
is often jobless and which beneits main-
ly the urban elite. As the example of  In-
dia cautions us, rapid economic growth 
without structural transformation can 
leave vast swathes of  a country behind. 
With the best eforts of  Kenyan techno-
crats, parts of  Nairobi may conceivably 
one day resemble Singapore, but what 
of  the rest of  the country?
Malaysia does have a large rural popu-
lation, but it, too, has not achieved the 
kind of  broad-based development asso-
ciated with the East Asian developmen-
tal states.  While Malaysia has been suc-
cessful in diversifying its economy and 
improving the living standards of  large 
numbers of  its citizens, its agricultural 
sector remains highly dependent on a 
small number of  exported cash crops. 
In 2005, a full 63% of  agricultural land 
use was given over to the cultivation of  
palm oil.  This creates problems with 
food suiciency—Malaysia must import 
many dietary staples.  
Malaysia’s use of  cash crops also relies 
on a landholder/estate model of  agri-
culture that does not necessarily lead to 
efective poverty alleviation. It may do 
so if  revenues from this sector are chan-
nelled back into social programmes and 
invested in poor areas.  This has hap-
pened to some extent in Malaysia, but 
inequality persists.  The GINI coei-
cient is considered by many to be one of  
the most reliable measures of  inequality 
within a country. According to the CIA 
World Fact book, Malaysia’s GINI coef-
icient in 2009 was actually higher than 
Kenya’s in 2008, translating into greater 
inequality in the former.  Much of  this 
wealth divide is also an urban-rural di-
vide, and the country’s large population 
of  migrant farm labourers—many of  
whom are often employed illegally and 
face very harsh conditions—is particu-
larly afected.  If  even Malaysia’s agri-
cultural model faces such problems, is 
it really suitable for Kenya, which al-
ready grows cash crops like cofee, tea 
and lowers on large estates and has a 
far worse track record of  wealth redis-
tribution?
It is understandable that Kenya’s lead-
ers would seek out models—Singapore 
with its strong service sector, Malaysia 
with its mixed economy and commer-
cial approach to agriculture—that al-
ready resemble their own country in 
many ways.  It is equally understandable 
that Ethiopia’s ruling party should try 
to balance its longstanding emulation 
of  South Korea, China and Taiwan’s 
agricultural development-led industri-
alisation with the new opportunities 
ofered by foreign investors.  Singapore 
and Malaysia may have other, more spe-
ciic lessons for Kenya.  And Ethiopia 
would indeed not be able to emulate 
its preferred East Asian models whole-
sale, as important elements of  Taiwan, 
China and South Korea’s land reform 
processes stem from rather speciic his-
torical circumstances.
These considerations notwithstanding, 
current trends are taking both Ethio-
pia and Kenya further along the path 
towards the large-scale commercialisa-
tion of  agriculture and therefore away 
from the classic East Asian model, even 
as leaders in each country ironically 
profess to be looking to this region for 
lessons.  African policymakers may de-
cide that this classic model is too dif-
icult to follow, given the continent’s 
own historical legacy and structural 
constraints. Or they may decide to fo-
cus on the key aspects of  this model, 
even if  outcomes will necessarily not be 
identical.  There is no getting away from 
the fact, however, that these key aspects 
entail initial investments in smallholder 
agriculture and rural development, long 
before manufacturing becomes a prior-
ity and even longer before the service 
sector receives attention.  There can be 
no ‘Singapore of  Africa’, ‘South Korea 
of  Africa’, or ‘Japan of  Africa’—if  this 
indeed is what Africans from all walks 
of  life want—without this essential in-
gredient.   
* For a more detailed discussion of  indings, 
see: E. Fourie. 2015. “China’s Example for 
Meles’ Ethiopia: When development ‘models’ 
land”. Journal of  Modern African Studies 
53(3) (forthcoming in August); also E. Fourie. 
2014. “Model Students: Policy Emulation, 
Modernization and Kenya’s Vision 2030”. 
African Afairs 113(453), pp. 540-563.
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Two decades of  strong economic expansion have raised expectations of  Africa’s 
emergence.  But to achieve this, African countries will need to accelerate growth 
and economic transformation, and make growth more inclusive. 
GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA
Punam Chuhan-Pole
World Bank Group
S
ub Saharan African countries 
have been enjoying two dec-
ades of  sustained economic ex-
pansion. The region’s economy 
grew at an average annual rate of  4.4 
percent in 1995-2014, comparable to 
that of  the rest of  the developing world. 
This growth performance represents a 
remarkable turnaround from the sub-
par pace of  expansion (annual growth 
of  less than 1.5 percent) of  the previ-
ous 20 years.  A notable feature of  Af-
rica’s growth is that it has been broad 
based, although there is considerable 
cross-country variation, with resource-
rich countries growing substantially 
faster than non resource-rich countries. 
Thanks to robust growth, the region’s 
aggregate output has more than dou-
bled in real terms since 1995, and was 
over $1.6 trillion in 2013.  Recent rebas-
ing of  national accounts in several large 
countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, 
suggest that the region’s actual GDP 
might be undercounted by a substantial 
amount. 
Overall, the region now boasts 22 mid-
dle-income countries, and by 2025, an-
other 10 countries could join these ranks 
(Devarajan and Fengler 2013).  Africa’s 
middle-income countries are home to 
over 40 percent of  the region’s popula-
tion and account for around 80 percent 
of  its output (Chuhan-Pole 2014).  Re-
lecting the dynamism of  the region, a 
handful of  African countries—Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zam-
bia—have joined the ranks of  the so-
called frontier markets or the next set of  
emerging markets.  
The quality of  growth raises 
some concerns
Looking beyond GDP growth, there are 
some less impressive aspects of  Africa’s 
growth story.  First, on a per capita basis, 
output growth has been far from stellar. 
Rapid population growth (2.65 percent 
a year), underpinned by fertility rates 
that are the highest of  any developing 
region, has translated into a moderate 
pace of  per capita GDP growth, aver-
aging 1.8 percent a year in 1995-2014. 
This is a much slower pace than the 4.4 
percent growth rate for the economy as 
a whole.  Thus, measured in real terms, 
per capita income has only increased by 
40 percent during this period. 
While Africa’s 20 years of  sustained 
output growth have reversed the income 
decline of  the lost decades of  the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s, the pace of  per 
capita output growth has been below 
that of  other developing countries.  In 
short, on a per capita basis, growth did 
not converge to the average for other de-
veloping countries.  Again, there is vari-
ation across the region’s countries, with 
resource-rich countries posting much 
higher per capita income growth than 
non resource-rich countries.  Overall, 
however, convergence of  income levels 
with emerging market and more devel-
oped economies will require a substan-
tial acceleration of  per capita income 
growth.  
Africa’s rise
23 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
Second, despite sustained growth, 
which is central to moving people out 
of  poverty, poverty has remained stub-
bornly high in Africa.  The incidence 
of  extreme poverty (using the interna-
tional standard of  under $1.25 per day 
on 2005 PPP basis) fell from nearly 60 
percent in 1993 to around 47 percent 
in 2011.  Moreover, because of  popu-
lation growth, the number of  people 
living in poverty actually increased to 
nearly 420 million in 2011.  The pace 
of  poverty reduction in Africa has been 
too slow, and lagging relative to other 
regions.  Consequently, the region has 
achieved only 35 percent of  the Mil-
lennium Development Goals poverty 
target of  halving the proportion of  peo-
ple living in extreme poverty (between 
1990 and 2015), while globally this tar-
get has already been met.  The region 
is also lagging on non-income welfare 
measures--such as child and maternal 
mortality--of  the MDGs.  Progress on 
human development outcomes needs to 
be ramped up to converge with levels in 
more developed countries. 
Weak progress on poverty reduction is 
partly due to rapid population growth, 
which slowed output expansion in per 
capita terms (as explained above), and 
partly because growth itself  has not suf-
iciently beneited the poor.  The pace 
of  poverty reduction depends not only 
on the rate of  economic expansion but 
also, critically, on how the gains from 
growth are distributed.  Indeed, the esti-
mated average growth elasticity of  pov-
erty in Africa is -0.7, compared with the 
developing country average of  around 
-2.0 (Christiaensen, Chuhan-Pole, and 
Sanoh 2014).  This means that growth 
in Africa has one-third the impact on 
reducing poverty, compared to growth 
in other developing countries.  
Third, Africa’s pattern of  growth has 
been uneven across sectors, and it has 
been associated with little structural 
transformation.  Historically, develop-
ment has been underpinned by struc-
tural transformation out of  agriculture 
and into modern sectors such as manu-
facturing.  But Africa’s structural trans-
formation process has been diferent, 
with a shift out of  agriculture and into 
services (mostly in the informal sector), 
and bypassing manufacturing.  Under-
standably, Africa’s pattern of  growth 
has raised concerns over the sustainabil-
ity of  this growth.  
Pattern of  growth and struc-
tural transformation
Two decades of  rapid growth have 
transformed the economic structure of  
the regional economy and shifted the 
sectoral composition of  output.  A de-
composition of  this growth by broad sec-
tors—agriculture, industry, services—
shows that the fastest-growing sector 
was services, which includes wholesale 
and retail trade, banking, transport, and 
public services.  According to Africa’s 
Pulse (volume 10), per capita growth of  
this sector averaged 2.6 percent per year 
in 1995-2011.  Growth of  the industry 
sector was much lower at 1.7 percent, 
while agricultural per capita growth 
lagged substantially at 0.9 percent.  A 
closer look at the industry sector, which 
includes mining, manufacturing, con-
struction, and utilities, suggests that in-
dustrial growth has largely been driven 
by natural resources.  Manufacturing 
has scarcely taken of in the region. 
Spurred by the region’s resource boom, 
industry has, thus, contributed 25 per-
cent to the cumulative growth in GDP 
per capita during this period; services 
contributed the most with 62 percent, 
and agriculture’s contribution was a 
paltry 13 percent.
Disparities in sectoral growth rates have 
changed the structure of  Africa’s econo-
mies, with some unexpected trends. 
The share of  the services sector in out-
put has grown, and that of  agriculture 
has declined.  Africa’s Pulse (Volume 10) 
inds that between 1995 and 2011, the 
relative size of  the services sector has 
Panorama of sea port, Casablanca - Morocco
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grown from 49 percent of  GDP to 55 
percent.  A troubling trend, however, is 
the decline in industry’s share in GDP, 
from 33 percent to 30 percent over 
this period.  Within the industry sector 
there are divergent trends.  Speciically, 
the share of  “other industry” (which in-
cludes mining) has risen sharply, thanks 
to the region’s boom in natural resourc-
es, while the share of  manufacturing 
shrank to under 10 percent.  There are 
some exceptions to the regional trend 
of  gain in services sector’s share and 
declining shares of  agriculture and in-
dustry.  For example, in Mauritania, 
the Republic of  Congo, and Guinea, 
industry (which is heavily reliant on 
extractives) accounted for all of  the cu-
mulative growth since 1995.  In a few 
countries, such as Burundi, Liberia, 
and the Central African Republic, ag-
riculture has been the largest driver of  
growth.
While the growing importance of  ser-
vices in the region is not exceptional, 
Africa’s pattern of  growth difers from 
that in other developing countries in 
notable ways.  One important difer-
ence is that per capita growth in in-
dustry in other developing countries is 
much higher than in Africa, and com-
parable to the pace of  expansion in 
services.  This has translated into a ris-
ing share of  industry in output in these 
countries.  In addition, manufacturing 
has maintained its share in output in 
other developing countries.  
Africa’s exports also show little evidence 
of  diversiication, reinforcing the narra-
tive of  limited structural transforma-
tion. Typically, as poor countries devel-
op, there tends to be a diversiication of  
exports away from commodities and to-
ward better quality of  existing products 
or new products.  This diversiication 
supports structural transformation.  But 
Africa’s exports remain concentrated 
in a narrow set of  products.  Moreover, 
the region remains heavily reliant on 
resource-based exports, and the share 
of  primary commodities in total exports 
is high, at 75 percent.  Within primary 
commodities, fuels and metals have 
gained share and agricultural com-
modities have declined.  In addition, the 
number of  new products that have been 
exported remains low.
A changing economic structure is likely 
to impact jobs.  For developing countries, 
this means that the share of  agriculture 
generally declines with rising GDP per 
capita and that of  services and indus-
try increases.  Evidence on trends in 
employment and jobs in Africa suggests 
that labor share in agriculture has de-
clined and that the movement of  work-
ers has been out of  this sector and into 
services, not manufacturing (de Vries et 
al. 2012, and McMillan and Harttgen, 
2014).  Notwithstanding these shifts, 
nearly 60 percent of  Africa’s workers 
continue to be employed in agriculture, 
even though this sector accounts for less 
than one-sixth of  output (Africa’s Pulse 
Volume 10).  Moreover, agriculture em-
ploys an overwhelmingly large number 
of  poor workers (nearly 80 percent). 
Overall, most Africans continue to earn 
livelihoods in the traditional economy 
or the informal sector—non wage jobs 
in farming and small household enter-
prises.  In other developing countries, 
by contrast, labor is more evenly dis-
tributed across sectors, with agriculture 
accounting for under 40 percent of  em-
ployment.  
Is Africa’s growth momen-
tum sustainable?
Africa’s pattern of  growth raises con-
cerns about the sustainability of  growth. 
The process of  structural change in 
Africa has been diferent from that of  
other countries, and not the kind of  
transformation that was expected.  Ac-
cording to the standard literature on 
structural transformation, as economies 
develop, there is a reallocation of  re-
sources across sectors, causing labor to 
shift from low-productivity sec-
tors and jobs to high-productivity 
ones.  For poor countries, this has 
typically meant a shift out of  tra-
ditional sectors and activities such 
as agriculture to modern sectors 
such as manufacturing—as in 
East Asia’s growth take-of.  By 
contrast, the experience of  Af-
rican countries has been one of  
declining shares in GDP of  both 
agriculture and manufacturing. 
While the services sector—formal 
and informal—has been absorb-
ing workers and capital in most 
countries, much of  the growth 
in services has been in low-pro-
ductivity activities in the informal 
sector.  
The overall lack of  industrializa-
tion in Africa’s boom has raised 
concerns over the sustainability 
of  this growth.  There is much 
debate on whether sustainable 
growth in the region requires a shift 
in favor of  manufacturing, or whether 
such growth can be achieved by moving 
up the quality ladder in sectors where 
countries currently enjoy a comparative 
advantage.  An example of  the latter 
would be moving from a mere produc-
tion of  raw materials to both production 
and processing of  these raw materials. 
Advances in information communica-
tion technology suggest another poten-
tial path to sustainable growth—that is, 
a shift into high-productivity modern 
services (such as software development, 
call centers, and outsourced business 
processes), as experienced by India.  
Analysis of  labor productivity growth 
for 16 countries for the period 1995-
2009 inds that the shift in labor across 
sectors accounted on average for around 
half  of  the overall growth in labor pro-
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ductivity during this period (Mcmillan 
and Harttgen 2014).  The remaining 
was from intra-sector productivity im-
provements.  Of  course, there is sub-
stantial variation in the contribution of  
structural change to productivity across 
countries.  For instance, in Mauritius, 
most of  this growth was from produc-
tivity gains within the modern services 
sector, and not from intersectoral re al-
location of  labor.  In Uganda, shifts out 
of  agriculture into non farm activities in 
both rural and urban areas accounted 
for all of  the growth in labor productiv-
ity (Christiaensen and Kaminski 2014). 
Some countries actually experienced 
a decline in labor productivity.  Over-
all, the results suggest scope for growth 
from intersectoral labor re allocation, as 
well as from moving to the productivity 
frontier within sectors.
The challenge of  more inclu-
sive growth, and the role for 
structural transformation
Sustainable development requires both 
rapid and inclusive growth.  While Af-
rica’s growth has been strong, slow pov-
erty reduction implies that this growth 
has not been very inclusive. But is struc-
tural transformation out of  agriculture, 
in particular to more manufacturing 
and modern sectors, the answer?  For 
growth to be inclusive, irst and fore-
most, this means that growth will need 
to take place in the sectors and places 
where the poor are enabling the poor 
to make a larger direct contribution to 
growth.  In particular, this means rais-
ing productivity in sectors that provide a 
livelihood for the poor.  Since poor peo-
ple are generally concentrated in rural 
areas and are engaged in agriculture, 
promoting growth in agriculture is an 
obvious place to start.  
Agricultural productivity is disappoint-
ingly low (though improving) in Africa, 
and well below levels in other develop-
ing regions.  Lifting agricultural produc-
tivity is a priority, and there is consider-
able potential for public policy in terms 
of  improving access to and functioning 
of  agricultural input and output mar-
kets; bringing better irrigation services 
and production techniques to farmers; 
and strengthening rural infrastructure. 
An appreciation that not all agricultural 
growth is equally poverty reducing, is 
relevant to the policy debate on poverty 
reduction.  For example, growth that 
positively afects smallholder staple crop 
productivity as opposed to exports has 
been found to be more poverty reducing 
(Diao, Thurlow, and Fan 2012).  Unde-
niably, robust evidence will need to in-
form the policy debate and choices.
But boosting agricultural productivity 
alone will not suice.  It will be impor-
tant to foster processes that enable oc-
cupational shifts from lower-productiv-
ity jobs to higher-productivity ones.  In 
short, it will be important to promote 
rural income diversiication, that is, 
nonagricultural rural activity.  Evidence 
suggests that jobs that are generated 
nearby to agricultural activity—that 
is, in the rural economy, either on the 
farm, or in rural and secondary towns, 
are particularly efective in reducing 
poverty (Christiaensen, De Weerdt, 
and Todo 2013).  A recent World Bank 
study on youth employment in Africa 
(Filmer and Fox 2013) concludes that 
the region’s jobs will continue to be in 
the informal sector for some time.  Since 
“informal will be normal” in many of  
the region’s developing countries, pub-
lic policy in these countries will be well 
served by focusing on lifting productiv-
ity of  informal household enterprises, 
especially through investments in rural 
public goods, such as education, health, 
transport, electricity, and ICT.  
Finally, Africa needs to grow its mod-
ern sector—both manufacturing and 
services.  African manufacturing is con-
strained by a number of  well-known 
structural factors.  Among these are: an 
acute skills gap of  labor, and the need 
to build human capital for the 21st cen-
tury; infrastructure deiciencies, espe-
cially access to reliable and afordable 
electrical power; high transport costs 
and trading costs, which weigh heav-
ily on the region’s competitiveness; and 
costly market regulations that discour-
age completion.  All these factors weigh 
down heavily on the competitiveness of  
Africa’s manufacturing sector. 
Growth and structural change will dis-
rupt livelihoods of  some, and gains may 
be spread unevenly.  To make growth 
more inclusive will, thus, also require 
redistributing the gains from growth 
taking place elsewhere for the beneit of  
the poor.  There is much scope for do-
ing this in mineral-rich countries, where 
extractive activities have little backward 
linkages with the local economy.  Social 
safety nets and cash transfers can be ef-
fective in redistributing the gains from 
growth.  Although social protection 
mechanisms have increased in number 
and size, there is substantial variation 
in scope and coverage across African 
countries.  Clearly, redistribution alone 
will not suice to eliminate poverty and 
boost shared prosperity.  This will re-
quire high and sustained growth.
In conclusion, Africa’s emergence re-
quires accelerating growth and making 
this growth more inclusive.  As we dis-
cussed above, there is much scope for 
policy to address the key constraints to 
sustainable development. 
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Cooperation
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Introduction
The South Korean economic development story is of  great interest to 
many developing countries. Until the early 1960s, South Korea was among the 
poorest countries in the world. Arguably, its ‘initial development conditions’ 
were worse than those of  many countries in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA). Over 60 
percent of  its population lived below the poverty line and its life expectancy 
was 57 years. Agriculture constituted more than 40 percent of  its GDP and 
employed 60 percent of  its labour force.
However, within a generation, the country had transformed itself  into a 
‘Newly Industrialized Country (NIC). From an agricultural based economy in 
the 1960s, the country is today a technology and knowledge driven economy. 
By 2014, South Korea had become the 13th largest in the world. Its GDP per 
capita stands at USD 28,739.
Korea’s 5 Major Export Commodities in 2014(US$ billion)
Year Electronics 
goods
Automobile Computers and 
Machinery
Chemical
Products
Shipbuilding
2014 138.23 73.3 63.0 52.4 46.7
2010 110.8 53.4 52.0 32.6 38.3
Source: Korea Statistics Oice (2015)
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How did she do it? The government of  Park Jung Hee launched the country’s structural transformation strategy in 
1962 with the irst Five-year Economic De-
velopment Plan. A labour-intensive, export-
oriented industrialization (i.e. e.g. textiles, 
light industries) and poverty eradication 
topped the agenda of  this plan. The plan 
sought to promote exports in selected stra-
tegic industries. This included the establish-
ment of  performance targets (e.g. exports, 
technological upgrading). The irst ive year 
development plan was succeeded by succes-
sive 5-year development plans, each focusing 
on diferent priority industries. The 1973-
1978 Development Plan (Heavy Chemical 
Industrialization) focused on the promotion 
of  heavy and chemical industries. Capital 
intensive industries such as iron and steel, 
chemical, shipbuilding, and automobile were 
given priority in the 1970s. Investments went 
into the manufacture of  steel, non-ferrous 
metals, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics 
and chemicals. The government introduced 
special interest loans, export subsidies and 
other tax incentives for export industries. 
The Korean strategy has been characterized 
as ‘Outward Looking or Export Oriented 
Industrialization (EOI). The export sector 
has been a driving force of  South Korea’s 
development. Earnings from exports allowed 
the country to import industrial raw materi-
als, capital goods and foreign technologies. 
The country transitioned from exporting 
mainly primary products such as minerals 
(in the 1960s) to low technology, labour in-
tensive products such as textile in the 1970s 
and to more to more sophisticated industrial 
products (e.g. semi-conductors, ICTs) from 
the 1980s onwards. Many of  the industries 
that were promoted under this policy remain 
competitive today. These include: petro-
chemicals, iron, steel and ship building, and 
automobile industries are some of  the best 
examples. (Consider that South Korea does 
not have oil for example).
The Korean economy became more liberal-
ized and integrated into the world economy 
in the 1990s. The country joined the OECD 
in 1996.  The Asian inancial crisis of  1997 
marked a temporary departure from the 
country’s core economic policy. The country 
turned to the IMF for a inancial ‘bail out’ 
and a number of  large conglomerates went 
into bankruptcy. After the Asian economic 
crisis, the country strengthened its capac-
ity to compete in the international market 
by focusing more on the knowledge-based 
economy.
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Korea’s Annual Trade Growth in 2000-14(US$ billion)
Year Export Import Balance
2000 172.2 160.5 +11.8
2004 254.2 224.5 +29.7
2008 363.5 323.1 +22.0
2012 547.9 519.6 +28.3
2014 572.7 525.5 +47.2
Source: Korea Statistics Oice (2015)
Lessons for Africa?
In about the same time that as many Af-
rican countries have been independent 
(i.e. since the early 1960s), South Korea 
has transformed her economy from low 
technology, labour intensive industries 
to capital intensive industries and i-
nally to high technology and knowledge 
intensive industries. Along the way, it 
has managed to create a highly skilled 
labour force, a vibrant private sector 
and a highly competent civil service. 
Along the way, it managed to eradicate 
poverty. What can Africa learn from this 
experience? 
A strong public sector
There are lessons that African coun-
tries could learn from the South Korean 
development experience. First of  all, 
efective policy formulation and imple-
mentation requires strong and compe-
tent public institutions, beginning with a 
strong, development minded or orient-
ed state and a merit based bureaucratic 
system. The public sector must be able 
to formulate and to implement iscal, 
monetary and other macroeconomic 
policies that are sound, stable and for-
ward looking. Implementing a develop-
ment or industrial policy requires strong 
and competent institutions (there are 
multiple interests to weigh, after all). Po-
litical stability is critical because without 
it, there can be no macroeconomic sta-
bility or certainty. 
Secondly, investing early in skilled la-
bour force is important. It is particularly 
important to invest in science, technol-
ogy and research and development. 
South Korea’s current global competi-
tiveness in high technology industries 
can be traced back to its investments 
in education, science, technology and 
R&D beginning in the mid-1960s.
Thirdly, a ‘balanced growth’ approach 
or simultaneous investments in both ag-
ricultural and industrial sectors, urban 
and rural areas, large scale industries 
and small and medium size industries 
might help in creating vital inter-secto-
ral linkages and accelerate poverty re-
duction. In the 1970s, the Republic of  
Korea introduced the Saemaul Undong 
Movement. The Saemaul Undong was 
a community driven movement that 
contributed to poverty reduction in ru-
ral communities through agricultural 
production, communal empowerment 
and regeneration, and women’s partici-
pation in economic development. South 
Korea did not start out with a strong 
or even competent state and or public 
institutions. It built one from the early 
1960s onwards. It is possible for African 
countries to build strong, competent, 
and development oriented public insti-
tutions.
 
A strong private sector
With government support and a diverse 
set of  incentives the private sector in 
South Korea was able to produce quali-
ty products for the international market. 
The private sector has to be the driv-
ing force of  economic development in 
Africa. African governments must ind 
ways to create conditions that enable 
the private sector to play a pro-active 
role in economic development. Social 
and physical infrastructure and a skilled 
labour force, are key in this process. 
While Africa may not be able to repli-
cate all the industrial policy tools used 
by South Korea (due for example to 
WTO induced changes in global trade 
rules) there are still many instruments 
they can use to provide the ‘incentivize’ 
businesses to invest in national priority 
sectors. South Korea manipulated its 
domestic market to create, protect and 
incentivize its private sector (i.e. Chae-
bols) to play a positive role in its eco-
nomic development. Some of  the tools 
available to South Korea might not be 
available to many African countries 
today. Nevertheless, they can still do a 
lot to promote the growth of  a vibrant 
private sector and to co-opt them in the 
national development process.
Social and environmental 
protection
Trade unions faced tight regulations in 
South Korea until the late 1980s. Envi-
ronmental protection regulations also 
came relatively late in the Korean devel-
opment experience. There is no reason 
why African countries should replicate 
these trends. Both might be critical to 
political stability, poverty reduction and 
sustainable development although this 
will depend on the nature of  the rela-
tionship between the state, unions and 
the private sector.  
China
The economic development of  China 
has been a boon to the South Korean 
economy. The rapid growth of  the Chi-
nese economy has allowed a number 
of  South Korean businesses to expand 
into China, especially after the 2008 
global inancial crisis. A number of  
South Korean companies have moved 
their manufacturing facilities to China. 
Presently, China is South Korea’s larg-
est trading partner and South Korea is 
China’s third largest. Obviously, Africa 
cannot replicate South Korea’s trading 
successes with China. Nevertheless, the 
large size of  the Chinese market and its 
un-orthodox development policies pre-
sent potentially good opportunities for 
Africa’s development. 
30 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
CHINA
THE ‘ONE BELT, ONE 
ROAD’ INITIATIVE
Daniel Poon
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
China’s “going out” strategy formally began in the early 2000s with the 
broad objective of  promoting the foreign expansion of  Chinese irms to 
improve resource allocation and international competitiveness.
C
hina’s annual outward FDI 
lows have grown from around 
$2bn in the late 1990s, to 
$101bn in 2013. This still 
only represents 7.2 per cent of  annual 
global FDI outlows in 2013, but the 
world economy could be on the cusp of  
the next phase in China’s foreign policy 
- a more active Chinese participation in 
global economic governance. In 2014, 
a Deutsche Bank report argued that 
with the pace of  domestic growth and 
investment slowing, China is expected 
to continue generating large current 
account surpluses that will enable it to 
shift from its reputation as the “factory 
of  the world” to that of  the “investor to 
the world”. In the context of  weak glob-
al economic growth, “how the world 
absorbs China’s large current account 
surpluses will deine the next round of  
economic expansion”, the report con-
cluded.
This is the context within which one 
must view initiatives such as the China-
led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the New Development 
Bank (NDB). Both initiatives, viewed 
by some as potential rivals to existing 
inancial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), represent China’s emerging 
‘Plan B’ for revamping the global de-
velopment and inancial architecture. 
Whereas ‘Plan A’ mainly pursued re-
forms within pre-existing global insti-
tutions and processes, ‘Plan B’ seeks to 
use a mixture of  cooperation and com-
petition to facilitate changes that better 
relect the growing economic heft and 
interests of  emerging economies.
This could signal a shift from the ori-
entation of  past Chinese regimes that 
generally sought a low proile in foreign 
relations, preferring to focus on domes-
tic development instead. One of  Deng 
Xiaoping’s most striking foreign policy 
maxims was, “never become a leader”. 
The advent of  China-inspired multilat-
eral inancial institutions could usher in 
a new phase in China’s foreign policy: 
one where China is actively learning to 
lead in the Asia region and beyond. The 
AIIB and the Silk Road Fund (SRF) are 
key inancial instruments of  a broader 
Chinese initiative known as “One Belt, 
One Road”. The One Belt, One Road 
Initiative (IBIR) seeks to promote Asian 
regional economic cooperation and in-
tegration primarily through investments 
in infrastructure: railways, air routes, 
ports, roads, power plants and reiner-
ies.
For other developing countries, how-
ever, there is even more at stake in 
China’s growing interest in interna-
tional economic governance. The Chi-
na’s economic development model has 
been predicated on the strategic use of  
unorthodox development policy tools 
including: industrial policy, state banks 
and enterprises, capital controls, stable 
and competitive exchange rates and low 
interest rates. Though industrial policy 
tools remain pivotal to the process of  
economic development and structural 
transformation, such tools are often 
of-limits for many other developing 
countries due to the prevailing develop-
ment ‘orthodoxy’ of  many of  their de-
velopment partners. That leaves China, 
through its Chinese inspired multilat-
eral inancial institutions, with an excel-
lent opportunity to champion industrial 
policy as an efective tool in economic 
development. Should it decide, it could 
signiicantly re-orient economic doc-
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trine in many developing countries by 
steering its investments and foreign aid 
towards industrial policy. In using an 
array of  industrial policy tools, China 
is piecing together the ladder of  devel-
opment that was “kicked away” (to use 
Ha-Joon Chang’s apt phrase) by today’s 
developed countries. China’s economic 
development model may serve as an 
immediate and pragmatic example for 
other developing countries to follow.  
The ‘One Belt, One Road Initiative’ 
(IBIR)
The 1B1R strategy was irst articulated 
by President Xi Jinping in successive 
trips to Southeast Asia in 2013 when he 
raised the idea of  a ‘Silk Road Econom-
ic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road’. In the latest version of  the 
initiative, the overland ‘Belt’ includes 
three directions: from China to central 
Asia and Russia, then on to Europe; 
from China to central Asia, heading 
south through the Middle East and on 
to the Persian Gulf  and the Mediterra-
nean Sea; and from China to Southeast 
Asia, onward to South Asia and the In-
dian Ocean. The maritime ‘Road’ starts 
from Chinese eastern ports, towards the 
South China Sea, onward to the Indian 
Ocean and then to Europe. A branch of  
the maritime ‘Road’ also extends south-
east from the South China Sea to the 
South Paciic Ocean (see Map 1).
Map 1. Geographic Contours of  the “One Belt, One Road” Strategy
Source: China Daily, 15 April. See, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/15/content_20435638.html
Fifty seven countries (including China) are founding members, and are expected to complete ne-
gotiations over its Articles of  Agreement by late June 2015 – with operations to begin by year-end. 
China and 20 countries signed an MOU last October to establish the AIIB, to be based in Beijing. 
Thirty-six have since become founding members (Table 1). To become a founding member, a 
country had to submit a formal “conirmation letter” to China. This had to be approved by the 
existing members (although not all applicants followed this process). The application deadline for 
founding members was March 31. Countries applying after this date will be “regular” AIIB mem-
bers. The list of  founding members was inalized on April 15.
Post-MOU AIIB Founding Member Countries, 2014-2015
Indonesia
Maldives
New Zealand
Saudi Arabia
Tajikistan
Jordan
United Kingdom
France
Italy
Germany
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Turkey
South Korea
Austria
Netherlands
Brazil
Georgia
Denmark
Australia
Finland
Russia
Kyrgyzstan
Sweden
Iceland
Portugal
Iran
United Arab Emirates
Malta
Spain
Egypt
Norway 
Israel
South Africa
Azerbaijan
Poland
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Last October, the Ministry of  Finance 
(MoF) stated that founding members agreed 
that shareholding will be allocated accord-
ing to a member country’s GDP size. This 
makes China the largest shareholder in 
AIIB, although China has stated that it is 
not seeking to be the “lone, big sharehold-
er” with a 50 per cent stake. The creation 
of  AIIB regional oices and senior man-
agement appointments will be subject 
to further consultation and negotia-
tion. China is the standing chairman 
of  the negotiators’ meetings, to be 
co-chaired by the member country 
hosting the event. Also, an interim 
multilateral secretariat has been 
established to support the work 
of  the institution, headed by 
Chinese economist Jin Liqun. 
Silk Road Fund: a Key 
South-South Financial 
Building Block?
In President Xi’s speech 
at APEC in November 
2014, he formally announced China’s plans 
to establish the SRF with $40bn for invest-
ment in countries along the 1B1R initiative 
in infrastructure, natural resource develop-
ment, industrial and inancial cooperation, 
and other related projects. Xi stressed that 
China seeks to do more than just build 
roads and bridges, but to enhance “inter-
connectivity” in the Asia-Paciic region in 
ive key areas: policy, infrastructure, trade, 
inance, and people. By February 2015, 
Xi conirmed that AIIB’s main role is 
to provide inancing for building infra-
structure in Asia and the 1B1R.
Little is known about the SRF, but Chinese 
media have reported it will be capitalized 
by four state agencies: State Administration 
of  Foreign Exchange (SAFE), China Invest-
ment Corp. (CIC), China Export-Import 
Bank (China Exim Bank), and China 
Development Bank (CDB). The SRF 
was oicially registered on De-
cember 29 2014 in Beijing 
and held its irst Board 
of  Directors meeting on 
January 6th, 2015. 
SRF could be viewed as 
China’s latest sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF) ini-
tiative and has been re-
ferred to as the “second 
CIC” in some Chinese 
media. The CIC was created 
in 2007 and put under managerial 
control of  the MoF. This time around, 
however, SRF appears to have a distinct 
People’s Bank of  China (PBoC) imprint 
– SAFE is a branch of  the PBoC, China’s 
central bank. By early February, the SRF’s 
chief  executive, general manager, and a 
member of  the board of  directors were an-
nounced, all with a PBoC background. 
In a recent interview, PBoC governor Zhou 
Xiaochuan declared that at present the 
SRF will not use the SWF concept, because 
many SWFs have a clear investment port-
folio allocation among stocks, bonds, and 
mergers & acquisitions, whereas the SRF 
will “perhaps concentrate more on co-
operation projects” - particularly on 
direct equity investment. Zhou con-
tends that there are many projects 
looking for equity investment. 
However, many private equity 
(PE) irms have short invest-
ment horizons of  7-10 years. 
There is thus, a need for 
longer-term infrastruc-
ture investment funds. 
Zhou hopes that 
others will look at 
SRF as a kind 
of  PE inves-
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tor, but with a longer time horizon of  15 years 
or more for returns.
Zhou also highlighted how the SRF will work 
with other Chinese state inancial institutions 
in a selected project equity and debt inancing. 
Though he said that competition can never be 
ruled out, he stressed that cooperation would 
take the form of  joint equity investments by 
SRF and other investors in a needed project, at 
which time China Exim Bank and CDB could 
follow with loans for debt inancing. CIC could 
also partially participate in equity investments. 
The SRF and AIIB could cooperate in arrang-
ing both equity and debt inancing. Add in the 
NDB, and a constellation Chinese led South-
South development inance institutions begins 
to take shape. 
A Fine Balance
Though Zhou also suggested that experiences 
of  China Exim Bank and CDB 
will have a beneicial impact on 
the future development of  SRF, 
many observers believe striking 
a balance between political and 
economic interest will be the big-
gest challenge facing the 1B1R ini-
tiative. For example, in looking at 
some of  China’s previous domes-
tic regional infrastructure building 
plans, some analysts believe that 
many did not meet their goals be-
cause “inancial returns were not 
the key investment concern”.
Perhaps more tellingly, Finance 
Minister Lou Jiwei argued that in 
learning from existing multilateral banks’ ex-
perience, the AIIB will have strict but practi-
cal safeguard policies in order to reduce costs 
and improve operating eiciency. According to 
Deputy Finance Minister Shi Yaobin, existing 
multilateral institutions have continuously im-
proved safeguard policies and have made im-
portant reforms. He argued that strictly speak-
ing, there are no “best practices”, only “better 
practices”.
For Zhao Changhui, a risk analyst at China 
Exim Bank, 1B1R-related projects should 
meet at least three conditions: ability to inance 
large scale transnational infrastructure pro-
jects; projects should go beyond infrastructure 
to include value-added manufacturing sectors 
such as petroleum and steel reining; projects 
must be irmly founded on multilateral con-
sensus. Others, like Zhu Jiejin of  Fudan Uni-
versity’s BRICS Research Centre, called for 
greater consideration of  localization in related 
projects and cooperation with host-country 
development banks. Even President Xi, dur-
ing his APEC speech, suggested that countries 
could cooperate on inancial support through 
regional, industry, or project-speciic subsidiary 
funds.
Never become a leader?
The 1B1R initiative is arguably China’s at-
tempt at learning to lead in the Asia-Paciic 
region, using its development model as a guide. 
In his APEC speech, Xi ofered a metaphor 
to explain the initiative: “if  ‘One Road, One 
Belt’ can be regarded as the two wings of  Asia’s 
take-of, then interconnectivity is like the arter-
ies and veins of  the two wings.”  It might be 
tempting to view China’s growing interest in 
global economic governance from the old Cold 
War mindset. However, it would be more prag-
matic to look at these new Chinese inspired 
multilateral inancial institutions as mecha-
nisms for facilitating the provision of  much 
desired public goods in the form of  infrastruc-
ture inancing – a hugely unmet need in much 
of  the developing world. Indeed, Chinese-led 
inancial institutions have not ruled out the 
possibility of  cooperating and co-inancing 
projects with existing multilateral institutions. 
The new China-led inancial institutions like 
the AIIB, the NDB, and the SRF remain works 
in progress. However, it is possible to envision 
their potential roles as part of  an emerging con-
stellation of  ‘South’ led development inance 
institutions, more sympathetic to development 
ideology in many developing countries. Chi-
nese development assistance has had its prob-
lems in some developing countries. These new 
‘instruments’ will have their limitations too. 
Nevertheless, they provide an additional win-
dow for developing countries to leverage the 
much needed resources for their development.
Daniel Poon is an economist with United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). He is 
author of  the UNCTAD Discussion Paper, “China’s 
Development Trajectory: A Strategic Opening for In-
dustrial Policy in the South” (2014). Portions of  this 
article are drawn from, “Development Finance with 
Chinese Characteristics?” co-authored with Richard 
Kozul-Wright and published by Project Syndicate, as 
well as from, “China leading by example in South-
South relations”, published by East Asia Forum.
Though industrial policy tools remain pivotal 
to the process of economic development and 
structural transformation, such tools are often off-
limits for many other developing countries due 
to the prevailing development ‘orthodoxy’ of 
many of their development partners.
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People throughout the world and across history have always attached great 
importance to light.  We see this in cultural symbolism, myths and legends, 
and in the many ways that studying the science of  light and applying it in 
practical applications has shaped the societies in which we live.
P
eople throughout the world 
and across history have always 
attached great importance to 
light.  We see this in cultural 
symbolism, myths and legends, and in 
the many ways that studying the sci-
ence of  light and applying it in practi-
cal applications has shaped the societies 
in which we live. Light is central to our 
planet and our existence. On the most 
fundamental level- through photosyn-
thesis- it is light from the sun which 
drives life itself; in our daily lives, the 
light-based technologies of  photonics 
give us applications such as internet 
communications, modern manufactur-
ing, the fabrication of  computer chips, 
and medical imaging.
In recognition of  the importance of  
light in so many areas of  life, the United 
Nations has proclaimed the year 2015 
as the International Year of  Light and 
Light-based Technologies.  This In-
ternational Year has grown from an 
initiative of  a large consortium of  many 
diferent partners together with UN-
ESCO, and its overarching objective is 
to raise worldwide awareness of  how 
important the science and technology 
of  light is for humankind, and the many 
ways in which photonics provides solu-
tions to problems of  global importance. 
The world today faces many urgent 
challenges, such as providing food to a 
growing population; developing clean 
sources of  energy that can promote 
growth whilst having low carbon foot-
print; improving education; reduc-
ing poverty and inequality; improving 
healthcare and quality of  life for all. 
These challenges are of  course ad-
dressed in the proposed Sustainable 
Development goals which are expected 
to frame governmental actions relating 
to the United Nations Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda.  But as discussions of  
these goals gathers pace in the count-
down to their adoption, it is the ideal 
time to recall that one of  the central 
messages of  the International Year of  
Light is that light science and technolo-
gies provide practical and cost-efective 
solutions to meet many of  these chal-
lenges.   
In what follows we provide an overview 
of  the many ways in which light sci-
ence can aid sustainable development. 
The examples below are of  course not 
exhaustive, and a selection of  further 
reading is provided.  But we hope that 
the selection of  applications we have 
chosen highlights just in how many 
ways light-based technologies can lead 
to practical solutions that can extend 
social, medical, and energy generat-
ing beneits to billions of  people in the 
world today. 
Agriculture and Farming
The food and agriculture sector is essen-
tial to sustainable development.  Indeed, 
ending hunger, ensuring food security, 
and promoting sustainable agriculture 
are key objectives of  the Sustainable 
Development Goal targets.   In many 
developing countries, agriculture is also 
the backbone of  the economy, and is a 
key for long-term and inclusive growth 
due to its strong multiplier impact on 
other sectors. 
Light-based technologies can play an 
important role in improving agricul-
ture and farming through the area of  
agri-photonics.  Lasers and imaging 
sensors on planes can be used to map 
soils and crop density, and relectance 
data from vegetation can be used to de-
termine very speciic information such 
as the amount of  nitrogen present in 
plants.  Lasers and telescopes can be 
used to monitor evaporation and guide 
decisions on irrigation, and with ap-
propriate lighting, vegetables and fruits 
can be grown indoors outside of  their 
normal season, opening up possibilities 
for crop-cultivation year-round, even in 
inhospitable regions.  
Climate Science
Developing countries are at the front-
line of  human-induced climate change 
over the next century. According to the 
to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 
throughout the 21st century climate 
change is expected to lead to increases 
in ill-health in many regions, and es-
pecially in developing countries with 
low income. Rural areas are expected 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS OF LIGHT FOR
HARNESSING
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to experience major impacts on water 
availability and supply, food security, 
infrastructure and agricultural incomes, 
including shifts in the production areas 
of  food and non-food crops around the 
world. 
Light-based technolo-
gies are critical for 
monitoring and predict-
ing the consequences of  
climate change. They 
are extensively used to 
map radiation emitted 
from the Earth’s sur-
face using radiometers, 
scanners and sensors 
placed in satellites orbiting our planet. 
These measurements are transmitted 
to ground stations where the data is 
converted to images that provide in-
formation on ocean currents or global 
carbon-dioxide distribution.  Of  course, 
mitigating the efects of  climate change 
will also rely heavily on light-based tech-
nologies in the ield of  renewable ener-
gy as described below.
 Communications 
The visible light that we can see is only 
a small part of  the spectrum of  electro-
magnetic radiation that inds important 
and widespread use in modern society. 
It is invisible microwave electromag-
netic radiation that is used in mobile 
telephone communications and satel-
lite networks, and it is the invisible light 
from infrared lasers that carries the 
pulsed signals of  optical information 
under the oceans and across continents 
via the optical iber infrastructure of  the 
Internet.   
The importance of  communications 
for development is stressed by the UN 
Broadband Commission for Digital 
Development, who have recently stated 
how access to mobile devices (phones, 
tablets and e-readers) with broadband 
internet connectivity can bring qual-
ity education to people everywhere, es-
pecially in the world’s poorest or most 
isolated communities.  Although it is 
technology such as ibre to the home 
(FTTH) that is being emphasized in 
many developed countries, it is mobile 
broadband that is perceived as the most 
practical solutions for many developing 
countries.  The International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) reports that 
mobile broadband is the fastest growing 
technology in history - mobile phone 
subscriptions now exceed the world’s 
total population, and active mobile 
broadband subscriptions exceed 2.1 bil-
lion!  Signiicantly, most of  this progress 
has taken place in developing countries, 
which account for 82% of  net additions 
of  new Internet users globally in the last 
ive years.  The UN Broadband Com-
mission and the ITU are pushing hard 
to ensure that mobile broadband can 
fulil its potential to improve education 
and development.  
This was expressed eloquently by ITU 
Secretary-General Houlin Zhao during 
the 11th meeting of  the UN Broadband 
Commission in February 2015: “For 
the irst time in history, mobile broad-
band gives us the chance to truly bring 
education to all, regardless of  a person’s 
geographical location, linguistic and 
cultural frameworks, or ready access 
to infrastructure like schools and trans-
port.” 
Education and Training 
In addition to the use of  light-based 
technologies to improve educational 
infrastructure, light science is an ideal 
subject to stimulate interest in STEM 
(science, technology, engineering, math-
ematics) subjects in a classroom context. 
This has been recognized for many 
years by UNESCO, the UNESCO 
Category I Centre ICTP (International 
Centre for Theoretical Physics) and the 
International Society for Optics and 
Photonics (SPIE) who have developed a 
global programme on Active Learning 
in Optics and Photonics (ALOP).  In-
quiry-based, or active learning encour-
ages students to construct the knowledge 
from their own observations, guided by 
a facilitator whose role it is to lead them 
from observation to discovery.  
This is on contrast to the normal class-
room scenario in which the teacher lec-
tures and the students passively absorb 
as much information as they can, which, 
by itself, is known to be inadequate in 
developing correct conceptual under-
standing of  the underlying physics. 
ALOP modules have been developed 
for many subjects, from the basics to the 
advanced:  Geometrical Optics, Lenses 
and Optics of  the Eye, Interference and 
Difraction, Atmospheric Optics, Opti-
cal Data Transmission and Wavelength 
Division Multiplexing.  In many cases 
the cost of  material is low, and cours-
es can be adapted to 
many diverse cultures.  
ALOP courses are 
not aimed at students, 
however, but are fo-
cused on teachers – 
“training the trainers.” 
This is an essential 
part of  the philoso-
phy, and indeed since 
2004, ALOP workshops have reached 
over 1,000 teachers from 55 develop-
ing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. The participants are typically 
lecturers in universities as well as some 
secondary school teachers of  physics. 
Follow-up activities, in which trained 
trainers train others locally are an im-
portant part of  the strategy and this 
has been very successful in a number of  
regions around the world.  ALOP work-
shops also provide practical examples 
of  how Interactive Lecture Demonstra-
tions using light-technologies can be 
used in large classes.  
One example involves image formation 
and serves to also illustrate how signii-
cant learning gains can be achieved with 
low-cost materials and without “black-
box” solutions which can sometimes 
be counter-productive.  For instance, a 
cylindrical lens can be designed from a 
transparent plastic container jar illed 
with water, using a 9V battery and 
lashlight bulb as light source.
Energy and Lighting 
Rural areas are expected to experience major 
impacts on water availability and supply, food 
security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, 
including shifts in the production areas of food 
and non-food crops around the world.
 Credit: SolarAid/Kat Harrison
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When one thinks of  harnessing light-
based technologies for sustainable de-
velopment, renewable energy through 
solar power would likely be the irst 
thing that came to mind for most peo-
ple.  After all, many developing coun-
tries have abundant solar energy re-
sources (insolation), and the use of  solar 
energy is ideally-suited to providing 
an of-grid energy supply as a sustain-
able alternative to the diesel generators 
which would otherwise be used.  
There remain many challenges to ad-
dress, but research is advancing rapidly 
in the underlying physics and materi-
als science, the development of  storage 
technologies, and in optimising and 
comparing the technologies of  photo-
voltaics and solar thermal collection. 
Although the economics of  deployment 
in the energy sector can be complex, the 
International Energy Agency encapsu-
lated the issues well in its 2011 report 
when they stated explicitly that solar 
energy “…will increase countries’ en-
ergy security…enhance sustainability, 
reduce pollution, lower the costs of  mit-
igating climate change, and keep fossil 
fuel prices lower than otherwise. These 
advantages are global. Hence the ad-
ditional costs of  the incentives for early 
deployment should be considered learn-
ing investments.” 
Closely coupled to the availability of  
energy is the availability of  lighting. 
With no reliable source of  light, many 
people in developing communities de-
pend on kerosene lamps for light, which 
has been estimated to lead to the death 
of  over a million people every year.  Pro-
viding clean, eicient forms of  lighting 
to developing communities is not only 
important for health reasons - it is also 
vital for productivity. Families in rural 
communities rely on work to provide 
for the most basic needs of  their family, 
but working hours can be limited due to 
scarce lighting after sunset. The major-
ity of  children in developing countries 
are also expected to work during the day 
to help provide for their family. With no, 
or inadequate, light at night, children 
are deprived of  an education.  Although 
longer term solutions will require clear 
policies on renewable energy on the re-
gional level, many industries and NGOs 
and other associations are working on 
the ground to promote the use of  pota-
ble solar-powered high-brightness LED 
lanterns in regions where there is little 
or no other reliable source of  light.  
A low power LED lighting system can 
give children in developing regions 
enough light to read, helping them with 
their schooling.
Healthcare and Medicine
Optical technologies play a key role in 
medicine from simple diagnostics and 
monitoring, to advanced treatment op-
tions and research. Photonics appears 
in very simple and widespread devices: 
clip-on pulse oximeters use the trans-
mission of  light from an LED through 
a inger to measure oxygen saturation 
and heartrate, and ear thermometers 
use infrared light detectors to provide 
a safe and reliable measurement of  
body temperature.   Imaging and sur-
gery have been revolutionized with the 
use of  endoscopy and laparoscopy, and 
light-based technologies and lasers ind 
important uses in many medical proce-
dures including neurosurgery, derma-
tology, dentistry, vision correction, heart 
surgery, and reconstructive procedures. 
Many light-based 
therapies have also 
proven efective for 
detecting and treat-
ing cancer. One 
example of  a light-
based technique to 
treat cancer is pho-
todynamic therapy, 
where a patient is 
given a nontoxic 
photosensitive drug 
that is absorbed by 
cancer cells.  During 
surgery, a light beam 
is positioned at the 
tumour site, which 
then activates the 
drug to become toxic 
to targeted malignant cells.  
In developing countries, there are of  
course many challenges in ensuring the 
best healthcare treatments are available, 
but the advanced technology of  the 
smartphone promises huge potential to 
revolutionise medicine in low-resource 
areas.  Such technology-based mobile 
health can take many forms.  For exam-
ple, a specialised mobile app and lens 
adapter can convert a smartphone into 
a device that can take diagnostic-quality 
images of  cataracts.  The resulting im-
age can then be sent by email to a re-
mote expert for evaluation and recom-
mendation for treatment, and the ability 
to geotag results with built-in GPS fa-
cilitates record-keeping for ield work-
ers.  Other examinations possible with 
a smartphone include retina screening, 
depth of  ield tests, colour vision testing, 
and visual acuity.  Beyond testing vision, 
adaptations to turn smartphones into 
microscopes are allowing for detection 
of  parasites in blood or stools. 
There is, of  course, much work to be 
done in moving from demonstration to 
large-scale uptake, but the smartphone 
is one of  the most advanced technologi-
cal devices ever made, with state-of-the-
art imaging and communications built-
in. It is clear that it has tremendous 
potential as a potable mobile labora-
tory.  Recent years have seen dramatic 
strides in the ield of  telemedicine in 
general, the use of  telecommunica-
tion and information technologies to 
provide access to medical services that 
would often not be consistently avail-
able at a distance.  The smartphone 
may well be showing the way towards 
the democratization of  healthcare in 
developing countries.   
Vision and Seeing
People in developed countries take eye-
glasses and good vision for granted. 
However, worldwide estimates of  those 
who sufer from uncorrected defective 
eyesight range from the 100’s of  mil-
lions to over a billion adults and chil-
dren!  Far more than just an “inconven-
ience,” the worldwide lack of  eyeglasses 
to correct vision prohibits people from 
working and taking care of  their fami-
lies and has a negative efect on chil-
dren’s schooling and study.  In fact, one 
2012 study estimated the loss in GDP 
due to uncorrected vision was US$ 202 
billion annually!  
Looking at this objectively, it may seem 
hard to understand – after all, eyeglass-
es are a 13th century (!) optical technol-
ogy, and techniques for their inexpen-
sive mass production have existed for 
Symon from Zomba Malawi trying new glasses 
provided by the one dollar glasses initiative. 
(Credit: Wolfram Cüppers)
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decades.  But it is also easy to see how 
bottlenecks can arise with testing, pre-
scription and distribution.  A number 
of  NGOs and industries are therefore 
working on complementary approaches 
to solve these problems.  One approach 
uses luid illed lenses where a user can 
self-adjust the eyeglasses, allowing a 
very convenient way to select the ap-
propriate correction.  Another idea 
uses low cost prefabricated lenses and 
a compact bending machine to create 
frames from spring steel; this approach 
can also encourage the establishment 
of  sustainable businesses producing and 
selling these glasses in local communi-
ties. 
Water Quality
Water is essential to human health. De-
spite impressive gains made over the 
last decades, billions worldwide still suf-
fer from health problems due to the lack 
of  clean water.  Although much 
progress has been made in the 
use of  conventional treatment 
processes, there is a continu-
ous need for the development 
of  new and complementary 
technologies to produce high 
quality water, especially in de-
veloping areas. Photonics tech-
nologies can signiicantly help 
in this regard by improving 
both water quality assessment 
and access to clean sources of  
water. For instance, low-cost 
water treatment systems pow-
ered by solar panels can de-
compose organic pollutants in 
water, and solar-powered well 
pumping has proven to be a 
sustainable, low-cost solution to provide 
drinking and irrigation water in of-grid 
locations in drought-prone regions.  Re-
search is also ongoing into the develop-
ment of  LED-based potable systems for 
point of  use puriication.  
Conclusion
Light-based technologies are pervasive 
in the everyday lives of  people living 
in aluent areas of  the world, but it is 
our hope that this series of  examples il-
lustrates the many applications that can 
have a real impact on sustainable devel-
opment.   It is appropriate here to quote 
from the message of  Ban Ki-Moon in 
his message to the Opening Ceremony 
of  the International Year of  Light held 
in Paris on 19-20 January 2015: “As 
we strive to end poverty and promote 
shared prosperity, light technologies can 
ofer practical solutions to global chal-
lenges.” 
In concluding, it is perhaps worth re-
calling that when the laser was invented 
in 1960, it was described as a “solution 
looking for a problem.”  Today, howev-
er, lasers are part of  the everyday lives 
of  billions of  people living in aluent 
areas of  the world, from driving the 
undersea global telecommunications 
network to the daily tech of  barcode 
scanning at the supermarket.  The last 
decades of  research in advanced pho-
tonics has created many new technolo-
gies that provide practical solutions to 
problems in developing countries, but a 
bottleneck has arisen because the scien-
tists and engineers working on the tech-
nologies are very often simply not aware 
of  what these problems are.   On the 
other side of  the coin, it is often the case 
that political decision-makers as well as 
those working in developing regions are 
just not aware that these solutions may 
exist.  The International Year of  Light 
asks the scientiic community to work to 
bridge this gap in knowledge and un-
derstanding, and it is our hope that this 
article takes a positive forward step in 
achieving this.   
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The United Nations Educational, Scientiic and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) has proclaimed 2015 as the International 
Year of  Light. This global initiative brings together a broad-based 
consortium of  stakeholders – including scientiic societies and 
unions, educational institutions, technology platforms, non-proit 
organizations and private-sector partners.
CAN END LIGHT POVERTY
SOLAR LED SOLUTIONS
 AFRICA IN
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ts aim? To raise awareness of  
the power of  light-based tech-
nologies in solving global chal-
lenges in energy, education, ag-
riculture, public infrastructure and 
health. 
Over 1.2 billion people around the 
world – one in ive – are trapped 
in light poverty as they do not have 
access to electric light. In Africa, 
65% of  the population lives of the 
grid. Like food and water, light is a 
fundamental necessity that no one 
should be denied. Without artiicial 
light, life grinds to a halt at sunset. 
Communal life stops, children are 
unable to study, and businesses are 
forced to close.
Most of  those afected resort to 
kerosene lamps and candles to 
light their homes and businesses. 
But these very basic light sources 
claim the lives of  1.5 million peo-
ple every year through respiratory 
illnesses and ires – the same num-
ber killed annually by HIV-related 
diseases. In Kenya, for example, 
75,000 people, mostly women and 
children, get sick or even die every 
week as a direct result of  inhaling 
smoke from kerosene lamps, wood 
ires and candles.
“And all this at a time when, else-
where in the world, we’re learn-
ing how to print human organs, 
exploring self-driving cars, and 
recently landed a spacecraft on the 
surface of  a comet more than 500 
million kilometers away,” says Eric 
Rondolat, CEO of  Philips Light-
ing. “The time has come for the 
world to recognize this inequality 
and unite to end light poverty and 
its stranglehold on human develop-
ment. Especially when it could so 
easily be consigned to history by 
technology readily available today”
Solutions immediately to 
hand
Light poverty afects huge parts 
of  Africa, Asia and South Ameri-
ca. In South Sudan, for example, 
as few as 1.5% of  the population 
have access to electric light. The 
obvious solution might appear to 
be for afected countries to invest 
in electrical grids and power plants 
to provide a reliable energy supply 
– and thus lighting – to all their cit-
izens. In many countries, however, 
electrical grids are not viable due 
to the geographic and inancial 
constraints of  linking hundreds 
of  remote communities. And yet, 
that is no reason for us to throw in 
the towel: innovative solutions are 
available, here and now. 
Solar-powered LED lighting tech-
nology, for example, can provide 
light at a fraction of  the cost of  
running kerosene lamps, without 
any of  the health, safety or envi-
ronmental dangers – or the need 
for major investment in infrastruc-
ture. A single solar-powered LED 
lantern uses zero energy and can 
ill a room with clean, electric light 
for a one-of cost of  $10-20, com-
pared to the $50 annual fuel bill of  
running a kerosene lamp.
Relecting its mission to improve 
people’s lives through meaningful 
innovation, Philips has expanded 
its portfolio of  solar lighting solu-
tions with the launch of  Philips 
LifeLight, a range of  100% ener-
gy-eicient solar-powered LED 
lighting designed for homes in 
of-grid rural and semi-urban com-
munities. The range was devel-
oped by the Nairobi-based Philips 
Africa Innovation Hub, a center 
for developing innovations specii-
cally “in Africa, for Africa” in the 
areas of  healthcare, lighting and 
healthy living. These lights make 
daily activities, such as studying or 
working in the evening, safer and 
more practical. The Philips Life-
Light Home lighting system even 
includes a USB port for solar-pow-
ered phone charging, thereby of-
fering the dual beneit of  light and 
connectivity.
 
“Today an estimated 560 million 
Africans live without electricity,’’ 
says Mary Kuria, General Man-
ager, Philips Lighting East Af-
rica. “For these people night-time 
means either darkness or the lick-
ering light of  a candle or kerosene 
lamp. However the disadvantages 
of  kerosene lanterns are many, in-
cluding safety, health risks and high 
costs. And the light output of  these 
lanterns is so low as to make vis-
ibility for practical activities almost 
impossible. Using the energy of  the 
sun to power lighting solutions can 
make a true diference to people’s 
lives.”
Solar-powered technology is also a 
feature of  Philips’ innovative fan-
driven biomass cook stove (Jiko), 
which can reduce smoke and car-
bon monoxide emissions by more 
than 90% compared to an open 
ire, thus reducing the health risks 
of  indoor cooking. The electric 
fan is powered by a long-lasting 
rechargeable battery that can 
be charged by connection to the 
mains or a 10 W solar panel.
Bringing whole communities 
to life at night
On a larger scale, energy-eicient 
The time has come for the world to recognize 
this inequality and unite to end light poverty 
and its stranglehold on human development. 
Especially when it could so easily be consigned 
to history by technology readily available today
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LED luminaires and solar panels can be com-
bined to produce sustainable lighting in public 
places, again without the need for costly infra-
structure. These Community Light Centers 
(CLCs) – roughly the size of  a small football 
pitch – are relatively inexpensive, easy to install 
and maintain, and far more reliable than elec-
trical grids, which regularly sufer from outages 
in remote areas. Enabling healthcare services 
and businesses to operate after sunset, as well 
as encouraging sports and other social activi-
ties, these centers allow communities to thrive 
after dark. By the end of  2015 Philips will have 
installed 100 of  them in rural Africa, where 
some 500 million people do not have access to 
electric light.
In the Democratic Republic of  Congo, where 
those without electricity spend 20-30% of  their 
household income on kerosene to light their 
homes, Philips has recently completed the in-
stallation of  solar-powered LED lighting in 
homes, streets, hospitals and Community Light 
Centers as part of  a corporate giving/employee 
engagement initiative – the Philips Gift of  Light 
project.
Urbanization – opportunity and chal-
lenge
It is not only of-grid rural and semi-urban com-
munities that stand to gain from the adoption 
of  (solar-powered) LED lighting technology. 
Far from it. A century ago around 10% of  the 
world’s population lived in cities. By the start 
of  the 21st century this igure had risen to over 
50%, and by 2050 over two thirds of  us will 
be living in cities. We are also seeing this trend 
across Africa. Urban growth and transforma-
tion on this scale ofers tremendous opportuni-
ties for economic and social development, but it 
also presents huge challenges, for example with 
regard to energy. 
Energy-eicient connected lighting
“In Africa, lighting is thought to consume 
around 15% of  the total electricity output of  
an industrialized economy like South Africa,” 
says Harry Verhaar, Head of  Global Public & 
Government Afairs at Philips Lighting. “On a 
global level, that igure stands at 19%. It has 
been calculated that approximately half  of  a 
city’s energy bill goes on lighting – for public 
oices, schools and outdoor environments. We 
can make signiicant savings – on average 40% 
– simply by switching to energy-eicient light-
ing technologies. On a global level the potential 
savings amount to €128 billion in reduced elec-
tricity cost and 670 million tonnes of  avoided 
CO2 emissions. If  fully realized, that would 
represent a signiicant contribution in the ight 
against global climate change.”
Another advantage of  using solar-powered 
LED technology, in this case for street lighting, 
is that it can be connected to smart lighting con-
trols and software in fully integrated city-wide 
solutions. This ofers substantial beneits such 
as further energy eiciencies (up to 80% com-
pared to conventional lighting), increased safety 
and greater control of  the lighting. For 
example, if  there is no movement on 
the road, the lights dim or switch of. 
If  there is movement, they switch on. 
And if  there is an emergency situation, 
the light can be made brighter. 
With connected LED lighting, lamp 
poles have the potential to become a 
form of  digital real estate, providing 
additional functionalities and services 
which help to create safer, more ei-
cient and more appealing urban en-
vironments, promote commerce and 
tourism, and attract inward invest-
ment. Technology like this ofers Afri-
can countries a very real opportunity 
to leap-frog developed countries in the race to-
ward full digital functionality and connectivity. 
Cost no object
The cost of  installing (solar-powered) LED-
based public lighting can be recovered quickly 
from the savings on the reduced energy con-
sumption. What’s more, there are new perfor-
mance-based business models and inancing 
mechanisms that ofer solutions involving little, 
if  any, up-front cost.
For example, Philips has developed a new con-
cept to deliver ‘lighting as a service’. Typically, 
business customers pay only a service fee for 
the light they actually use, while Philips retains 
ownership of  the ixtures. For the duration of  
the contract, the company installs, maintains 
and upgrades the lighting system as needed. 
And it re-uses, refurbishes or recycles the equip-
ment at end-of-life, thus closing the materials 
loop. Cities around the world are embracing 
this capex-neutral, risk-free model.
There’s more to light than meets the eye
Lighting can perform many other functions be-
yond the illumination of  oices, shops, streets, 
etc. For instance, Philips has developed a range 
Solar-powered LED lighting technology, for 
example, can provide light at a fraction of the 
cost of running kerosene lamps, without any of 
the health, safety or environmental dangers – or 
the need for major investment in infrastructure.
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of  products speciically for horticulture. 
These LED lighting ixtures make use 
of  speciic wavelengths of  light to stim-
ulate and steer crop growth, thereby 
boosting local food productivity. The 
company has also developed a water 
puriication solution that treats water 
with ultraviolet light to kill bacteria.
And in another exciting development, 
Philips Research in the Netherlands has 
been involved in investigations, led by 
Prof. Travis Longcore of  the Univer-
sity of  California, aimed at reducing 
the number of  insects an LED bulb at-
tracts while stilI delivering white light. 
Many insect species, such as sand lies 
and mosquitos, are attracted to light. 
Diferent insects are sensitive to particu-
lar combinations of  wavelengths, which 
means that the type of  bulb you use can 
actually increase the risk of  catching 
insect-borne diseases. More research is 
still needed on this subject, but the re-
sults of  the investigations so far provide 
proof  in concept that LED lamps can 
be customized to avoid speciic areas of  
the spectrum that could have adverse 
environmental consequences, while still 
providing light for indoor use.
Huge opportunity for Africa
The potential beneits of  solar LED 
lighting for Africa extend way beyond 
functional illumination. In India, stud-
ies indicate that improved electricity 
supply for lighting in Assam correlated 
to a 17% increase in literacy rates of  
people over the age of  6. 
And the economic argument for install-
ing solar-powered LED systems in the 
worst-afected communities is as com-
pelling as the humanitarian obligation: 
access to light is a catalyst for growth in 
the areas that need it the most. “Lifting 
1.3 billion people out of  light poverty 
would not only end this stranglehold on 
economic, social and cultural develop-
ment, but would also give a huge boost 
to global GDP,” says Philips Lighting 
CEO Eric Rondolat. “Political will, 
combined with entrepreneurial drive, 
can snuf out this injustice and create a 
brighter future if  cemented by a com-
mon purpose.”
And so, as we celebrate the Interna-
tional Year of  Light and everything 
that light can do, it is time for govern-
ments, cities and businesses to embrace 
the technology that is already available 
– and deliver lasting positive change to 
communities currently blighted by light 
poverty across Africa. 
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DOES AFRICA REALLY WANT 
YESTERDAY’S FUTURE?
Four years after Fukushima, enthusiasm for nuclear power is back, spreading across – 
and connecting – the African and Asian continents. China, whose nuclear ambitions exceed 
all others, barely missed a beat: emitting assurances of  safety and regulatory upgrades, it 
quickly resumed construction on what may become the world’s largest nuclear leet.
I
n India, local protests delayed the 
launch of  the Kudankulam plant, 
but the irst reactor is now opera-
tional and the government has just 
signed new agreements on nuclear co-
operation with France and the US.
Desperate for more electricity, many 
African states are eager to follow suit. 
From South Africa to Niger, from Gha-
na to Kenya, atomic enthusiasm is gain-
ing momentum. Uranium producers 
such as Niger and Namibia talk about 
transcending their colonial past by 
beneiciating their own raw materials. 
South Africa sidesteps its apartheid past, 
invokes earlier nuclear achievements, 
and insists it will build next generation 
reactors. Some non-uranium produc-
ing countries are even more zealous, 
issuing tenders and signing cooperation 
agreements with Russia or China (and 
sometimes both). Across the continent, 
energy ministers and entrepreneurs 
wax eloquent about nuclear power’s po-
tential to create jobs, provide baseload 
electricity for industrial development, 
power homes, drive the economy, and 
ultimately catapult their nation to 21st 
century modernity. 
How can nuclear bring all these 
goodies? 
Through cheap power, proclaim the en-
thusiasts. Insisting that the most devel-
oped countries around the world relied 
on atomic energy to achieve their pre-
sent modernity, the publicity director 
for Kenya’s Nuclear Electricity Board 
quoted 19th century electricity guru 
Thomas Edison: “we will make the cost 
of  electricity so cheap that only the rich 
will burn candles.” An oicial at Gha-
na’s Ministry of  Energy and Petroleum 
went a step further: nuclear energy, he 
enthused, “would be so cheap that we 
would not even have to price electric-
ity.” 
Such scenarios are presented as vi-
sions of  Africa’s techno-future. But the 
dreams are as old (and tired) as the nu-
clear age itself. In his 1953 “Atoms for 
Peace” speech to the United Nations, 
US President Dwight Eisenhower called 
for experts to apply atomic energy “to 
the needs of  agriculture, medicine, and 
other peaceful activities,” adding that 
“a special purpose would be to pro-
vide abundant electrical energy in the 
power-starved areas of  the world.” The 
following year, the chairman of  the US 
Atomic Energy Commission predicted 
that “our children will enjoy in their 
homes electrical energy too cheap to 
meter.” 
That phrase has become legendary for 
its sheer absurdity. Not a single nucle-
ar operator has forgone metering and 
charging for electricity use – not even in 
France, whose state-run utility provides 
Prof. Gabrielle Hecht
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75% of  the nation’s electricity. Indeed, a 
2010 paper in the journal Energy Policy 
shows that French nuclear construction 
costs actually exhibit a negative learn-
ing curve: unlike other well-established 
technological systems, the costs of  build-
ing nuclear power plants escalate over 
time. As recent proclamations show, 
however, the “too cheap to meter” idea 
has not lost its rhetorical appeal. 
Of Dreams and Damages
Of  course, seven decades into the 
atomic age, even the zealots know they 
must acknowledge the dangers of  their 
dreams. After all, the world has seen 
spectacular reactor accidents in the US 
(1979), the Soviet Union (1986), and 
Japan (2011). The irst and smallest of  
these took fourteen years and nearly $1 
billion to clean up. Chernobyl costs are 
notoriously di cult to evaluate and still 
accumulating three decades after the ac-
cident, but $300 billion (in 1990 dollars) 
is a commonly used igure. According 
to inlation calculators, that’s equivalent 
to around $550 billion in 2015 – higher 
than the GDP of  Nigeria, Africa’s larg-
est economy. (Nigeria igures promi-
nently among the continent’s nuclear 
aspirants, having recently signed a co-
operation agreement for 4 reactors with 
Rosatom.) As for Fukushima, no one re-
ally knows how much Japanese taxpay-
ers will end up paying for the cleanup. 
Credible, conservative estimates range 
from $100 to $250 billion, and most 
agree that it will take at least four dec-
ades. Lesser-known – but still signiicant 
– accidents have occurred in Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, France, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. The UK gets 
the frequency prize, with at least six ac-
cidents. 
Nuclear promoters aren’t stupid. They 
know they have a public relations prob-
lem. So they pad their triumphalist 
techno-talk with reassuring promises: 
Parliaments will create regulatory au-
thorities.  Rules will be written, proce-
dures followed, plants licensed, dangers 
monitored. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) will help; some 
even claim that the IAEA will moni-
tor their reactors. The words of  one 
highly placed Kenyan oicial typify this 
approach: “Without being bold, man 
could have not landed on the moon. We 
must emulate what others have done 
in the past and the present to be where 
they are. Kenya would successfully im-
plement the nuclear energy by borrow-
ing safety from countries which have 
used the energy for decades. We will 
observe the rules.” Kenya would thus 
follow “stringent global nuclear regula-
tions.” 
History, however, teaches us that it’s not 
that simple. Enthusiasts talk as though 
nuclear were a irst-order infrastructure, 
a base for other forms of  industrial de-
velopment. But in order to work at all 
– let alone as promised – nuclear power 
depends on the smooth interoperability 
of  many other infrastructures. These in-
clude electric grids (whose transmission 
lines need to be able to handle the 1000 
MW reactors that Rosatom and other 
companies are trying to sell), good roads 
(to support the transportation of  huge 
pieces of  equipment), robust regula-
tion (to manage the complex risks), and 
strong maintenance systems, among 
many others.
Consider regulation. It’s not enough 
to create an agency and make rules. 
Mounting and running adequate regu-
latory infrastructures has proved partic-
ularly challenging, not the least because 
the experts best qualiied to assess safety 
in nuclear plants are those who have 
helped to build and operate them. Even 
leading nuclear countries such as the 
US, France, and Japan, with large pools 
of  scientiic and engineering expertise, 
have a “revolving door” problem, as in-
dividuals move back and forth between 
industry and regulatory jobs. The Fuku-
shima accident is partly attributable to 
deliberate regulatory negligence (which 
some just call “corruption”) stemming 
from this very tension. Efective regu-
lation requires complex technological 
systems, including instrumentation, 
laboratories, a large pool of  trained sci-
entists and engineers, and much more. 
It’s also expensive. And in order to be 
credible, it must be state funded. 
As for “stringent global nuclear regu-
lations,” let’s be clear: there are none. 
There are only recommendations. Nor 
is the IAEA is a regulatory body. Yes, 
global media often refer to the agency 
as the world’s nuclear policeman or 
regulator, but this betrays a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of  its character. 
The IAEA has neither the funding, nor 
the capacity, nor the authority to make 
and enforce rules. It can provide techni-
cal assistance and advice, but those are 
only the irst steps in crafting efective 
regulation. Since its inception in 1957, 
the IAEA’s primary mission has been 
the promotion of  civilian atomic energy. 
That’s the mission the agency is fulilling 
by conducting Integrated Nuclear In-
frastructure Review (INIR) missions in 
Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria this year. 
In the words of  IAEA Director Gen-
eral Yukiya Amano, the missions “are 
part of  the comprehensive package of  
assistance which the IAEA provides to 
help ensure that even the most challeng-
ing issues in introducing nuclear power 
can be successfully dealt with.” INIR 
missions aim less at assessing whether 
a country can sustain a nuclear power 
programme than at midwiing such pro-
gramme into existence. 
Atomic enthusiasts rarely discuss the 
problem of  liability. Yet this issue is cen-
tral to all cooperation agreements. For 
example, South Africa’s agreement with 
Russia makes absolutely clear that South 
Africa would pay for all damages in the 
event of  an accident.  South African 
media outlets expressed outrage when 
these terms became public. But such li-
ability clauses are common. India alone 
attempted to enforce a law that would 
hold suppliers responsible for damages 
resulting from defective equipment. 
This deterred foreign irms from sub-
mitting reactor tenders. Undermining 
its own law, India has devised a complex 
insurance scheme, designed to pay for 
damages from cofers alimented in part 
by premiums paid by operators, and in 
part by the Indian state itself. Parallel 
Yes, global media often refer to the 
agency as the world’s nuclear policeman
or regulator, but this betrays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of its character. 
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public-private liability arrangements 
prevail everywhere; no private insurer 
has proved willing to underwrite nucle-
ar power plants. The IAEA has facilitat-
ed international conventions that could 
provide supplementary compensation, 
but at best these only kick in after states 
themselves pay very substantial damag-
es. One way or the other, governments 
can expect to disburse crippling sums in 
the event of  an accident.
Africa’s nuclear history
Like so many other techno-future 
dreams, African atomic enthusiasm 
(whether by Africa’s elites or by the 
Asian, American, or European corpo-
rations seeking business there) bubbles 
along by ignoring large 
parts of  the continent’s 
nuclear history. When 
enthusiasts do invoke 
the past, they typically 
limit themselves to a 
discussion of  research 
reactors, as though this 
represents the conti-
nent’s only real en-
gagement with the nu-
clear world. Consider 
this opening to a 2011 
IAEA report, authored 
by members of  the Afri-
can Regional Coopera-
tive Agreement:
“In 2009, Africa passed 
a milestone of  ifty years 
of  involvement with nu-
clear technology, dating 
from the initial critical-
ity of  the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo’s 
TRICO I research re-
actor at the University of  
Kinshasa. Egypt and South Africa soon 
followed, signaling a continental com-
mitment to providing researchers, sci-
entists, students and industries all across 
African access to modern nuclear ana-
lytical techniques and capabilities.”
In this framing, Africa’s nuclear history 
began in 1959, when the Kinshasa reac-
tor went critical. Nuclear countries are 
those with reactors – other technologies 
don’t count. In addition to the three 
countries mentioned in the quote, this 
rendition of  African nuclearity includes 
only Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, 
and Nigeria. 
Origin stories often have political util-
ity. This one aims to bolster arguments 
in favor of  building power reactors on 
the continent. But as with any history, 
we must also ask what is left out of  the 
lineage.
African places have been involved in the 
global history of  nuclear things since the 
early 20th century, when the Shinkolob-
we mine in Katanga furnished Marie 
Curie with radium for her experiments. 
That same mine provided pitchblende 
(extremely high-grade uranium) for 
the Hiroshima bomb, and continued 
to supply the US military throughout 
the 1950s. Meanwhile, the post-World 
War II atomic frenzy sent geologists to 
South Africa and Rhodesia in search 
of  fuel for the UK’s atomic bomb pro-
gramme. France also headed south, 
inding signiicant uranium deposits 
in Madagascar, Gabon, and Niger. In 
return for allocating a portion of  capi-
tal to host nations (typically 25-30%), 
French-owned companies continued to 
exploit these mines after independence. 
Throughout the second half  of  the 20th 
century, uranium mines in Africa pro-
vided fuel for weapons and reactors in 
North America, Europe, and East Asia. 
For much of  their history, however, 
these mines were not treated as fully 
nuclear sites.  National regulatory agen-
cies – when they existed at all – did little 
to monitor radiation exposure among 
mineworkers. Indeed, for many decades 
the IAEA itself  didn’t treat uranium 
ore and yellowcake as nuclear materials 
whose circulation required monitoring. 
In order to understand why this was the 
case – and how it matters for assessing 
today’s atomic enthusiasm – we need a 
broader vision of  Africa’s nuclear his-
tory.
How did uranium lose nuclearity?
Let’s revisit the creation of  the IAEA 
in 1957. Because apartheid South Af-
rica was a major supplier of  uranium 
to the British and American weapons 
programmes, it was included as one of  
the 12 countries involved in designing 
the agency’s governing statute. One im-
portant question involved determining 
which countries would secure perma-
nent seats on the IAEA’s Board of  Gov-
ernors. This was a technopolitical issue, 
which involved taking both technical 
“advancement” and political geogra-
phy into account. Knowing that inter-
national opposition to apartheid would 
prevent its election to the board by the 
membership at large, South Africa lob-
bied hard to be appointed as the repre-
sentative from the so-called Africa and 
Middle East region. On the strength of  
its uranium production, South Africa 
won the seat. 
Barely a decade later, however, ura-
nium mines lost their nuclear status. 
The IAEA’s 1968 safeguards document 
speciically excluded mines and mills 
from the classiication of  “principal 
nuclear facility.” The 1972 safeguards 
document further excluded uranium 
ore from the category of  “source mate-
rial.”  International authorities thus did 
not consider uranium as nuclear until it 
became feed for enrichment plants or 
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fuel for reactors. 
Excepting uranium ore and yellowcake 
from the category of  nuclear things 
meant that mines and yellowcake plants 
were formally excluded from the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) 
safeguards and inspection regimes. Ura-
nium’s nuclearity plummeted because 
several uranium-producing countries—
including apartheid South Africa—ac-
tively lobbied for such an exclusion 
starting in the late 1960s. South Africa, 
for one, now had other nuclear facilities 
and didn’t need mines to qualify as a 
“nuclear” nation. 
Denuclearization was driven by the de-
sire to commodify. Freedom from direct 
inspections opened the possibility of  
treating uranium (in yellowcake form) 
not as an exceptionally nuclear thing 
that had to be carefully monitored, but 
rather as a banal commodity like any 
other—one that could (in principle) be 
bought and sold without government or 
international oversight. This had direct 
consequences for the pricing and mar-
keting of  African uranium. 
The price of  non-nuclearity
Consider Niger, currently the world’s 
fourth largest uranium producer. When 
he came to power in 1960, Hamani Di-
ori, Niger’s irst postcolonial president, 
sought to maximize the beneits of  de-
posits discovered by the French in order 
to secure his nation’s sovereignty over its 
natural resources. Diori got two succes-
sive French presidents to acknowledge, 
in writing, the special signiicance of  
uranium-related transactions. This ena-
bled him to discuss uranium revenues 
and prices as matters of  state diplo-
macy, rather than subjects of  corporate 
negotiation.
Inspired by the Organization of  Petro-
leum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) 70 
percent increase in the price of  crude 
oil in 1973, Diori sought similar lever-
age over the price of  uranium. In 1974, 
he tried to emulate OPEC’s model with 
the help of  Gabon, France’s other main 
uranium supplier. Niger’s representa-
tives argued that “the content of  urani-
um transcended commercialism.” They 
reasoned that if  Niger could contribute 
to the exceptional nuclearity of  France, 
then surely France could make excep-
tional contributions to the economic de-
velopment of  Niger—notably, by pay-
ing a price for uranium that relected its 
political, nuclear signiicance. 
In response, the French delegation 
sought to denuclearize uranium by in-
sisting on the banality of  the market. 
Drawing upon IAEA deinitions of  
what did and didn’t count as a nuclear 
material—and upon various market de-
vices that uranium mining corporations 
and international agencies used to con-
vert uranium into a sellable commod-
ity—the French insisted that the only 
possible way to determine the value of  
uranium was to treat it like an ordinary 
market commodity.
Trilateral discussions were interrupted 
when Diori was ousted by a military 
coup in April 1974. His successor, Seyni 
Kountché, went for a diferent sort of  
market arrangement. Kountché negoti-
ated an agreement that entitled Niger 
to sell—directly and independently—a 
proportion of  yellowcake output equal 
to the percentage of  its capital holdings 
in the mining companies. This in turn 
freed Niger to develop a customer list 
that included Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan, 
all of  which were willing to pay for the 
nuclear value of  uranium.
Those customers dried up in the 1980s, 
however, as worldwide prices for ura-
nium began to plummet. Large multi-
national mining companies rode out the 
storm by stockpiling yellowcake until 
prices rose. Unable to aford storage 
costs, Niger returned full control over 
sales and pricing to the French compa-
nies. Disputes resurge regularly, howev-
er, as successive Nigérien governments 
struggle to obtain higher prices for the 
country’s yellowcake.
Yesterday’s modernity
Grand promises of  modernity accom-
panied the launch of  uranium extrac-
tion in Niger, especially around the con-
struction of  Arlit, the mining town built 
to house company employees. Yet Niger 
consistently ranks at or near the bottom 
of  the United Nations Human Develop-
ment Index. For over a decade, Nigérien 
civil society has probed this paradox, 
elucidating the social, economic, health, 
and environmental dimensions of  ura-
nium mining. In 2003, Aghir In’Man, a 
local NGO started by an employee of  
the Somaïr uranium mine, invited sci-
entists from a French NGO to measure 
radiation levels in Arlit. They found ra-
dioactive scrap metal in market stalls, 
where it was being repurposed for cook-
ing pots and washbasins. Contaminated 
water lowed from community taps 
throughout town. Water used to protect 
unpaved roads against high desert winds 
left uranium residues. As these indings 
became public, more NGOs formed, 
including a “publish what you pay” or-
ganization focused on issues of  inancial 
transparency and accountability.
These observers conclude that obstacles 
to building regulatory capacity in Niger 
are compounded by widespread corrup-
tion. For decades, they insist, uranium 
revenues lowed primarily into fancy 
buildings in Niamey and private bank 
accounts of  government oicials. Under 
these circumstances, could any Nigérien 
state agency maintain the independence 
required for credible expertise? Niger’s 
Centre national de la radioprotection 
(CNRP), a state regulatory body for ra-
diological hazards, was not established 
until 1998 — three decades after the 
launch of  the irst uranium mine. Over 
a decade later, one of  its oicials noted 
ruefully that the CNRP still didn’t pos-
sess instruments that could measure 
radon levels. Anticipating two such 
detectors to arrive soon, he neverthe-
less expressed faith in the expertise and 
transparency of  radiation protection at 
the mines. Needless to say, NGOs in Ar-
lit do not share his conidence that two 
radon detectors suice to monitor some 
of  the world’s largest uranium mines. 
Niger’s history with uranium is not 
unique. When communities in eastern 
Gabon learned about the eforts of  the 
Nigérien NGOs, they too solicited help 
mapping out radioactive contamination 
in the region around Mounana, where 
a French-owned company mined ura-
nium from 1957 to 1999.  A team of  
scientists, doctors and lawyers went to 
Mounana in 2006, where they took in-
dependent environmental readings and 
interviewed nearly 500 former mine 
employees about their health and work 
experience. Most employees reported 
Throughout the 
second half of the 20th 
century, uranium mines 
in Africa provided 
fuel for weapons 
and reactors in North 
America, Europe, 
and East Asia. 
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no formal training on radiation or ra-
don-related risks and no feedback on 
their monthly dosimetric readings. The 
Gabonese state had done nothing to 
monitor working conditions or occupa-
tional health. One former medical doc-
tor testiied that company clinicians had 
no training in uranium-related occupa-
tional health and that the company’s ra-
diation protection division consistently 
refused to transmit dosimetric readings 
to the medical division. Residents dis-
played a range of  symptoms, but their 
illnesses remained undiagnosed and un-
treated. 
In response to the ensuing public rela-
tions scandals, Areva – France’s nuclear 
parastatal – promised to install “health 
observatories” in Gabon and Niger. 
Two of  the French NGOs involved in 
the 2006 investigations agreed to par-
ticipate in a joint committee that would 
name experts to oversee the observato-
ries, deine protocols for data collection, 
analyze results, and make proposals to 
improve the environment at the sites. 
But other NGOs were skeptical that the 
agreement would result in prompt, ef-
fective remediation. Even less promising 
was the fact that no residents or workers 
were included, a striking oversight given 
how little Nigérien and Gabonese work-
ers trusted the state. 
Indeed, the observatories were a far cry 
from the remediation and compensa-
tion demanded by local employees. In 
mid-2011, the doctor in charge of  ex-
amining former workers in Gabon told 
a radio producer that she couldn’t reach 
any conclusions because she didn’t 
have national databases—most nota-
bly, cancer registries—against which to 
compare the health of  former workers. 
The families of  two French employees 
who had worked in Niger and Gabon 
have been awarded damages by French 
courts. So far, however, no Africans 
have received compensation.
Mounana residents did obtain a modest 
victory in 2011, when Areva agreed to 
demolish 200 houses with extremely el-
evated radon levels. At the time of  their 
construction in the 1970s, these houses 
had served as emblems of  a new Gabo-
nese modernity, complete with electric-
ity and running water. They’d been 
built using uranium mine tailings – a 
practice also followed in the US in the 
1950s and 1960s during a construction 
boom in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 
the 1970s, just as the Mounana houses 
were going up, the ones in Grand Junc-
tion were being torn down because of  
their high radon levels. It would take 
another forty years for Gabonese citi-
zens to learn that they’d been served 
yesterday’s modernity.
A brief  return to South Africa shows 
that such issues were not conined to 
small countries, or to Francophone ar-
eas. As we saw, the apartheid govern-
ment initially argued for the nuclearity 
of  uranium in order to secure a seat 
on the IAEA’s governing board. That 
did not mean, however, that uranium 
counted as a nuclear material for reg-
ulatory purposes within the country. 
South African uranium occurred in the 
same ore matrix as gold. This made it 
easy to deny its nuclearity, and indeed 
most of  the men who worked the urani-
um-rich shafts – whether black or white 
– did not know that they were extract-
ing radioactive ore. Before 1999, South 
African mines implemented no special 
protections against radiological haz-
ards, despite numerous studies docu-
menting extremely high radon levels in 
some shafts. 
The battle to regulate radiation ex-
posure in South African mines lasted 
for decades, spanning the apartheid 
and post-apartheid periods. The min-
ing industry iercely opposed the very 
principle of  classifying any mine shaft 
as a “nuclear” workplace. Drawing on 
the appearance of  good recordkeeping 
ofered by apartheid-era systems of  in-
lux and labor control, mine operators 
argued that the workforce of  black min-
ers was so transient that no individual 
could have received dangerous levels of  
radon exposure. This occluded the fact 
that many men returned yearly, engag-
ing in repeat contracts for periods of  20 
years or more. 
In 1994, the year of  South Africa’s ac-
cession to democracy, a government 
commission was established to investi-
gate the full range of  health and safety 
hazards in South African mines. It es-
timated that some 10,000 mineworkers 
had radiation exposures above interna-
tionally recommended limits. Mining 
companies argued that remediation 
would drive up costs and force shaft 
closures, putting tens of  thousands out 
of  work just as they’d inally obtained 
political freedoms. Companies lost the 
argument, and in 1999 the National 
Nuclear Regulator gained purview over 
South Africa mines. 
Nevertheless, problems surrounding the 
transparency of  monitoring results arise 
repeatedly. There are no mechanisms in 
place to address the health concerns of  
mineworkers exposed in the past. And 
across the Rand, mine tailings — rife 
with radioactive rubble and other tox-
ins — now serve as home to people 
displaced by proitable industrial devel-
opment. In sum, South Africa has not 
dealt adequately with its current nucle-
ar legacy. Nevertheless, its government 
is eager to create new nuclear futures.
Why Cling to Yesterday’s Future?
The liability costs for radiation ex-
posure while mining uranium in Ni-
ger, Gabon, and South Africa are tiny 
compared to the damages that would 
be incurred even by a moderate reac-
tor accident, not to mention one on the 
scale of  Chernobyl or Fukushima. We 
can hope that operators have learned 
enough that those particular scenarios 
wouldn’t recur. But it would be a serious 
error to conclude that we can prevent 
any reactor accident. This is because 
accident prevention isn’t a matter of  
abstract knowledge. At a minimum, it 
requires interlocking, well-maintained 
infrastructures, efective regulation, and 
constant technopolitical vigilance. And 
even that is unlikely to suice. Thirty 
years ago, sociologist Charles Perrow 
argued that the social and technologi-
cal complexity of  nuclear systems pro-
duced non-linear interactions that were 
impossible to fully predict or prevent. 
Unfortunately, he has been proven right 
time and time again.
African countries have been at the fore-
front of  mobile technologies, showing 
that widely distributed communica-
tions and inancial systems are pos-
sible without the crippling investment 
and maintenance expenses of  national 
grids. Why not do the same for energy 
technologies? It’s time to focus on inno-
vation, not emulation. Investing in dis-
tributed wind and solar power systems 
would place African countries at the 
forefront of  a new energy revolution. 
Given the availability and lower cost 
of  such options, does Africa really want 
yesterday’s future? 
*Gabrielle Hecht is professor of  History at 
the University of  Michigan and director of  its 
Programme in Science, Technology, and So-
ciety. She recently served as associate director 
of  UM’s African Studies Center. Her 2012 
book, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global 
Uranium Trade was published jointly by MIT 
Press and Wits University Press, and won sev-
eral awards. She is currently beginning a book 
about technology and power in Africa.
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TOWARDS AN AFRICAN NANOFUTURE
A REGULATORY APPROACH
Prof. Roger Brownsword, King’s College London
The Vision of  an 
African Nanofuture
H
ow is the vision 
of  an African 
nanofuture to 
be realised? 
While nanotechnologies 
are spoken about as being 
‘relatively low cost’, there 
needs to be investment in 
both the underlying sci-
ence and the technology 
itself, and policymakers 
need to be persuaded 
that the investment rep-
resents good value for 
money. In some places, 
it will be easy to make 
the case. For example, in 
the Ministerial Foreword 
to the UK Nanotechnologies 
Strategy: Small Technologies, 
Great Opportunities (2010), 
we read that the govern-
ment is determined ‘‘to 
develop the nanotech-
nologies industry while 
protecting the health of  
consumers and employ-
ees and avoiding damage to the envi-
ronment.’’ The challenge is to make the 
case for an African nanofuture.
If  policymakers are persuaded that 
investment in nanotechnologies is pru-
dent, then it is equally important that 
the vision of  a nanofuture is also so-
cially acceptable. New technologies 
are invariably ‘disruptive’; and there is 
no reason to think that the application 
of  nanotechnologies would not have 
disruptive efects—for example, there 
might be economic and social impacts 
(e.g. some jobs might disappear, but oth-
ers might be created; some disturbance 
to traditional customs, practices and 
values might occur). 
Even if  these disruptive efects are an-
ticipated, their impact should not be 
underrated. Moreover, there might 
be unanticipated efects. What, some 
might ask, if  a swarm of  malign nano-
bots escapes our control leading to the 
kind of  scenario depicted in Michael 
Crichton’s novel, Prey? What if  the devel-
opment of  nanotechnologies proves to be cata-
strophic? It is at this point that we need 
to think about creating the right kind of  
regulatory environment for an African 
nanofuture.
Getting the Regulatory Environ-
ment Right
Regulators, whether they are operating 
as national lawmakers or as industry 
standard-setters, face formidable chal-
lenges as new technologies emerge. In 
the early days of  the development of  
a technology, it might well be unclear 
whether special regulatory measures 
will need to be introduced—and, if  so, 
what those measures should be and who 
should have the responsibility for their 
introduction. At national legislative 
level, the di culty with rapidly emerg-
ing technologies is that there is no easy 
way of  keeping the law connected to 
the technology and its applications. Al-
though the law might be expressed in 
ways that it well with the understand-
ing of  the technology and its applica-
tions at the date of  enactment, things 
can rapidly move on—as we have seen, 
for example, in Eu-
rope with informa-
tion technologies 
and data protection 
law. Moreover, if  
the responsibility for 
setting the regula-
tory framework is 
left to the scientists 
and technologists 
themselves, this 
may make for bet-
ter connection but 
there are obvious 
questions about the 
legitimacy of  the 
process and the ac-
countability of  the 
regulators.
These problems are 
compounded where 
there are many dif-
ferent views about 
the acceptability of  
a particular technol-
ogy. In Europe, the 
regulatory framework for biotechnolo-
gies has been deeply contested by dif-
ferent value constituencies. On the one 
side, there has been a strong emphasis 
on the potential health care beneits 
that should low from a deeper under-
standing of  human genetics; on the 
other side, there has been a concern 
that this focus on the potential beneits 
will lead to the compromising of  hu-
man dignity. Similarly, in relation to 
GM crops and GM food, while on the 
one side there has been an emphasis on 
the potential beneits together with re-
liance on the science that suggests that 
the technologies are safe, on the other, 
opponents are nervous about safety and 
express concerns about both the dignity 
of  humans and the dignity of  the envi-
ronment. 
A Four-Stage Regulatory Ap-
proach
It is constantly said in relation to nano-
technologies that the mistakes made in 
relation to biotechnology should not be 
repeated. Nevertheless, avoiding these 
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mistakes is far from straightforward. I 
suggest that an African nanofuture poli-
cy might be taken forward by regulators 
in four inclusive stages. At the irst stage, 
the task is to make sure that the commu-
nity is comfortable with the project, that 
there is a social licence that authorises 
the research, development, and applica-
tion of  nanotechnologies. At the second 
stage, an appropriate precautionary 
strategy for the initial research and de-
velopment of  nanotechnologies needs 
to be put in place; and, moreover, there 
needs to be debate about which lines of  
development would best serve the public 
interest. At the third stage, there need to 
be appropriate ex ante regulatory meas-
ures that determine whether nanoprod-
ucts, nanomedical devices, and so on, 
are put into circulation; and there need 
to be ex post monitoring and compen-
satory measures.  Finally, the regulatory 
scheme of  incentives, including patent 
law, will need to be ine-tuned so that 
the regulatory environment supports 
and encourages those nanotechnolo-
gies that are most urgently required. We 
can say a little more about each of  these 
four stages.
Informing, Educating and Debat-
ing
The irst stage is one of  informing, edu-
cating, and debating nanotechnologies. 
Although nanotechnologies have been 
current for some time and although 
there are many nanoproducts in cir-
culation—for example, in clothes and 
sports equipment, in cosmetics and 
surgical dressings—this is still a technol-
ogy that has a relatively low proile. It 
cannot be assumed that everyone will 
be familiar with the language of  na-
notechnologies—with nanoparticles, 
nanoibers, nanotubes, Buckyballs, and 
the nanoscale itself—let alone have a 
view about whether their development 
and application would be a good thing. 
In the United Kingdom, a irst step in 
public information was taken in a well-
known report in 2004 from the Royal 
Society and the Royal Academy of  En-
gineering, Nanoscience and Nanotech-
nologies: Opportunities and Uncertain-
ties. 
This was a good starting point but, as 
the report makes clear, public engage-
ment on the possible use of  the technol-
ogy has a long way to go. Even in the 
UK, the authors of  the report found 
that ‘awareness of  nanotechnologies is 
currently low’ (7.2.3, para 19); and it 
follows that any assessment of  public at-
titudes is problematic.  Accordingly, one 
of  the recommendations made in the 
report is for investment in public dia-
logue, this to be taken forward by both 
government and industry (7.6, para 49). 
Interestingly, the report also argues for 
a more strategic look at new technolo-
gies, bringing together ‘representatives 
of  a wide range of  stakeholders to look 
at new and emerging technologies and 
identify at the earliest possible stage 
areas where potential health, safety, en-
vironmental, social, ethical and regula-
tory issues may arise and advise on how 
these might be addressed’ (9.7, para 
32).  There is much good sense in these 
remarks—remarks that ind several 
echoes in the more recent report from 
the Nuield Council on Bioethics on 
Emerging Biotechnologies: Technology, 
Choice and the Public Good (2012)—and 
they might ofer some helpful pointers 
for structuring the irst stage towards an 
African nanofuture.     
  
Initial Precaution
At the second stage, the regulators need 
to put in place a precautionary approach 
to the initial research and development 
of  nanotechnologies. Famously, Princi-
ple 15 of  the Rio Declaration provides: 
‘Where there are threats of  serious or ir-
reversible damage, lack of  full scientiic 
certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing such [precautionary] 
measures.’ Of  course, where the un-
derlying science is well understood and 
where there are reliable risk assessments 
of  the particular technologies, there is 
no need for Africa to reinvent the wheel. 
However, where there are new lines of  
proposed research and development, 
precaution is required—and, it needs to 
be borne in mind, that some critics will 
argue not simply that the costs of  invest-
ing in nanotechnologies will exceed the 
beneits but that, because of  the uncer-
tainties surrounding the technology, the 
risks might prove to be catastrophic. 
In the face of  this, it seems reasonable 
to insist that regulators should strive 
to maintain a responsible and rational 
approach. However, precautionary ap-
proaches are frequently accused of  be-
ing irrational because they focus in a 
one-eyed way on the need to avoid a 
particular set of  adverse consequences 
at the expense of  ignoring the adverse 
consequences of  making a precaution-
ary intervention (See, e.g., Cass R. Sun-
stein, Laws of  Fear, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) Clearly, it is irrational to as-
sess the options in such a one-sided way; 
that simply will not do. However, where 
there is no way of  knowing what the 
risks are, it seems prudent to proceed in 
small steps (as with contained use) and 
to do so only where (assuming that regu-
lators get it wrong in deciding whether 
or not to run the risk) the ensuing nega-
tive outcome is the least unacceptable 
relative to the interests of  regulatees. 
Ideally, the application of  this princi-
ple should be guided by the reasonable 
views of  the public. In the absence of  
a clear public steer, a plausible assump-
tion is that, whilst a community might 
be willing to forego the beneits of  a raft 
of  inessential consumer products (nano-
coated tennis balls, golf  clubs, and the 
like), it would be reluctant to forego the 
beneits that nanotechnologies promise 
to generate in such areas as health care 
and environmental improvement. For, 
relative to the needs of  agents, products 
of  the latter kind are a higher priority. 
This suggests a spectrum of  agent needs 
with, at one pole, those needs that are 
essential for basic human lourishing 
and, at the other, those needs that are 
inessential. 
With regard to products that lie at or 
near the essential end of  the spectrum 
of  agent needs, the priority is to encour-
age research and development together 
with a responsible approach by produc-
ers so that knowledge as to the type, 
scale and extent of  possible hazards and 
risks is made known. As for products 
that lie at or near the inessential end of  
the spectrum of  agent needs, members 
of  the community would want to know 
which kind of  interests are at risk. If  
such products might represent a threat 
to life, regulators should consider ap-
plying a prohibition; but, where the risk 
that is believed to be associated with a 
product is less serious, regulators might 
take a more relaxed approach. Judg-
ments of  precaution cannot be coher-
ently acted on in isolation; comparative 
judgments of  proportionality also need 
to be made.
It bears emphasising that scientiic and 
technical experts hold no special brief  
to speak for the priorities and prefer-
ences of  their communities. As a report 
prepared for the Washington-based 
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies 
puts it, the public needs to be engaged 
in two capacities: irst, as citizens, mem-
bers of  the public are stakeholders in as-
sessing the larger social and ethical risks 
associated with nanotechnology; and, 
secondly, as potential consumers of  na-
notechnology products, members of  the 
public need to be able to make informed 
choices (J. Clarence Davies, Managing the 
Efects of  Nanotechnology).
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Regulating Circulation and Use
This takes us to the third stage: the con-
ditions on which nanoproducts and na-
nodevices should be cleared for circula-
tion in the consumer marketplace or in 
health care. Here, we should distinguish 
between ex ante and ex post provision. 
Ex ante, regulators seek to ensure that 
consumer products and medical pro-
cedures are reasonably safe; ex post, 
they seek to ensure that consumers and 
patients who are injured by dangerous 
products or procedures are fairly com-
pensated; and, in an ideal world, they 
try to bring together ex ante and ex post 
provision in a coherent scheme of  pro-
tective and corrective regulation. How-
ever, even in highly developed regulato-
ry regimes, novel nanotechnologies are 
likely to expose a number of  weaknesses 
in existing provision as a result of  which 
some ine-tuning and clariication of  
the regulation will be necessary. 
(See Albert C. Lin, “Size Matters: Regulating 
Nanotechnology” (2007) 31 Harvard En-
vironmental Law Review 349, at 361-374 
(for the view  that US regulatory provisions are 
inadequate); and, generally, Trudy A Phelps, 
“The European Approach to  Nanoregulation” 
in Nigel M de S Cameron and M Ellen Mitch-
ell (eds), Nanoscale (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 
2007) 189.).
One policy question is whether nano-
products should be subjected to some ex 
ante regulatory review, or whether they 
should be simply allowed to circulate 
subject to whatever ex post regulatory 
provision (in contract law, tort law and 
product liability law) there is. In most 
communities, the default rule will be 
that prevention of  injury is to be pre-
ferred to compensation for injury; and 
the logic of  this is that ex ante regula-
tory controls should be applied to nano-
products. Without the requisite regula-
tory clearance, nanoproducts should 
not go to market; and, once they are 
in circulation, there need to be robust 
compensation and insurance schemes in 
place where products prove to be dan-
gerous.
The ex-ante regulatory review track 
for nanomedicines and nanomedical 
devices is likely to be more complex. 
First, there is the basic research to be 
undertaken; secondly, the new nano-
medicines and devices need to be tri-
alled in humans; and, thirdly, there 
needs to be formal approval for clinical 
application. Where researchers have 
a nanomedicine that they think might 
be efective and suiciently safe to try 
in humans, they would need approval 
for the trial. Where clearance is given 
for a trial, there remain a number of  
detailed questions about the terms on 
which the trial is conducted. Even if  
we assume that participation must be 
voluntary and on an informed consent 
basis, this leaves open questions about 
the scope and nature of  liability to par-
ticipants if  there are adverse incidents. 
For example, does it matter whether 
the particular nanomedicine is a high 
or a low priority? What if  participants 
are paid for their participation? Where 
a nanomedicine goes through the trial 
stage successfully, it will be presented for 
a further round of  regulatory clearance, 
this time for application in clinical prac-
tice. Where regulatory clearance is giv-
en, we can expect that these novel na-
nomedicines will not be administered to 
patients except on an informed consent 
basis. However, this again leaves many 
issues of  regulatory detail to be settled 
in particular, concerning the scope and 
nature of  ex post liability.
Incentivisation
Finally, there is the fourth regula-
tory stage, that of  targeted incentivisa-
tion, particularly (but not exclusively) 
through the patent regime. On the face 
of  it, patent law is well intended. How-
ever, in practice, patents attract mixed 
reviews. While some defend patents, 
arguing that without the monopoly in-
centive and protection against infringe-
ment there would be signiicantly less 
investment in innovation, others accuse 
patents of  denying millions of  people in 
the developing world access to essential 
drugs. To this, we can add the familiar 
problems of  patent clusters and thick-
ets, not to mention the activities of  pat-
ent ‘trolls’, all distorting the operation 
of  the intended scheme of  incentives.
Standing back from these details, the 
overarching principles are clear. Ac-
cording to Article 27 of  the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR):
(1) Everyone has the right freely to par-
ticipate in the cultural life of  the com-
munity, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientiic advancement and its beneits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protec-
tion of  the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientiic, literary or 
artistic production of  which he is the 
author.
But, how are we to do justice to both 
limbs of  Article 27? With the best regu-
latory will, how can the interests of  in-
novators be protected (as human rights) 
when the beneits of  inventions are to 
be shared (also as a matter of  human 
rights)?
Possibly, we can ind more satisfactory 
initiatives outside the patent regime. A 
number of  imaginative ideas are in cir-
culation—put forward by, amongst oth-
ers, Thomas Pogge and James Love—
including proposals for a Health Impact 
Fund (HIF), patent pools, prizes, and 
a Medical Research and Development 
Treaty. The di culties associated with 
these proposals should not be under-
estimated. Even so, if  nation states are 
to honour their human rights commit-
ments, the obvious thing is for them 
to become more proactive and more 
focused by continuing to fund public 
sector research and development as well 
as the mechanisms for transferring the 
beneits to those who are most needy.
Conclusion
In the news recently, we read that re-
searchers have discovered that, if  car-
bon nanoballs are added to the insula-
tion plastic used in high-voltage cables, 
this could result in enormous eiciency 
gains in the power grids of  the future; 
that, by using palladium nanoparticles 
as a catalyst, harmful nitrate can be re-
moved from drinking water; and that a 
chip with nanowires coated with anti-
bodies can be used to extract and ana-
lyse cancerous cells. Developments of  
this kind might well play some part in 
an African nanofuture. 
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NANOTECHNOLOGY 
FOR WATER TREATMENT 
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O
nly 3% is fresh water, the 
bulk of  which is distrib-
uted in icecaps and glaciers 
(79%) and as groundwater 
(20%), leaving a mere 0.03% as the 
only readily accessible water for domes-
tic and agricultural use. Each year, the 
number of  people dying from water-
related diseases is more than 5 million, 
globally. Access to clean water has been 
singled out as the most important global 
crisis of  the 21st century by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), United 
Nations International Children Educa-
tion Fund (UNICEF) and the United 
Nations (UN). 
Annually, more than one billion peo-
ple depend on the use of  potentially 
harmful sources of  water for domestic 
purposes. The importance of  water, 
sanitation and hygiene for both health 
and development has been relected 
in the outcomes of  a series of  interna-
tional policy documents. These include 
the International Conference on Pri-
mary Health Care, held in Alma-Ata, 
Kazakhstan (former Soviet Union), in 
1978; the 1977 World Water Confer-
ence in Mar del Plata, Argentina, which 
launched the water supply and sanita-
tion decade of  1981–1990; the UN 
Declaration on the Millenium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) and the World 
Summit for Sustainable Development 
held in Johannesburg in 2002. Most 
recently, the UN General Assembly de-
clared the period from 2005 to 2015 as 
the International Decade for Action, 
Water for Life.
Access to safe drinking-water is essential 
to health. It is also a basic human right. 
It has been shown that investments in 
water supply and sanitation can yield 
net economic beneits, since the reduc-
tions in adverse health efects and health 
care costs outweigh the costs of  invest-
ments in water infrastructure. This is 
true for major water supply infrastruc-
ture, as well as for water treatment sys-
tems in the homes. Improvements in ac-
cess to safe water also tend to favour the 
very poor, meaning that these type of  
investment can be an efective strategy 
for poverty alleviation.
Traditional Methods of  Water Pu-
riication in Africa
In Africa, rural communities are often 
more afected by lack of  access to safe 
drinking water compared to urban resi-
dents. 
Many women in sub-Sahara Africa still 
walk long distances to fetch water for 
domestic consumption.
In most African countries, waterborne 
diseases are common in communities 
where access to potable water is low. 
Traditional methods of  water iltration 
are not always efective. With the aid of  
local heating systems such as irewood, 
coal and charcoal, the boiling method 
is popularly believed to be the most ef-
icient, arguably yielding total decon-
tamination after a few minutes of  con-
tinuous boiling.
What is Nanotechnology?
Nanotechnology is the manipulation 
of  matter on an atomic, molecular, and 
supramolecular scale. It is a science, 
engineering or technology conducted 
at the nanoscale, which is about 1 -100 
nanometers. Nanotechnology refers 
to a broad range of  tools, techniques 
and applications that involve materi-
als of  ininitesimal sizes used either for 
Today, almost one-ifth of  the world’s population lack access to safe drinking 
water. Although about 71% of  the earth is covered by water, 97% of  this is salty 
sea water which is unsuitable for drinking. 
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biological, chemical or engineering and 
physical applications. Nanotechnology 
centers on the design, characterization, 
production and application of  materi-
als, devices and systems by controlling 
shape and size on the approximate scale 
ranging from a few to hundreds of  na-
nometres in diameter (1-100 nm where, 
1 nm = 10 Ǻ or 10-9 m). 
Nanomaterials come in form of  parti-
cles, sheets or wires that have nanosize 
in at least one dimension. They have 
some unique physicochemical and sur-
face properties that lend themselves to 
novel uses. This is mainly due to the 
large surface area to mass ratio. The 
large surface area enables efective in-
teraction of  components. Examples of  
these interactions include adsorption, 
catalysis and pore behaviour. 
New Technologies for Water Treat-
ment
With the advent of  nanotechnology and 
its potential applications in water purii-
cation, scarcity of  safe drinking water in 
Africa could still be a thing of  the past. 
Treatment of  high volumes of  waste-
water containing low concentrations 
of  pollutants is becoming increasingly 
important as discharge regulations are 
now more stringent. Most of  the past 
eforts have focused on the removal of  
higher concentrations of  pollutants by 
employing the more traditional and yet 
expensive adsorbent/ion-exchange ma-
terials. 
Figure1:
Can we use nanotechnology to treat wa-
ter in Africa?
Desalination of  Sea Water by Nanoiltration 
and Reverse Osmosis in Florida, USA
Nanotechnology in use: showing Four 
- stage nano-iltration membrane units. 
Delivering high-quality water for Dania 
Beach, Florida, USA, to meet stringent 
disinfectant by-product (DBP) rules. 
The city of  Florida partnered with 
CDM Smith Company on a new treat-
ment process-based expansion. The 
new designed nanoiltration & reverse 
osmosis plant expected to accommo-
date at least 20 to 30 years of  growth 
and development. African countries can 
borrow a leaf  from Florida USA nano-
iltration systems
Nanotechnology for Water Purii-
cation
New approaches are continually being 
examined to supplement traditional 
water puriication methods. Nano-en-
abled technologies are being intensely 
explored to play a signiicant role in 
water treatment as more attention is be-
ing given to the development of  ilters 
and media that can take advantage of  
the the properties of  nano-materials to 
remove contaminants from water. Wa-
ter puriication using nanotechnology 
exploits nanoscopic materials such as 
carbon nanotubes, electrospun cellulose 
and chitosan and alumina nanoibers 
for nanoiltration of  water. The water 
puriication technology also utilizes the 
existence of  nanoscopic pores in zeolite 
iltration membranes, as well as nano-
catalysts and magnetic nanoparticles. 
Nanosensors, such as those based on 
titanium oxide nanowires or palladium 
nanoparticles are used for analytical de-
tection of  contaminants in water sam-
ples. Eiciency, durability and cost are 
the three key factors that inluence the 
design of  many of  these technologies.
Nanomaterials for water iltration: (a) 
electrospinning setup to produce na-
noibers using cellulose acetate CA, 
biopolymers; (b) Packed nanoibers in 
water iltration cartridges.
Types of  Water Pollutants 
The three main categories of  water 
contaminants are heavy metals, per-
sistent organic pollutants, and micro-
organisms. Heavy metals include: lead 
(Pb), mercury (Hg), arsenic (As), cad-
mium (Cd), zinc (Zn), copper (Cu) and 
chromium (Cr). Persistent organic pol-
lutants (POPs) include halogenated sol-
vents, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), 
trichloroethene (TCE), trichlorinated 
biphenyl (TCB), dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT) and their me-
tabolites. Common microorganism in-
clude bacteria such as Escherichia coli 
(E. coli) and Vibrio cholera (V. cholera).
Heavy metals pollution is arguably the 
most researched aspect of  water pollu-
tion from a chemical perspective. The 
control of  heavy metals using loccu-
lation, ion exchange, precipitation or 
reverse osmosis have proven expensive. 
Disposal of  the resulting sludge adds to 
environmental degradation. Eicient 
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and inexpensive materials for the re-
moval of  toxic metal ions is a growing 
area of  research. Filtration materials 
in the nanoscale dimension have been 
shown to be more efective than macro-
dimension materials. Membrane iltra-
tion has shown promise.
Membrane iltration for water pu-
riication
Water puriication by physical separa-
tion with the aid of  membranes and il-
ters are the most explored.  Membranes 
or ilters act as a physical barrier and 
selectively reject substances bigger than 
their pores, and so remove harmful pol-
lutants and retain useful nutrients pre-
sent in water. 
Membrane ilters can be divided into 
two general categories:
a)Permeable (micro-iltration and ultra- 
iltration)
b)Semi-permeable (nano-iltration and 
reverse osmosis).
Microiltration and ultrailtration pro-
cesses are applied when the purpose is 
to eliminate suspended solid particles 
whilst nano-iltration and reverse osmo-
sis (RO) are processes used to eliminate 
salts dissolved in water. The impurities 
that nanotechnology can tackle depend 
on the stage of  puriication of  water to 
which the technique is applied. It can 
also be used for removal of  sediments, 
chemical eluents, charged particles, 
bacteria and other pathogens. Apart 
from toxic trace elements, viscous (oily) 
impurities can also be separated from 
water, during puriication using nano-
technology. 
Currently, many water treatments in-
clude micro– and nanoscale processes, 
but are not considered as nanotechnol-
ogy as they are produced convention-
ally. When produced via nanotechnol-
ogy–driven approaches, all aspects 
of  the membrane can be reined and 
optimised to include smaller and more 
uniform sized pores and more reactive 
membranes. The ilters and membranes 
(see below) are made from a variety of  
nanomaterials including carbon na-
notubes (CNTs), nanoporous ceramics 
(clays), dendrimers, zeolites, nanoibres 
and nanosponges. Multi–use iltration 
systems could be developed to detect, 
separate out, and/or detoxify a contam-
inant. It is anticipated that in the near 
future, such membranes and ilters will 
become commonplace in detecting and 
removing viruses from water. 
Carbon nanotubes (CNTs)
Membrane ilters
Nanoiltration membranes made from 
CNTs and cellulose acetate biopoly-
mers are capable of  removing water 
pollutants such as metals, organic com-
pounds and microorganisms.
Biopolymer and synthetic poly-
mer membranes ilters
Cellulose as one of  the most abundant 
biopolymers has been investigated for 
use in removal of  water pollutants by 
utilizing the hydroxyl groups on its sur-
face. Its performance can be increased 
by adding functional groups which have 
a higher complexing capacity. Cellulose 
nanoibers, produced by electrospin-
ning and deacetylation of  cellulose 
acetate provide an adsorbent material 
which has a high surface area and high 
pore density. For example the cyclodex-
trin polymers have cavities that capture 
pollutants (see below). When grafted 
with functional groups, the materials 
show improved capacity for removal of  
heavy metals from waste streams and 
polluted waters.
Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) can remove 
almost all kinds of  water contaminants 
including turbidity, oil, bacteria, viruses 
and organic contaminants. Although 
their pores are signiicantly smaller, 
CNTs have been shown to have an 
equal or a faster low rate as compared 
to larger pores, possibly because of  the 
smooth interior of  the nanotubes. Com-
paratively, nanoibrous alumina ilters 
and other nanoiber materials also re-
move negatively charged contaminants 
such as viruses, bacteria, and organic 
and inorganic colloids at a faster rate 
than conventional ilters. While the 
current generation of  nanoilters may 
be relatively simple, it is believed that 
future generations of  nanotechnology-
based water treatment devices will capi-
talize on the properties of  these new 
nanoscale materials.
The process involved in developing 
nanoiltration membranes; (a) chemi-
cal reaction to produce a polymer; (b) 
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shapes of  a polymer with cavities capable 
of  scavenging pollutants; 
(c) electrospinning the polymers to 
produce nanoibers.
Apart from membranes and ilters, 
other nano-engineered materials 
useful for water puriication in-
clude (i) nanocatalysts and mag-
netic nanoparticles, and (ii) na-
nosensors for detecting pollutants in water. 
Nanocatalysts are particles with catalytic 
properties that can chemically break down 
POPs (Persistent Organic Pollutants) and 
render them harmless. Nanocatalysts have 
the potential to treat contaminants at very 
low levels, especially where current treat-
ment techniques are inefective or very 
expensive. Magnetic nanoparticles have 
large surface areas relative to their mass 
and easily bind with chemicals. Their abil-
ity to bind with contaminants, such as ar-
senic or oil, which can be easily removed 
using magnetic nanoparticles, make nano-
materials an appealing solution for water 
treatment.
Nanocatalysts for removing pollut-
ants in water
Nanotechnology is being used to develop 
small and potable sensors with enhanced 
capabilities for detecting biological and 
chemical contaminants at very low con-
centration levels in water bodies. The 
development of  low–cost potable na-
nosensors has provided minute yet highly 
eicient detectors for monitoring changes 
in water quality. This provides real time 
information which enables scientists and 
civil engineers to accurately administer 
required water treatment solutions.
Nanosensors for detecting pollutants in 
water
Nanotoxicity Concerns
There are genuine toxicity concerns with 
regards to nanotechnology. Notwithstand-
ing its potential applications highlighted 
above, like all technologies, nanotechnol-
ogy comes with potential risks and uncer-
tainties. For example, some researchers 
have found that the level of  risks associ-
ated with nanomaterials could be higher 
relative to those associated with its macro-
scale counterparts. This is because the 
surface area to volume ratio of  nanopar-
ticles make them more reactive than the 
bulk materials. 
Nanotoxicology- focuses on environmen-
tal exposure, hazard, and risk of  applied 
nanostructured materials.
Water puriication based on nanotechnol-
ogy has not yet led to any human health 
or environmental problems but some re-
search suggests that further studies into 
the biological interactions of  nanoparti-
cles should be carried out. For instance, 
it has been that fullerenes were found in 
the brain of  rats after prolonged exposure. 
Likewise carbon nanotubes were found to 
accumulate in vital organs in ish after 
exposure. Because of  lack of  adequate 
and authoritative toxicity efects based on 
prolonged exposure indings, there is need 
to tread with caution and carry out more 
research to address these safety concerns. 
Summary and Future Outlook
Clean water is essential to human health 
and is a critical feedstock in a 
variety of  key industries. Nano-
materials have a number of  key 
physicochemical properties that 
make them particularly attractive 
as sorbents for water puriication. 
Generally, nanoparticles have rela-
tively large surface areas than bulk 
particles. Nanomaterials provide 
unprecedented opportunities to 
develop more eicient water-pu-
riication catalysts and redox active me-
dia due to their large surface areas and 
sizes, shape-dependent optical, electronic 
and catalytic properties. Nanomaterials 
are also being used to develop chlorine-
free biocides through functionalization 
with chemical groups that selectively tar-
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Figure 12:  Nanoibers packed in cartridges as water puri-
ication units can be used by rural communities to deliver 
high quality water.
Nanotechnology is the next big thing in the technological 
revolution. Africa should seek to harness applications of  
this technology to address some of  its development chal-
lenges, including but not limited to water security. In this 
respect, the continent should invest in world class research 
centres and centres of  excellence in nanotechnology re-
search, equipped with state-of-the art labs, equipment and 
infrastructure. 
get key biochemical constituents of  waterborne 
bacteria and viruses. Nanomaterials can be 
grafted with various chemical groups to increase 
their ainity toward a given substance. They can 
also serve as high capacity/ selectivity and recy-
clable ligands for toxic metal ions, radionuclides, 
organic and inorganic solutes/anions in aqueous 
solutions.
In the near future, we anticipate that nanomateri-
als will help solve challenging water puriication 
problems including: (i) desalination of  brackish 
water; (ii) recovery of  valuable and toxic metal 
ions from membrane concentrates thereby fa-
cilitating brine disposal; (iii) development of  
chlorine-free biocides; and (iv) the puriication of  
water contaminated by toxic pollutants such as 
perchlorate, pharmaceuticals, chiral compounds 
and endocrine disrupting compounds (EDCs). We 
envision that nanomaterials will become critical 
elements in industrial and public water puriica-
tion systems. We anticipate that the rural com-
munities will have access to low cost cartridges 
to purify water for domestic consumption. The 
development of  smart membranes with bioilm-
resistant surfaces and embedded sensors/actua-
tors that can automatically adjust membrane per-
formance and selectivity by the year 2020, is a key 
long-term goal of  the Desalination and Water Pu-
riication Roadmap prepared by the US Bureau 
of  Reclamation and Sandia National Laborato-
ries.  We anticipate that nanomaterials will be key 
components of  these technologies. 
The development of  visible light-activated titania 
(TiO2) nanoparticles could have a signiicant im-
pact on water supplies. Furthermore, silver oxide 
(Ag2O) has great potential to degrade bacteria 
and other microorganisms in water. The con-
trolled release of  titania nanoparticles into surface 
waters exposed to sunlight, could signiicantly re-
duce organic carbon load through oxidative pho-
tochemical degradation.
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BIG DATA AND THE 
RISE OF AFRICAN 
CONSUMERISM
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Founder, African Innovation Foundation 
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T
his presents the tantalizing pros-
pect of  a robust, healthy, virtuous 
cycle of  domestic growth and a 
healthy local supply chain. As do-
mestic and regional consumption 
grows, so too is interest from international re-
tailers – and where retailers go, so too do ana-
lytics. The rise of  ‘big data’ as a marketing 
and business development tool remains con-
troversial in the West – so what will happen 
in such virgin territory as Africa? How will 
African governments and citizens respond to 
their data being mined? How will the grow-
ing hunger for material goods afect the con-
tinent’s rich cultural identity?
The scale of  change itself  is staggering. Re-
search and analysis is being conducted by 
many parties in order to make sense of  what 
is happening to the African consumer. A re-
cent report by McKinsey’s Africa Consumer 
Insights Center entitled ‘The rise of  the Afri-
can Consumer’ illustrates the dramatic speed 
of  growth: between 2000 and 2010, Africa’s 
private consumption grew by $568 billion. 
The impact of  this surge in spending has 
been outlined in a recent article in The Afri-
can Executive magazine, which suggests that 
90,000 small locally owned shops in Kenya 
have been replaced by around 230 supermar-
kets. It seems that – perhaps unsurprisingly 
- multinational retailers are locking to the 
continent; building mega-malls and driving 
prices of  big, aspirational brands ever-lower. 
A piece of  research carried out by the African 
marketing and research agency, Youth Dyna-
mix, claims that 39% of  Kenyan youths as-
pire to own an iPhone and 32% a Blackberry; 
indicating a thirst for international brands. 
And, like their western counterparts, young 
Africans are buying on-line. 
Africa’s virtual footprint is rising steadily
Current statistics show that only 1% of  all 
retail sales in Africa are online, compared 
to around 14% in the UK (Ernst & Young, 
November 2014) – but year-on-year growth 
is high and set to grow exponentially. Accord-
ing to the latest MasterCard Worldwide On-
line Shopping Survey, internet access grew by 
3600% from 2000 – 2012. In Q2 of  2014, 
the continent had 297,885,898 internet us-
ers (Internetworldstats.com). This represents 
26.5% of  the total population. In Nigeria 
70.3 million people use the internet, roughly 
40 per cent of  the population, with Egypt 
and South Africa with 46.2 and 24.0 million 
users respectively. Other African countries in 
the top ten are Kenya, Morocco, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania. 
The growth in internet access in Africa is 
creating ever-more space for online retail, 
providing more ways for more consumerism 
to reach more people. This phenomenon is 
already taking hold: one of  the region’s larg-
est online retailers, Jumia, has exploded on to 
the market in only eighteen months. It now 
stocks 100,000 separate items at its main 
Africa’s economic potential should be great news 
for every stakeholder, particularly its historically 
disenfranchised people. Indeed, the high level of  
investment and subsequent job creation has giv-
en rise to a new generation of  African consumers 
with more spending power than ever before. 
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AFRICAN CONSUMERS ARE STARTING TO 
SHOP ONLINE
AT PRESENT ONLY 1% OF ALL RETAIL SALES IN AFRICA 
ARE ONLINE – BUT YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH IS 
HIGH AND SET TO GROW EXPONENTIALLY
Source: Ernst & Young
Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm
297,885,898 Internet users in Africa estimated for June 30, 2014
Copyright © 2014, Miniwatts Marketing Group
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warehouse, boasts seven others and has 
a delivery leet of  over 200 vehicles.
These two ingredients – online shop-
ping and mass online activity – not 
only present Africa with the challenge 
of  adapting to a western-style con-
sumerism but it presents them with 
the new issue of  privacy. Whether it is 
online shopping, using social media or 
browsing the internet; Africans are now 
equally as vulnerable to big data as the 
rest of  the world. African policymak-
ers and citizens need to examine and 
understand what big data is and what 
it is being used for. At the very least, 
understanding the issue enables gov-
ernments and citizens to start to make 
decisions about how they navigate cy-
berspace. Education has to be at the 
heart of  it. 
The Importance of  Informed 
Consumerism 
For several years western countries 
and citizens have debated the pros 
and cons of  data-mining. Human 
rights activists hold governments and 
big business to account, lobbying for 
regulatory protection. Public aware-
ness campaigns and media coverage 
have made people more aware that 
they can control how their online life 
is tracked by disabling cookies or using 
VPNs. For those that care, there are 
ways to control who is watching us. In 
Africa, where the internet revolution 
is playing catch up, policymakers also 
need to get up to speed and work hard 
to make consumers aware that every 
page they click, every item they search 
for online and every page visited on Fa-
cebook will have direct repercussions on 
their future online presence. They also 
need to understand how big data dif-
fers from conventional data capture and 
what this means for society.
Big data itself  is a term that most lay-
men in any part of  the world won’t un-
derstand. However it is a development 
that is already revolutionizing the way 
companies target and speak to new and 
existing customers. Big data analyt-
ics is exciting for businesses because it 
enables them to handle vast volumes of  
data that was previously too random to 
make sense of. It means that they can 
form a much more nuanced way of  
selling to customers. They are already 
gaining a much clearer understanding 
of  what we look at and why; where we 
are travelling and what our budget is 
for a hotel or car rental; what interests 
we have from the books we read to the 
shoes we wear and movies we go to see. 
These data processing systems bring to-
gether vast quantities of  data, forming 
algorithms that allow companies to un-
derstand us intimately. 
Big data is manna from heaven for 
multinationals and, as virgin retail ter-
ritory, Africa is there for the taking. The 
danger is that African populations may 
be too caught up in the excitement of  
their retail revolution to notice – or un-
derstand – how their data is being used. 
Informed consumerism, which includes 
understanding the prevalence of  data 
mining, can help African consumers 
hold on to their cultural identity and 
avoid outsiders dictating how African 
consumers should shop, dine and travel. 
Crucially, it will also help Africans to 
make their own decisions about wheth-
er to buy African or not – rather than 
blindly chase international brands to 
the possible detriment of  their own 
manufacturing industries. Several dec-
ades of  globalization in the west have 
led to a resurgence of  buying locally 
because those countries – the UK for 
example – have seen their home-grown 
industries fall victim to cheaper goods 
from abroad. It is now a badge of  pride 
to ‘buy British’. African citizens have 
an opportunity to leapfrog domestic 
decline by making informed choices. 
Africans have the ability to learn from 
the mistakes of  the West and arm them-
selves with the knowledge that big 
data may be leading them towards 
economic decline. 
Africa is perhaps even more vulner-
able than western nations. Many 
African countries do not have strong 
manufacturing industries – but it so 
desperately needs them. Africa so 
keenly needs to nurture domestic in-
novation. The retail boom presents 
three main problems: irstly, an inlux 
of  international retailers threatens 
to wipe out small local traders who 
cannot compete on cost. Secondly, 
the purchasing of  non-African goods 
could diminish the local supply 
chain, causing job losses and a con-
traction in the countries productiv-
ity – not to mention a decline in lo-
cal manufacturing and an increasing 
reliance on imports. Thirdly, online 
activity gives rise to even more big 
data, persuading African consumers 
to purchase even more international 
brands. This may create an ever in-
creasing cycle of  blind consumption 
of  global brands to the detriment of  
local business. And for Africa, such a 
scenario could be disastrous. 
The cultural dimension is also under 
threat from the consumer boom and 
big data. Africa is already being looded 
with aspirational brands and the new 
generation is hungry for technology and 
western goods. If  Africa continues to 
move in the same direction as the ma-
ture economies, they face the prospect 
of  building towns and cities that be-
gin to resemble the high-streets of  the 
Western world – streets lined with the 
same fast food outlets, cheap clothes 
and retailers that have spread around 
the world taking market share, shutting 
down local retailers and changing the 
cultural landscape. What follows next 
Big data is manna 
from heaven for 
multinationals 
and, as virgin 
retail territory, 
Africa is there for 
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can be seen in the extraordinary 
retail boom in the Middle East. In 
Dubai, Western brands dominate. 
Malls and streets are packed full of  
designer clothing outlets, luxury 
watches, jewelry, luxury car sales-
rooms or franchised food outlets. 
What we have seen in the Middle 
East should act as a stark warn-
ing to Africa – certain parts of  the 
Middle East are playgrounds for 
the wealthy who chase material 
goods. And it is no coincidence 
that the Middle East also has the 
highest rates of  obesity and diabe-
tes in the world. 
Big data can work for Africa
There are however, potential ben-
eits from the big data story. The 
inancial services industry, for ex-
ample, continues to underserve 
the continent because of  poor 
data handling. The continent’s na-
tions have varying degrees of  ef-
icacy in credit scoring; there is no 
regional credit system and lending 
to small and medium sized busi-
nesses is hampered by a reluctance 
to lend. This is one area where big 
data can help; to support lend-
ers and empower borrowers with 
the ability to manage their credit 
scores. Western consumers know 
that every time they search for a 
loan they are being watched and 
every time they apply for credit it 
has an impact on their personal 
credit score. This helps consumers 
to make wiser borrowing decisions 
and protects capital markets.
Big data can also help in the area 
of  healthcare in Africa. If  policy-
makers can work with the private 
health sector, there is the potential 
for both parties to make sense of  
illness and track healthcare be-
haviors and decisions. Such data 
could help the government to 
identify needs in certain geogra-
phies or quickly identify outbreaks 
of  disease. Governments can also 
use big data to see where there 
may be high demand for agricul-
tural products, enabling it to steer 
investment funds towards those 
areas. 
It is here that Africa has the op-
portunity to do things diferently. 
Governments have an opportunity 
to embrace big data where it helps 
and regulate against it when it 
doesn’t. African governments also 
need to educate their citizens so 
that they each have the ability to 
manage their own online behav-
ior. It is a di cult balance. Africa 
needs to continue to attract FDI 
and that means allowing multina-
tional brands to access the market; 
but this means that policymakers 
have a special responsibility to 
protect African irms, aggressively 
support and help growing Afri-
can companies and create public 
awareness campaigns that cel-
ebrate African culture and African 
traditions. It would be very sad in-
deed if  the price of  economic suc-
cess in Africa were to become its 
cultural identity – and the whole-
sale mining of  its citizen’s data for 
capitalist gain. 
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Innovations continue to take centre stage in the 
banking industry, with customers being spoiled for 
choice. Thanks to ICT, the latest wave is in the form 
of KCB M-Pesa, a partnership between Safaricom 
and the country’s largest bank, KCB.  As the 
biggest lender by assets, KCB is keen to double its 
customer numbers in the next one year, riding on its 
new proposition in partnership with Safaricom-KCB 
M-Pesa. As at the end of 2014, KCB had 4.1 million 
customers, according to the latest bank reports. In 
particular, KCB’s earnings report indicates that the 
lender has a target of hitting 10million customers in 
the next 12 months. 
The KCB M-Pesa account launched on 10th March 
2015 is already helping KCB in fast tracking the 
adoption of mobile banking and growing its retail 
customer base cost effectively. Under the program, 
KCB M-Pesa users will have access to loans of 
between Sh50 and Sh1 million repayable within 
one to six months.  Borrowers will repay the loans 
at interest rates of four, nine and 12 percent over 
periods of one, three and six months respectively.
“In the last one year, KCB has seen its customer 
transactions with M-Pesa triple to Sh125 billion, 
while the volume of transactions has grown from 
10,000 a day to 100,000,” said KCB’s Group CEO, 
Joshua Oigara at the launch of the new product. 
“We see the partnership with Safaricom as a game-
changer in the inancial services sector.  For us, such 
partnerships are meant to make inancial services 
more accessible to the general population.  This is 
a crucial part of our effort to make serious progress 
in addressing the deep poverty experienced by 
millions of citizens across the East African region 
and beyond, many of whom remain outside the 
formal inancial system,” he said.  The growth in 
KCB’s mobile transactions over the past year will 
provide the necessary impetus to grow KCB’s 
new M-Pesa loans program, allowing the bank to 
expand its loan book among retail customers. To 
achieve this ambitious feat, KCB intends to leverage 
on mobile phones and agency banking, enabling 
KCB to increase its proitability and turnover, while 
managing the cost of operations. 
With the new KCB M-Pesa product, subscribers 
can also place money in ixed deposit accounts 
that earn them interest of between three and six 
per cent per annum for periods of between one and 
12 months.
“Once a customer subscribes to the new product, 
their credit worthiness that will inform their loan 
uptake, will be dependent on their repayment history 
and their amount of savings,” said Bob Collymore, 
Safaricom’ s CEO.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs) 
What is KCB MPESA Account?
KCB M-PESA Account is a paperless mobile 
based bank account that will be offered exclusively 
to KCB and M-PESA registered customers. KCB 
M-PESA Account will have zero minimum balance 
and will provide customers with the ability to:
 •  Borrow loans with facility fee ranging from 2% 
to 4% per month
 •  Save from as little as KShs.1 and earn interest 
of 2% p.a.
 •  Save for a ixed period of time (Fixed Deposit 
Account) or Target Savings Account where 
you save little by little for a set period and earn 
interest from 3% to 6% p.a.
 • Place standing orders from: 
 • M-PESA to KCB M-PESA Account.
 •  M-PESA to Fixed Savings or Target Savings 
Account.
 •  KCB M-PESA to Fixed or Target Deposit 
Account.
 •  Transfer money in and out of the KCB-M-
PESA Account at no charge
Who does the product target? 
The KCB M-PESA Account is intended for all KCB 
and M-PESA registered customers who discern to 
save or borrow short-term loans, to enable them 
address various inancial causes.
What are the requirements to have a KCB 
M-PESA Account?
To get a KCB M-PESA Account, you will need to:
 • Be a registered Safaricom M-PESA customer.
 • Have an active Safaricom M-PESA account.
 •  Hold any one of the following Kenyan National 
ID, Kenyan Passport, Alien ID, Diplomatic 
ID(Registered on IPRS), Military ID.
How do I register for this speciic account? 
 • Dial *844#
 • Accept Terms and Conditions.
 • You will receive an SMS with your PIN
 •  Dial *844# to access the KCB M-PESA 
Account Menu and the system will prompt 
you to change PIN
How do I make a deposit into the account?  
 •  Dial *844# and enter the KCB M-PESA 
Account PIN
 • Select Deposit From M-PESA 
 • Enter Amount
 • Conirm transaction.
How will I withdraw from the account?
Customers can only make withdrawals from KCB 
M-PESA Account via M-PESA using the steps:
 •  Dial the USSD CODE *844# and Enter the 
KCB M-PESA Account PIN
 • Select “Withdraw” to M-PESA 
 • Enter Amount
 • Conirm payment.
 • Other KCB M-PESA Account
 • Enter Mobile number
 • Enter Amount
 • Conirm payment
How will I qualify for a loan?
Customers will be allocated a loan limit upon 
opting into the KCB M-PESA Account.  Loan 
amounts will be depended on M-PESA history and 
usage of KCB MPESA Account. Not all customers 
will qualify for loans immediately.
How do I request for a KCB M-PESA Account 
loan?
 • Dial *844# and enter the KCB M-PESA PIN
 •  Select “Loan” then “request loan” and enter 
amount.
 • Select the preferred period( 1,3 and 6 months)
 •  Funds will be transferred to your KCB M-PESA 
Account.
What are the interest rates range?
 • 30 day loan at 4% per month
 • 90 day loan at 3% per month
 • 180 day loan at 2% per month
How to check your loan limit and what 
determines it?
Immediately on dialing *844#, one is presented 
with a loan limit. The loan limit is determined by 
one’s activity levels generated from their history 
usage on both their M-PESA/ Safaricom and KCB 
M-PESA Account
How do I pay back my loan?
 •  Loan can be paid in full or in installments from 
both KCB M-PESA account and M-PESA.
 •  Dial USSD code *844# and enter KCB M-PESA 
PIN.
 • Select “Loan” then “Pay loan.”
 •  Select payment from either KCB M-PESA 
account or M-PESA.
 • Enter Amount to pay.
KCB ofers Leadership in Mobile money ecosystem
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A NEW CLIMATE 
ECONOMY FOR AFRICA
Russell Bishop, Senior Economist, Global Commission on Economy and Climate
Dr Firew Bekele Woldeyes, Associate Research Fellow, Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI)
T
he Global Commission on 
Economy and Climate was set 
up to examine whether it was 
possible to achieve lasting eco-
nomic growth while also tackling the 
risks of  climate change. It published its 
indings in September 2014 in its inau-
gural publication Better Growth, Better 
Climate: The New Climate Economy 
report. Seven countries established the 
fully independent Commission and re-
search for the report was coordinated 
between eight global research institutes. 
The former President of  Mexico Felipe 
Calderón chairs the Commission and 
the commissioners are former heads of  
government and inance ministers, and 
leaders from economics, business and 
inance. Africa is represented on the 
Commission through Luísa Diogo (for-
mer Prime Minister of  Mozambique), 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (former Finance 
Minister of  Nigeria), and Trevor Ma-
nuel (former Finance Minister of  South 
Africa). In addition, Ethiopia acts as a 
commissioning country and the Ethio-
pian Development Research Institute 
is a research partner. The Commission 
was also advised by an Economics Ad-
visory Panel, which again had African 
representation through Benno Ndulu 
(Governor, Central Bank of  Tanzania).
The resounding conclusion of  the Bet-
ter Growth, Better Climate was that 
countries at all levels of  income have the 
opportunity to build lasting economic 
growth at the same time as reducing 
the immense risks from climate change. 
This will be made possible by structural 
and technological changes unfolding 
in the global economy and opportuni-
ties for greater economic eiciency. The 
capital for the necessary investments is 
available, and the potential for innova-
tion is vast. What is needed is strong 
political leadership and credible, con-
sistent policies. 
The next 15 years will be critical, as 
the global economy undergoes a deep 
structural transformation. It will not be 
“business as usual”. The global econo-
my will grow by more than half, a billion 
more people will come to live in cities, 
and rapid technological advance will 
continue to change businesses and lives. 
Around US$90 trillion is likely to be 
invested in infrastructure in the world’s 
urban, land use and energy systems. 
How these changes are managed will 
shape future patterns of  growth, pro-
ductivity and living standards. 
The next 15 years of  investment will 
also determine the future of  the world’s 
climate system. Climate change caused 
by past greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions is already having serious economic 
consequences, especially in the more 
exposed areas of  the world. Without 
stronger action to peak and then reduce 
global emissions in the next 10-15 years, 
it is near certain that average global 
warming will exceed 2°C, the level the 
international community has agreed 
not to cross. On current trends, warm-
ing could exceed 4°C by the end of  the 
century, with extreme and potentially 
irreversible impacts. Any delay in re-
ducing emissions makes it progressively 
more expensive to shift towards a low-
carbon economy by building up GHG 
concentrations and locking in the stock 
of  high-carbon assets. 
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African countries will also change sub-
stantially over the next 15 years. The 
continent’s future economic growth 
does not have to copy the high-carbon, 
unevenly distributed model historically 
taken by other parts of  the world. There 
is now huge potential for African coun-
tries to act in their self-interest by invest-
ing in greater eiciency, structural trans-
formation and technological change in 
three key systems of  the economy: cities, 
land use and energy.
• Cities are engines of  economic 
growth. They generate around 80% 
of  global economic output, and 
around 70% of  global energy use 
and energy-related GHG emissions. 
How the world’s largest and fastest-
growing cities develop will be critical 
to the future path of  the global econ-
omy and climate. But much urban 
growth today is unplanned and un-
structured, with signiicant econom-
ic, social and environmental costs. As 
pioneering cities across the world are 
demonstrating, more compact and 
connected urban development, built 
around mass public transport, can 
create cities that are economically 
dynamic and healthier and have 
lower emissions. Such an approach 
to urbanisation could reduce urban 
infrastructure capital requirements 
by more than US$3 trillion over the 
next 15 years. 
• Land use productivity will determine 
whether the world can feed a popula-
tion projected to grow to over eight 
billion by 2030 while sustaining nat-
ural environments. Food production 
can be increased, forests protected 
and land use emissions cut by rais-
ing crop and livestock productivity 
through new technologies and com-
prehensive approaches to soil and 
water management. Restoring just 
12% of  the world’s degraded agri-
cultural land could feed 200 million 
people by 2030, while also strength-
ening climate resilience and reduc-
ing emissions. Slowing down and 
ultimately halting deforestation can 
be achieved if  strong international 
support is combined with strong do-
mestic commitment to forest protec-
tion and rural income development. 
• Energy systems power growth in all 
economies. We are on the cusp of  a 
clean energy future. Coal is riskier 
and more expensive than it used to 
be, with growing import dependence 
and rising air pollution. Rapidly fall-
ing clean energy costs, particularly 
of  wind and solar power, could lead 
renewable and other low-carbon 
energy sources to account for more 
than half  of  all new electricity gener-
ation over the next 15 years.  Greater 
investment in energy eiciency – in 
businesses, buildings and transport – 
has huge potential to cut and man-
age demand. In developing coun-
tries, decentralised renewables can 
help provide electricity for the more 
than one billion people without ac-
cess.
 Across all these systems, three “driv-
ers of  change” need to be harnessed 
to overcome market, policy and in-
stitutional barriers to low-carbon 
growth. These include improving ac-
tion in three areas (i) raising resource 
eiciency, (ii) providing investment 
for infrastructure and (iii) stimulat-
ing innovation in technologies, busi-
ness models and social practices. For 
example resource productivity can 
be improved by removing fossil fuel 
subsidies. While global subsidies for 
clean energy only amount to around 
US$100 billion, subsidies to pol-
luting fossil fuels are now estimated 
at around US$600 billion per year. 
Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can 
improve growth and release resourc-
es that can be reallocated to beneit 
people on low incomes. But African 
countries are showing leadership 
– phasing out fossil fuel subsidies 
has been successfully demonstrated 
in Ghana, Kenya, and Namibia 
through progressive policy reform. 
Well-designed policies in these ields 
can make growth and climate objectives 
mutually reinforcing in both the short 
and medium term. In the long term, if  
climate change is not tackled, growth 
itself  will be at risk. In addition, better 
growth provides beneits of  greater en-
ergy security, less traic congestion, im-
proved quality of  life, stronger resilience 
to climate change and environmental 
protection, and reduced poverty. 
To achieve better growth and reduced 
climate risk requires global leadership, 
including from Africa. The report pro-
poses a 10-point Global Action Plan of  
key recommendations. This asks deci-
sion-makers to: 
• Accelerate low-carbon transforma-
tion by integrating climate into core 
economic decision-making pro-
cesses. This is needed at all levels of  
government and business, through 
systematic changes to policy and pro-
ject assessment tools, performance 
indicators, risk models and reporting 
requirements. 
• Enter into a strong, lasting and eq-
uitable international climate agree-
ment to increase the conidence 
needed for domestic policy reform, 
provide the support needed by de-
veloping countries and send a strong 
market signal to investors. 
• Phase out subsidies for fossil fuels 
and agricultural inputs and incen-
tives for urban sprawl to drive more 
eicient use of  resources and release 
public funds for other uses, including 
programmes to beneit those on low 
incomes. 
• Introduce strong, predictable carbon 
prices as part of  good iscal reform 
and good business practice, sending 
strong signals across the economy. 
• Substantially reduce capital costs 
for low-carbon infrastructure invest-
ments by expanding access to insti-
tutional capital and lowering its costs 
for low-carbon assets. 
• Scale up innovation in key low-car-
bon and climate-resilient technolo-
gies, tripling public investment in 
clean energy R&D and removing 
barriers to entrepreneurship and 
creativity. 
• Make connected and compact cities 
the preferred form of  urban devel-
opment, by encouraging better man-
aged urban growth and prioritizing 
investments in eicient and safe mass 
transit systems. 
• Stop deforestation of  natural forests 
by 2030 by strengthening the incen-
tives for long-term investment and 
forest protection, and increasing in-
ternational funding to around US$5 
billion per year, progressively linked 
to performance. 
• Restore at least 500 million hectares 
of  lost or degraded forests and agri-
cultural lands by 2030, strengthening 
rural incomes and food security. 
• Accelerate the shift away from pol-
luting coal-ired power generation, 
phasing out new unabated coal 
plants in developed economies im-
mediately and in middle-income 
countries by 2025. 
The irst six recommendations provide 
the conditions necessary for a strong 
and credible framework to foster low-
carbon and climate-resilient investment 
and growth. The last four point to vi-
tal opportunities for change which can 
drive future growth and lower climate 
risk in cities, land use and energy sys-
tems. 
The Commission will publish its second 
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report in July 7th entitled Seizing the 
Opportunity: Partnerships for a Better 
Growth, Better Climate. This will ex-
plore the role of  international collabo-
ration in delivering economic growth 
and reducing climate risk
Unlocking the power of  Ethiopian 
cities 
One of  the areas that are important for 
building a New Climate Economy in 
Africa is harnessing the power of  future 
African cities. Today a little over half  of  
the world population lives in cities and 
it is expected that the number of  people 
living in urban areas is going to increase 
rapidly. Most of  the increase is expected 
to take place in developing countries. 
The expected scale of  urbanization 
presents an opportunity that can play a 
vital role not only in improving growth 
but also for the environment and quality 
of  life in general. Ethiopia, relative to 
more developed countries, is currently 
at a low level of  urbanisation, as one in 
ive people live in urban areas.  As the 
Ethiopian economy grows, so will the 
rate of  urbanization, which presents a 
vast challenge to policymakers. In light 
of  this, the Ethiopian Development Re-
search Institute and the Global Green 
Growth Institute in collaboration with 
the Global Commission on Economy 
and Climate has recently carried out 
a study to strategically align economic 
planning, urban development, and en-
vironmental issues in Ethiopia. This 
study “Unlocking the Power of  Ethio-
pian Cities” was published in February 
2015.
The report outlines a new “spatial 
framework” for assessing and maximis-
ing the contribution that cities can make 
to achieving economic, social and envi-
ronmental objectives, including outlin-
ing and assessing a range of  alternative 
urbanisation pathways. The report sets 
out an approach where stakeholders 
in Ethiopia can bring together the na-
tional development plan (i.e. the ive 
year Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP)) with a national spatial structure 
to beneit from the urban dividend and 
avoid the lock-in efects from poorly 
managed urbanisation. This approach 
will be of  use to other low-income coun-
tries as they grapple with similar issues.
The analysis highlights the need to 
explicitly link Ethiopia’s economic, 
environmental and spatial strategies. 
This involves identiication of  strate-
gic growth corridors linked to targeted 
economic functions, the number and 
hierarchy of  urban centres, and the in-
frastructure demands that support this 
including power, water, information 
and transportation. 
A 5 step spatial economic framework
The spatial framework proposed in the 
study works through ive stages of  anal-
ysis and planning that can be repeated 
in line with successive planning cycles 
(i.e. Ethiopia’s next 5 year economic 
planning periods GTP II, the GTP III). 
• Objectives and situation analysis. 
The starting point to assess future 
urbanisation needs is a strong under-
standing of  context.  The analysis 
undertook an assessment of  the cur-
rent macroeconomic context within 
which urbanisation is taking place in 
Ethiopia, including a review of  ex-
isting development goals, economic 
growth and urbanisation patterns 
and urban policy. The Government 
of  Ethiopia has outlined a vision to 
achieve lower middle income coun-
try (LMIC) status by 2025. 
 In present terms, this would re-
lect an increase in today’s GDP 
to $1,045 per capita. Experience 
around the world indicates that such 
rapid development would also be ac-
companied by rapid urbanisation. At 
around 19% currently, urbanisation 
in Ethiopia is low, and is much lower 
than the sub-Saharan Africa aver-
age. The Ethiopian Urbanisation 
Review by the Wold Bank indicates 
that urbanisation will reach 30% 
before 2030. The capital city Addis 
Ababa is currently the only Metrop-
olis city, attracting population from 
all parts of  the country and acting as 
an economic and political hub. How-
ever, the expected rate of  urbanisa-
tion can lead to the emergence of  
secondary cities that would reduce 
the primacy of  Addis Ababa as the 
major urban centre.  
• Urban demand model. Provided 
that the economy is expected to 
grow rapidly (around 9% per year) 
and associated fast urbanisation will 
follow, there is a need to identify the 
possible “hotspots” for urbanisa-
tion. Using Geographical Informa-
tion Systems (GIS) and secondary 
data sources, the analysis provides a 
spatial analysis of  the suitability of  
the country for urban development. 
The suitability for urban develop-
ment is derived from the existing 
urban structure, physical constraints 
and likely economic activity. Urban 
areas do not emerge overnight and 
will be inluenced by the pre-existing 
national urban system. The second 
consideration examines the presence 
of  physical constraints such as the 
availability of  suicient water sup-
ply (both surface and groundwater) 
to meet population and industrial 
needs. It also looks into vulnerability 
to natural hazards to account for the 
risk of  issues such as earthquakes. 
Lastly, the economic opportunities 
in terms of  proximity to resources 
such as mineral and agricultural pro-
duction and access to transport sys-
tem have been taken into account. 
In total, the analysis was conducted 
through 35 diferent GIS layers (from 
topography, groundwater availability 
and mineral resources to planned 
special economic zones, proposed 
rail systems and universities).
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Benchmarking and scenario devel-
opment.
It is important to learn from the histori-
cal urbanisation paths of  other coun-
tries to understand possible pathways. 
The analysis plots Ethiopia’s options 
for urbanisation against the historical 
experiences of  a range of  successfully 
urbanising countries to determine les-
sons learnt. The study then references 
a selection of  comparator countries 
that have previously urbanised and de-
veloped economically from a starting 
position similar to Ethiopia’s now. The 
case studies summarise the characteris-
tics of  that development and the choices 
made to shape this transition and iden-
tify good and bad practice in policy and 
decision making and consider how this 
can provide learning for Ethiopia. The 
selection criteria for the comparator 
countries relied on the importance of  
agriculture, a large and growing popu-
lation, devolution of  power to the sub-
national level and low urbanisation rate. 
Accordingly, three countries were se-
lected to provide a range of  approaches 
and experiences to urban development: 
South Korea, Colombia and Vietnam.
Experience from the case study coun-
tries suggests that a network of  cities 
is needed to provide back-up to Addis 
Ababa and reinforce economic growth 
and development. The model of  a 
primary city and supporting cities has 
worked in both the Korean and Co-
lombian contexts with an example of  a 
larger primary city (Seoul) and smaller 
primary city (Bogota). The correct selec-
tion and designation of  growth poles to 
counterbalance Addis is critical. Select-
ing too few growth poles throughout the 
country or those that are already well 
developed may limit the ability to divert 
growth away from Addis. To promote 
regional cities, Ethiopia could consider 
public-private partnerships, investment 
in infrastructure and the establishment 
of  favourable conditions for foreign in-
vestment to drive growth in these new 
urban centres. Rural-urban linkages 
are also critical. Simultaneous rural de-
velopment can drive and reinforce the 
success of  urban development and min-
imise regional income/wealth dispari-
ties. Stimulating economic growth in 
new centres has appeared more success-
ful than policies seeking to limit growth 
in large, dynamic and growing cities 
such as Addis. The development of  an 
integrated national transport infrastruc-
ture, particularly to connect growing 
urban areas, is also important. The con-
nectivity of  urban centres by high ca-
pacity road or rail networks encourages 
the eicient and efective movement of  
goods and labour. 
Options analysis and preferred 
spatial scenario. 
Using the international benchmarking 
data and wider experience and litera-
ture, the report then develops a range 
of  quantitative scenarios for Ethiopia’s 
urbanisation, each of  which displays 
the hallmarks of  a particular develop-
ment pattern experienced elsewhere. In 
addition to a Business-as-Usual (BaU) 
scenario, four alternatives for Ethiopia’s 
urbanisation are presented. These sce-
narios are:
• A Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario: 
Here the analysis suggests Addis 
Ababa continues to grow but in an 
unplanned and reactively managed 
way. There is high rural migration 
into the city and informal settlements 
appear as a consequence.
• Primary city scenario: Addis Ababa 
continues to grow into a dynamic, 
multi-functional and cosmopolitan 
megacity. The GTP is still delivered 
but largely driven by industry and 
services based in Addis Ababa, as 
well as foreign investment directed 
into the city and special economic 
zones surrounding the city. 
• Polycentric city network scenario: A 
network of  regional secondary cit-
ies emerges to support Addis Ababa. 
Addis Ababa retains national politi-
cal and administrative duties and re-
mains the largest urban area in the 
country but the other cities appear 
as dynamic and growing cities on the 
international scene.
• Clustered cities scenario:  Large and 
dynamic metropolitan areas develop 
in two clusters: one in central Ethio-
pia around Addis Ababa and one in 
the north of  the country. 
• Distributed cities scenario: Addis 
Ababa devolves greater power to the 
regions and regional capitals take on 
many of  the urban functions that 
Addis Ababa formerly held. Political 
and administrative functions are de-
livered by regional cities and indus-
trial and service activity can be found 
in all these cities. Operating relative-
ly independently of  each other, there 
is limited specialisation with all cities 
performing similar functions.
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Each of  these scenarios is analysed 
against 16 performance areas that 
are nested under four main drivers of  
growth. Each is an attribute of  the spa-
tial plan that can be compared between 
scenarios (e.g. low carbon, competi-
tiveness or rural-urban linkages). This 
analysis helps to display the relative 
trade-ofs and choices around urbani-
sation that Ethiopia will have to make. 
Learning from these reference scenari-
os, the report creates a preferred hybrid 
scenario which brings the best of  each 
reference scenario and combines it with 
the national constitutional, cultural and 
policy context. 
The preferred scenario is constructed 
by balancing the strengths of  each 
of  the test scenarios and is based on 
multiple urban centres clustered (poly-
clustered) into planned development 
areas and corridors, but only to the 
extent that there is underlying urban 
demand and suitability. This prevents 
overdevelopment of  less suitable areas 
and is a balanced model of  expansion. 
A total of  eight cluster development ar-
eas are identiied with high potential. 
These clusters are diverse in economic 
rationale and function. Because not all 
development clusters are needed today, 
nor would their parallel development 
be afordable, further analysis is needed 
on the most efective sequencing of  eco-
nomic clusters and corridors.
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• Implementation planning. Urban 
issues are the responsibility of  the 
Ethiopian Ministry of  Urban Devel-
opment, Housing, and Construction. 
However, implementing efective 
and well-designed cities goes well 
beyond the mandate of  one minis-
try, and requires cross-sector plan-
ning involving multiple stakehold-
ers. This needs to take place across 
the authorities responsible for key 
infrastructure – including energy, 
water and transport, but also agri-
culture, trade and logistics, industry, 
the emerging private sector and mi-
cro, small and medium enterprises. 
This coordination was not a focus of  
the report but any efective govern-
ment planning requires governance, 
inance and deep capacity, so these 
issues require further attention. The 
report is seen as a irst step for Ethio-
pia to link urban, economic and en-
vironmental issues at an early stage 
of  development. The Government’s 
progressive outlook seeks to harness 
opportunities and avoid many of  the 
disadvantages that rapid unplanned 
urbanization can create.
Conclusion
All African countries are grappling with 
the challenge of  how to improve the 
welfare of  their people. In the next 15 
years, the continent should experience 
rapid growth. In many countries, struc-
tural transformation of  economies will 
pull millions out of  poverty and ensure 
a base for continued prosperity. At the 
same time there will be huge advance-
ments in energy infrastructure, agricul-
tural productivity and development of  
cities. Driven by national interests, Afri-
can countries can choose a low-carbon, 
resource eicient, and climate resilient 
development pathway. The Global 
Commission on Economy and Climate 
has identiied actions that can be taken 
across all income levels to achieve better 
growth while simultaneously reducing 
climate risk. The challenge is on the im-
plementation of  these actions.  
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‘SMART CITY’ APPROACHES TO 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Nicholas You
WHEN AND HOW DID CITIES BECOME “NOT SMART”?
M
any of  these ideas and 
ideals were formulated in 
Europe starting in 17th 
century during the First 
Industrial Revolution. Their propo-
nents ranged from artists, architects, 
engineers, scientists to philosophers. 
They had considerable inluence on 
contemporary urban planning which 
distinguishes itself  from previous plan-
ning praxis by attempting to address 
concomitantly social, economic and 
aesthetic concerns within a cohesive 
spatial or physical layout or design. 
Modern urban planning, or its British 
version known as “town and country 
planning” and its French concept of  
“urbanism” were rooted in and con-
ceived as multi-disciplinary approaches 
to societal development. The social and 
environmental ravages of  the industrial 
revolution, the great depression and the 
world wars across much of  industrial-
ized Europe, Japan and North America 
led to an overarching concern by the 
early 20th century with social equity 
and environmental health. This gave 
rise to two policy streams that dominate 
contemporary urban planning and de-
velopment to this day: social or aforda-
ble housing and infrastructure, especial-
ly roads, drainage, water and sanitation. 
At the risk of  oversimpliication, urban 
planning practice in the so-called devel-
oped world, for a variety of  political and 
administrative reasons became far re-
moved from the day-to-day running of  
a city.  Slowly but surely city administra-
tions were divided into sectors, namely 
housing, infrastructure and mobility, 
water and sanitation, energy, health and 
social services. While cities continued to 
plan, mostly in the form of  long-term 
master plans, the day-to-day running 
of  the city became the realm of  “silos” 
each specializing in a given ield, each 
developing its own norms and stand-
ards, contract procedures and procure-
ment processes. These ‘silos’ would be 
further reinforced with the advent of  
computerization as each department 
tended to choose a diferent hardware 
and software system. The end result was 
twofold: (i) further compartmentaliza-
tion, and (ii) incompatible systems mak-
ing the sharing of  data and information 
di cult at best. 
Towards a new urban develop-
ment paradigm?
During the last decade or so, the grow-
ing necessity for making cities more liv-
The idea behind ‘smart city’ approaches has been in existence for a
long time. Planners, utopians and visionaries have, throughout ancient and 
modern history, proposed holistic visions of  what should or could constitute 
economically productive and socially harmonious societies.   
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able and sustainable so as to become 
more competitive has compelled many 
municipal and metropolitan adminis-
trations to re-examine their internal 
modus operandi and to search for new 
business and governance models and 
new partners to help bridge the ‘silos’. 
This necessity arises from several dis-
crete but inter-related issues. 
One important issue is that operating a 
city according to “silos” is very waste-
ful. Single-purpose urban management 
practice results not only in duplication 
of  efort, but also in competing de-
mands for renewable as well as non-re-
newable resources such as energy, water, 
land and eco-systems. One compelling 
example is the way contemporary cit-
ies consume fresh water. The average 
urban denizen requires less than 5 litres 
of  potable water per day to drink and 
cook. Yet the average urban denizen 
that has access to piped water supply 
and so-called modern sanitation lushes 
in excess of  75 litres of  potable water 
down the toilet every day and uses an-
other 90 to 150 litres of  drinkable wa-
ter to wash clothes, bodies, homes and 
oices, dishes and cars, and to water 
plants. Simple economics would dictate 
that it would be far more cost efective 
to give each urban denizen 25 litres of  
bottled water per week for drinking and 
cooking purposes and to have our piped 
water system consist of  clean but less 
than drinkable quality recycled water. 
Given the energy and resource costs of  
extracting, treating, transporting and 
piping water of  drinkable standards 
to our major metropolises, the current 
consumption pattern of  water seems 
un-smart. 
Another important issue is the realiza-
tion that truly sustainable and resilient 
urban development requires very close 
collaboration across sectors and depart-
ments. A case in point is that all urban 
public services consume energy, land 
and water. Efective resource eiciency 
would dictate that all these services and 
the people and businesses that use them 
operate in tandem and use a coherent 
set of  performance benchmarks. In 
reality, as most of  us experience on a 
periodic basis, the provision of  public 
services is not only rarely coordinated 
but in many instances, public service de-
partments work in splendid isolation of  
one another. The very nature of  public 
procurement exacerbates this problem. 
Concessions for water, gas, electricity, 
waste collection, public transport, traic 
management and parking are awarded 
individually by diferent departments 
and often for diferent jurisdictional 
areas, for diferent contract durations 
and with very narrowly deined perfor-
mance indicators. 
Few, if  any, cities have achieved the op-
timal degree of  integration, but many 
are trying and the literature abounds 
with references to “smart city” and 
“big data” approaches to solving urban 
problems and to help meet challenges 
that are looming on the horizon. The 
purpose of  this article is to help unpack 
these approaches by looking at recent 
“best practices” in the implementation 
of  “smart city” solutions. These peer-
reviewed practices are drawn from the 
Guangzhou International Award for 
Urban Innovation – a biennial award 
co-sponsored by UCLG and Metropo-
lis devoted to recognizing outstanding 
initiatives in striving for urban sustain-
ability. More speciically, the solutions 
reviewed in this paper originate from 
diferent regions and contexts in the 
hopes of  drawing some useful obser-
vations regarding what smart city ap-
proaches can do for a city and its in-
habitants, and what constitutes ideal 
conditions for such approaches. 
Putting people irst
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a city of  more 
than 6.5 million people with a complex 
geography and strong social and demo-
graphic pressures. Lying in the tropical 
storm belt, Rio has been hit hard by 
repeated Atlantic storms pounding the 
city. This especially afects the mostly 
low income settlements commonly re-
ferred to as favelas that are located on 
the high slopes surrounding the me-
tropolis and are prone to devastating 
landslides. Following a vicious storm 
in 2010, the mayor of  Rio de Janeiro 
convened a special task force with one 
single objective: to come up with plans 
to ensure no more deaths from land-
slides. This led to the establishment of  
an Emergency Centre that brought to-
gether, for the irst time, data gathering 
and information sharing between de-
partments that heretofore never worked 
together: departments for planning, 
meteorology, sub-soil analysis, mapping, 
housing, health, population distribution 
and density. 
 
Today, the Centre operates 24 hours a 
day. It is stafed by oicials from 30 city 
departments that continuously share 
data and information and solicit infor-
mation from citizens. This Centre has 
become a global model showing the 
beneits that can be derived from col-
laboration, alignment and data sharing 
across city departments. Since the fa-
cility went on-line, employing some of  
the latest information communication 
technology and weather forecasting sys-
tems, there have been no deaths caused 
by landslides. Traic emergency time 
response has been reduced signiicantly 
as citizens are alerted about traic snarl 
ups and accidents and redirected to 
least congested routes. Data gathered 
for the Centre also enables the identi-
ication of  neighbourhoods with higher 
dengue fever infection rates, allowing 
for health services to implement preven-
tative measures in a timely manner. In 
planning the facility, Rio oicials visited 
‘Alert Centres’ in Madrid, Seoul and 
New York. Rio has also since forged co-
operation with Johannesburg as it plans 
a similar system. 
Hangzhou China: Eighty percent of  
the nearly 9 million residents and com-
muters living and working in Hangzhou 
China identiied traic congestion as 
one of  the top priority issues.  This led 
the City to launch China’s irst public 
bicycle project. This bike sharing sys-
tem serves some 280,000 users daily and 
works in tandem with the city’s exten-
sive bus system to provide users of  the 
bus and metro systems with a last mile 
solution. In the centre of  the city, bike 
docking stations are less than 400 me-
ters apart and located in close proximity 
to bus and metro stops. 
Run by the Hangzhou Public Bicycle 
Development Company, the system uses 
data analytics and crowd sourcing from 
mobile phone applications as two key 
instruments. Data is shared across all 
departments dealing with traic man-
agement and public transport. Users 
can phone in their request for bikes and 
there is a free hotline support. The busi-
est stations are stafed by people who 
provide a wide array of  assistance and 
information. User feedback pertain-
ing to use and usability of  the system, 
monitoring of  real time trends, issues, 
problems and suggestions is managed 
by a local university. This has led to a 
unique management system that is de-
signed to overcome the most frequent 
problem areas of  bike sharing systems: 
service points; getting bikes to where 
they are needed when they are needed; 
responsive hot-line support; repairs; and 
implementing users’ recommendations 
for the continuous improvement of  the 
system. 
The system is unique in that it operates 
without government subsidies. Other 
than the initial start-up capital, the 
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company raises signiicant private 
funds through by selling advertis-
ing space on the bike docking sta-
tion kiosks. This bike-sharing pro-
gramme has inspired many other 
cities in China and may well mark 
an ironic turning point in bicycle 
use in China’s recent history – 
from the country with the most 
bicycle users 30 years ago to the 
country with most cars and traic 
jams today. 
Future-prooing cities  
Linköping, Sweden is a city of  
150,000 that has a bold goal: to 
become an absolutely carbon 
neutral city by 2025.   Creating a 
carbon-neutral municipality is a 
never-ending process. Linköping 
Municipality and companies 
operating in the region have as-
sumed a leading role in formulat-
ing policies, goals and guidelines. 
They have also led by example in 
using renewable fuels in vehicles; 
specifying energy and climate 
criteria for procuring goods and 
services; developing green IT so-
lutions and communicating cli-
mate and environmental issues to 
employees and residents. Munici-
pal property companies are also 
making existing schools, homes, 
care homes, oices, sports and 
cultural facilities more energy ef-
icient. People living and working 
in Linköping are given continu-
ous information owners about 
energy use.
Three main areas of  focus of  
the initiative are energy, sustain-
able living and local economic 
development. Since 2012, the 
Municipal Council has been col-
lecting food waste as the main 
substrate for producing biogas 
which is used for running the 
city’s buses and for the produc-
tion of  bio-fertilizer for organic 
food production. The Environ-
mental and Quality Programme 
for Vallastaden was approved in 
2013.Vallastaden is conceived as 
an eco-village where everything 
is within easy reach and social in-
teraction is stimulated by making 
it simple to move around on foot 
or by bicycle. Finally, the former 
industrial area of  Östra Valla has 
been earmarked for sustainable 
redevelopment. It is a business 
incubator for small and medium-
sized enterprises and serves as a 
platform for entrepreneurship 
and innovation, and a testing 
ground for sustainable solutions 
in environmental technology.
Since 2009, energy consumption 
in municipal premises has fallen 
by 5 percent. It is estimated that 
by 2029 it will have fallen by 15 
percent. New buildings use ap-
proximately 25 percent less en-
ergy than prescribed by national 
guidelines. In 2012, primary en-
ergy use in the district-heating 
system was 373 GWh compared 
with a igure of  1287 GWh for 
inal energy consumption. An 
investment of  1 billion Swedish 
kronor in a new CHP plant that 
comes online in 2016 will further 
reduce the use of  fossil fuels. An-
nual per capita waste has fallen 
from 305 to 208 kilos since 1992.
Nitrogen and phosphorus emis-
sions from treated wastewater 
have decreased by 60 percent 
and 35 percent respectively since 
2001. Nitrogen dioxide concen-
trations in the urban environment 
have fallen from 29 to 8µg/m3 
since the late 1980s. The number 
of  kilometers driven per vehicle/
year has decreased from 13,000 
to 12,000 km over 10 years while 
there has been a 50 percent in-
crease in new “green car” reg-
istrations. 56 percent of  all the 
electricity used is produced local-
ly from renewable sources helping 
to achieve a 25 percent reduction 
in CO2 emissions between 1990 
and 2010. In the words of  the 
mayor of  Linköping, the City 
Council’s road to these impressive 
results came about as a result of  
broad-based collaboration and 
partnerships with residents, em-
ployers, universities, the private 
sector, other cities and national 
and international networks, all 
sharing their data and informa-
tion across sectors and helping 
the city monitor its progress in 
achieving its goal.
The City of  Gwangju, Korea 
has taken a diferent and highly 
innovative approach to climate 
change mitigation. Five years 
ago, it initiated a programme 
to engage citizens in voluntary 
carbon-saving steps. Gwangju’s 
Carbon Bank System currently 
involves 330,000 households, rep-
resenting 62 percent of  the city’s 
population of  1.48 million. The 
Carbon Bank System calculates 
reduced amounts of  carbon di-
oxide through voluntary energy-
saving eforts by households and 
turns them into points. The Car-
bon Bank involves the active par-
ticipation of  the Korea Electric 
Power Corporation, the Gwangju 
Metropolitan Waterworks Au-
thority and Hae Yang City Gas. 
All three provide data to the sys-
tem based on participating house-
holds’ consumption. Gwangju 
City calculates the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
turns the amount into points. 
These points are then credited to 
the electricity, gas, and water bills 
of  the participating households.
The next 15 years will be critical, as the 
global economy undergoes a deep structural 
transformation. It will not be “business as usual”. 
The global economy will grow by more than half, 
a billion more people will come to live in cities, 
and rapid technological advance will continue to 
change businesses and lives. 
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This innovation has two efects: 
it provides citizens with a tangi-
ble means of  seeing their actions 
relected in terms of  CO2 reduc-
tions (the common good) and on 
their utility bills (personal ben-
eit). It also represents a major 
step in terms of  public policy by 
tying together water, electricity 
and gas. This bridging of  “silos” 
is perhaps one of  the most impor-
tant hurdles to be overcome when 
striving for low-carbon urban 
management and development. 
Through such an integrated sys-
tem, the city can analyze and 
evaluate how diferent actions 
in diferent areas afect the total 
equation of  GHG emissions and 
what areas need greater focus to 
continue to progress towards low-
ering the carbon footprint of  the 
city. Since inception of  the pro-
gramme in 2008 GHG emissions 
have decreased each year, most 
recently by 135,000 tons.
Between 1995 and 2009, the 
city of  Melbourne, Australia 
and its population of  just over 4 
million people sufered extreme 
hot weather resulting in severe 
drought, water shortages and 
heat waves that killed several 
hundred people. The immediate 
response of  the city was to plan 
a 90 percent reduction in potable 
water use. This included cutting 
irrigation support to the city’s ur-
ban forests and a plan to remove 
40 percent of  the city’s trees. 
Ironically, this solution underesti-
mated the value of  green spaces 
and ecosystem support services 
that are critical to climate change 
mitigation. Realizing the need for 
a more strategic long-term strat-
egy, in 2010 the city appointed 
a new Urban Landscape Team. 
The team produced an integrated 
open space and urban forest strat-
egy. Since 2010, forty million dol-
lars have been invested in related 
initiatives including urban forests 
and shrubbery; green space and 
rain water harvesting; permeable 
paving and protection of  water-
ways; and wetlands. The goal is 
to cool the city by 4 degrees Cel-
sius and thus lower energy use for 
cooling. 15,000 trees have been 
planted, 40 streets retroitted to 
improve permeability, and one of  
the world’s irst in-road storm wa-
ter harvesting system started.
The Darling Street Storm Water 
Harvesting Scheme is one of  the 
lagship projects of  this initiative. 
It is a world irst in combining 
a number of  known storm wa-
ter treatment technologies into 
a single space eicient and cost 
efective approach in the treat-
ment and reuse of  storm water. 
The scheme uses underground 
elements to reduce the surface 
footprint by 90 percent. This is 
important as land use in a ma-
ture urban setting can lead to 
very high costs of  and time-con-
suming legal procedures for land 
acquisition. By concentrating the 
treatment into a central location, 
the capital and operational cost 
have also been greatly reduced 
from the typical rain-gardens ap-
proach. It also allows for reuse to 
occur by including a bio-iltration 
system.
The system has provided eco-
nomic, social and environmental 
beneits. Firstly, the economic 
beneits of  this project include 
a more cost efective method for 
achieving storm water quality 
targets that is up to 75 percent 
cheaper than traditional Water 
Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) 
approaches. The project also of-
fers inancial savings in ongoing 
maintenance costs estimated to be 
one tenth of  traditional WSUD 
costs by shifting from a predomi-
nantly manual labour component 
to a mechanized cleaning system. 
Secondly, the social beneits in-
clude increased landscape amen-
ity, greater community awareness 
and conidence in WSUD tech-
nological solutions, and mitiga-
tion of  the Urban Heat Island ef-
fect. The environmental beneits 
include substantial improvements 
in storm water quality and thus 
reduced demand on Melbourne’s 
water storages for irrigation, im-
proved water supply to parks and 
gardens, and reduced low of  
run-of into waterways.
Due to the success of  the Rain-
water Harvesting System in 
Darling Street, the City of  Mel-
bourne is delivering two more 
storm water harvesting schemes 
following the Darling Street ap-
proach namely at Fitzroy Gar-
dens and at Birrarung Marr. 
These will be the irst of  a suit of  
harvesting schemes envisaged for 
the municipality. These and other 
initiatives have been possible due 
to two factors. The irst factor 
was a four year citizen’s engage-
ment programme that sought to 
educate and mobilise citizens to 
not only support innovation in 
climate adaptation but to become 
its chief  protagonists.  The sec-
ond was the close collaboration 
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and sharing of  a single objective across 
departments dealing with water, waste 
water, storm water drainage, parks and 
gardens, planning and infrastructure. 
While the city of  Melbourne provides 
the bulk of  the funding, regional and 
federal tiers of  governments have also 
contributed. Other partners include the 
universities of  Melbourne and Victoria 
for related research; and the media for 
public awareness.
People, partnerships and envi-
ronmental goals 
In 2005 the City of  Hamburg, Germa-
ny decided to embark on a socially-in-
clusive approach to zero-carbon urban 
development. A pilot project was es-
tablished for the redevelopment of  the 
Wilhelmsburg neighbourhood of  the 
City by hosting the International Build-
ing and the International Garden Show 
(IBA). An “IBA Partnership” was estab-
lished which brought together private 
companies and the local community. As 
a result, over 70 projects were developed 
around 3 themes including cities and 
climate change.
Wilhemsburg has 55,000 inhabitants 
living on an island in the Elbe. It is par-
ticularly vulnerable to looding. It is also 
an ethnically diverse and low income 
community with a physical environment 
afected by industrial and transport in-
frastructure. The projects are based on 
maximizing the use of  local energy re-
sources (i.e. energy savings and energy 
eiciency) and harnessing technology 
opportunity to accelerate local econom-
ic development. The aim is achieve 100 
percent local renewable energy supply 
by 2025 and 100 percent renewable 
heat by 2050, making the Elbe island 
carbon neutral. 
The IBA is also a unique in its govern-
ance structure as it is incorporated as a 
limited liability company. It thus has a 
certain amount of  independence from 
classic administrative hierarchies and 
can act more like a private enterprise. 
Additionally, IBA organized an oi-
cial “IBA-partnership” with about 150 
companies and institutions and it has 
included the inhabitants in numerous 
workshops and fora. Less bureaucracy 
and political interference allowed the 
IBA to set ambitious targets and to 
mobilize partners. Already scheduled 
projects will ensure that 54 percent of  
heat production and 14 percent of  the 
overall energy demand will be renew-
ably produced by the end of  2015. The 
IBA Hamburg Model and the Climate 
Protection Renewable Wilhemsburg’s 
strategy has made the City of  Hamburg 
one of  the frontrunners when it comes 
to socially inclusive and environmental-
ly sound urban development. The IBA 
is sharing the knowledge 
generated with other 
partner Cities and is cur-
rently scaling up the Wil-
hemsburg pilot to other 
parts of  the city. 
Smart City Bristol U.K. 
is a collaborative pro-
gramme between the 
public sector, business 
and community. The 
main aim is to use smart 
technologies to help meet 
the ambitious city target 
to reduce CO2 emissions 
by 40 percent by 2020 
from a 2005 baseline, as 
well as other social and 
economic objectives for 
its more than 430,000 
inhabitants. The pro-
gramme was launched 
in 2011 and focusses on 
‘Smart Energy, Smart 
Transport and Smart 
Data’. It includes pilot projects such as 
smart metering, smart grid, electric ve-
hicles and open data, alongside perma-
nent initiatives such as a Traic Control 
Centre and a Freight Consolidation 
Centre.
A distinctive trait of  Smart Bristol lies in 
the city’s collaboration with companies 
(notably, micro-electronic, environmen-
tal technology and creative/digital com-
panies) who are working with commu-
nities to make them smart. Smart City 
Bristol is about putting its more than 
430,000 people at the heart of  a smart 
city rather than technology. It is how 
people interact with technology that 
helps inform behavioural change and 
help the City to achieve its aims. Smart 
City Bristol is also evolutionary, in that 
it builds upon the lessons learned from 
previous projects to inform new ones.
Accomplishments thus far include: 
• Securing an additional £7m in fund-
ing for Green Capital activity.
• Becoming one of  the inaugural 100 
Resilient Cities, a pioneering initia-
tive funded by the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. 
• Achieving the 20% energy reduction 
target as part of  3e Houses
• Decrease in energy consumption by 
schools and council oices as part of  
the ‘smart spaces’ project.
• Increased awareness and engage-
ment with climate change issues via 
smart city projects in general.
Bristol is already the most energy and 
waste-eicient major UK city, and it is 
planning to meet future needs by man-
aging resources even more eiciently. 
Smart City Bristol has contributed to 
the image of  Bristol as a centre for in-
novation and a leader in adoption of  
‘smart’ solutions to city-level problems. 
According to the Mayor of  Bristol, the 
key to Bristol’s success lies in the empow-
erment of  its citizens. Citizens played a 
major role in choosing the technologi-
cal solutions according to their priori-
ties. This requires irst and foremost a 
commitment to “educate” the public so 
that they are properly informed of  the 
issues and their policy implications. It 
also requires that the city administration 
empower its citizens and trust its citizens 
to make important but nonetheless in-
formed decisions.
Conclusion
New technology and new ways to col-
lect and analyse data can contribute 
signiicantly to making our urban in-
frastructure and services more efective 
and eicient. For the irst time in history, 
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we can begin to envisage city planning 
and management as a truly holistic en-
deavour by using data and information 
from a myriad of  sources and across de-
partments and jurisdictions for problem 
identiication and solving. What tran-
spires, however, from the above case 
studies is that the key ingredients to a 
successful smart city are people, part-
nerships and participation.
The Emergency Centre in Rio de Ja-
neiro almost looks like something out 
of  a sci-i movie as a wall of  screens 
display real time information and their 
analysis from hundreds of  sources. But 
what makes this Centre an unparalleled 
success is its DNA, namely a single ob-
jective of  saving lives. The Centre now 
deals with dozens of  day-to-day opera-
tions of  the city, but it has remained 
people-centred and user-focused. The 
same goes for the Hangzhou bike-shar-
ing system. In the case of  Bristol, the 
city has gone out of  its way to empower 
its citizens to make decisions regarding 
which solutions and technologies are 
best suited to meet their current and fu-
ture needs. This goes well beyond sim-
ply informing citizens or inviting them 
to voice their opinions in town hall 
meetings and the like. It is putting citi-
zens in the driver’s seat in city planning.
Partnerships are a critical factor for 
success of  smart city planning. In the 
cases of  Melbourne, Hamburg and 
Gwangju, city administrations are giv-
ing new meaning to the concept of  
public-private partnerships. All three 
cases represent a radical departure from 
conventional regulatory and control 
functions. Melbourne has succeeded in 
bringing together diferent departments 
and three tiers of  government to focus 
on a single objective – ‘cooling the city’ 
Meeting this objective meant 
a combined approach to en-
ergy and water, the former 
to lower the heat sink efect 
and the latter to overcome 
drought and help green the 
city. This involved a reversal 
of  an initial policy of  cut-
ting down trees, as one of  
the single biggest consum-
ers of  water, to planting 
more trees to help cool the 
city. Meeting this objective, 
however, meant new ap-
proaches to water planning 
and management and the 
full integration of  water 
management within parks 
and gardens, land-use plan-
ning, infrastructure design 
and technology. The case 
of  Gwangju represents an 
equally radical departure 
from traditional public-pri-
vate partnerships. While the 
three ‘silos’ of  gas, electrici-
ty and water are still operating indepen-
dently, a commercial bank acts on their 
behalf  to provide a uniied approach to 
billing. The bank helps the three utili-
ties to present their bills in such a way 
that the consumer can see the collective 
impact on CO2 emissions of  their in-
dividual and household eforts to save 
water, gas and electricity. This efort is, 
in turn, translated into a personal ben-
eit in terms of  reduced monthly utility 
bills.  
The City of  Hamburg also provides a 
new approach to public-private part-
nership with the establishment of  a lim-
ited liability company to plan, design 
and implement an urban regeneration 
project for an entire district which is 
home to a sizeable low-income popula-
tion. This business model is far from be-
ing the outsourcing of  planning and de-
sign or providing development rights for 
a real-estate operation; it represents an 
integrated approach to iscal planning, 
land use planning, housing, infrastruc-
ture and services.  The set up not only 
leverages resources from public, private 
and civil society sectors, it also ensures 
policy continuity over several electoral 
periods. 
These and other examples show that a 
“smart city” is made up of  three forms 
of  ‘intelligence’: human intelligence 
through an empowered user or consum-
er; collective intelligence through new 
forms of  collaboration and partner-
ships that help break down traditional 
silos; and digital or machine intelligence 
through the use of  new information-
intensive technologies and applications. 
The challenge for many emerging econ-
omy cities lies in removing the barriers 
that prevent “smart city” approaches 
from becoming reality. The irst bar-
rier is to putting people at the centre of  
problem identiication and solving. This 
means engaging citizens in all aspects 
of  project planning, design and imple-
mentation. The “smart city” requires 
irst and foremost a well-informed and 
engaged citizenry. 
Removing the second barrier requires 
cities to unleash the potential of  entre-
preneurs to create new applications that 
will render the use of  infrastructure and 
services more efective and more ei-
cient. Local government need a regula-
tory space in which networks of  users 
and service providers have free and 
unhindered access to information and 
data and are allowed to come up with 
original solutions to city problems. Doz-
ens of  cities around the world which 
have removed the barriers of  access to 
information and eased regulatory re-
gimes have witnessed the quasi-sponta-
neous development of  applications that 
change the way people use and provide 
public services, manage traic and mo-
bility, improve safety and security, gen-
erate their own energy, and reduce the 
transaction costs for everything from 
water, electricity, gas, and waste man-
agement.   
The last barrier is the governance bar-
rier that separates local government 
administration and bureaucracy from 
both its citizens and from businesses 
that prevent new business models from 
emerging, new ways of  doing old things, 
and new forms of  partnerships. Local 
governments need to review their roles 
and responsibilities. They might want to 
transition from a command and control, 
monopolistic service provider to a true 
facilitator that enables people and busi-
nesses to ind innovative ways of  im-
proving quality of  life and livelihoods.
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EAST AFRICAN 
CITIES EMBRACE 
CCTVS FOR PUBLIC 
SAFETY
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The rise of  terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab and organized criminal gangs has result-
ed in terrible loss of  life and property in East Africa.  For Kenyans in particular, internal 
security has become a major public policy concern following recent terrorist attacks (e.g. 
Westgate Mall in September 2013, Mpeketoni, in June 2014, and Garissa University Col-
lege in 2015).
Al Shabaab has also carried out attacks in Uganda and has threatened attacks against a 
number of  East African countries. Part-
ly in response to terrorism and other or-
ganized crimes, East African countries 
are exploring ‘smart’ ways of  dealing 
with threats to internal security. Among 
the tools major cities (Nairobi, Kampa-
la, Kigali, Dar es Salaam) have resorted 
to are Closed Circuit Television Cam-
eras (CCTV) and related IP –based sur-
veillance cameras.  CCTV is the generic 
term used for a wide range of  video 
surveillance technologies. While tradi-
tional CCTV systems produce images 
that can be monitored using multiple 
screens, IP-based digital devices store 
data which can be saved to discs and 
other storage devices and/or transmit-
ted to diferent computer networks. The 
key diference is that CCTVs are about 
cameras connected in closed loops with 
images transmitted to a central site. 
East African countries are moving away 
from analogue videotapes that have 
limited storage capabilities and are in-
creasingly integrating their surveillance 
systems with their emerging IT infra-
structure. So far, the degree of  ambition 
and sophistication varies among these 
countries.
Kenya 
In developed countries, surveillance 
cameras are common in most business 
premises, malls, casinos, banks, and a 
good number of  central business dis-
tricts. Many developed economies also 
have installed cameras or systems that 
recognize vehicle number (license) 
plates and monitor traic movements 
in busy places. The main purpose of  
installing CCTVs in major cities is to 
enable real–time monitoring of  events 
at key installations and premises. Many 
CCTC systems are linked directly to 
and or management by the police and 
other security services.   
Following growing threats to public 
safety and security, Kenya has invested 
in CCTVs in key cities and towns. The 
main contract for the provision of  the 
CCTV system was awarded to Safa-
ricom, a company partly owned by the 
British telecommunication giant, Voda-
fone. Safaricom experts were contracted 
to set up a National Integrated Public 
Safety, Communication and Surveil-
lance System. It is reported that Safa-
ricom subcontracted Huawei, a China–
based telecommunication corporation 
to install part of  the system. The pro-
curement system has been a subject of  
controversy on the account of  lack of  
transparency. 
Safaricom claims that the Integrated 
Public Safety, Communication and Sur-
veillance System is an intelligent secu-
rity solution. It would support law en-
forcement to efectively coordinate and 
deploy resources in response to threats 
to national security.  Based upon LTE 
security communications network, the 
CCTVs would not be run on Safari-
com’s commercial network.
Kenya spent about Kenya Shillings 15 
billion for installation and purchase of  
at least 2,000 cameras in selected cities. 
Nairobi and Mombasa cities kicked of 
the role out of  the CCTV project. The 
Nairobi CCTV control room was set up 
at a government facility in the middle of  
the city. It has 80 screens and 51 cam-
eras. A back up system is to be manned 
by the Nairobi County government. 
Uganda 
The irst generation of  sophisticated 
public CCTV cameras was installed 
on selected routes in Kampala in 2007 
- in time for the November Meeting 
of  the Commonwealth Heads of  State 
(CHOGM). More recently, CCTV 
cameras were installed in Kampala 
Metropolitan Area following an order 
from President Yoweri Museveni. The 
Uganda government highlighted the 
fact that in the case of  the April 15, 
2013 terrorist bombing of  the Boston 
Marathon, the irst source of  informa-
tion was from CCTVs. The govern-
ment also cited the July 2005 terrorist 
attacks in London, observing that police 
were able to trace the culprits with the 
help of  CCTV footage. The Ministry 
of  Internal Afairs and the Uganda Po-
lice contracted a Chinese irm to pro-
77 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
cure and install surveillance systems on 
streets and nine major routes ostensibly 
to combat terrorism and crime.
Rwanda 
Rwanda’s ICT platforms are among the 
best in Africa. The country has integrat-
ed its traic control system with its sur-
veillance cameras. The country has also 
linked its CCTV cameras to its ATM 
Bank machines. Through an ATM 
monitoring system, alerts can be trig-
gered when damages and theft occur. 
The system is capable of  sending alerts 
in the case of  power vault failure, theft 
or breaches to software. Images capture 
facial features of  culprits, amounts of  
money stolen, and card holders accept-
ing cash.  
Tanzania
The private sector embraced CCTVs 
earlier than the public sector. But when 
the government embraced surveillance 
technology, its plan was among the most 
impressive in the region. The govern-
ment sought to boost its security cre-
dentials through installation of  CCTV 
cameras in various areas. Among the 
targets were the country’s roadways and 
transportation hubs. Tanzania’s con-
cern for monitoring the highways had 
more to do with tackling road accidents 
than perceived threats from terrorism. 
CCTV cameras were also installed in 
eight major cities including Dodoma, 
Moshi, Mwanza, Mbeya, Zanzibar, 
Tanga, Arusha and Dar es Salaam. 
The leadership of  Dar es Salaam be-
came increasingly attracted to the idea 
of  CCTVs after the terrorist bombing 
of  the US embassy in 1998.  
The Tanzania Intelligence Service and 
cabinet approved the installation of  
CCTV cameras in the city’s Central 
Business District (CBD), and along 
Kilwa, Old Bagamoyo and Morogoro 
Roads. The second phase targets the 
cities of  Arusha and Mwanza.
The Ministry of  Home Afairs argued 
that installation of  CCTV cameras 
would help curb crime. In May 2014, 
Minister Chikawe told parliament that 
the government would privatize the sec-
tor to enhance eiciency. The Tanzania 
project involves the ministries of  Works, 
Transportation, Urban Planning as well 
as local governments and individual cit-
izens. The Ministry of  Home Afairs is 
the lead agency. 
Pros and Cons of  CCTVs
The attraction to CCTVs is under-
standable. Cameras with night vision 
capabilities can help in ighting crimes 
that occur in the dark or poorly lit areas. 
Robust CCTV cameras have advanced 
zooming and tracking elements and 
are also capable of  transmitting images 
over the internet for onward transmis-
sion to multiple analysts. This can make 
it easier to have an integrated national 
security and response system. Some 
CCTV cameras can be operated by 
motion activated sensors, most of  which 
will, if  prompted, easily recognize and 
match facial features.
However, CCTVs are not a substitute 
for police patrols, or for the provision 
of  streetlights in urban centers. CCTVs 
rank behind physical police presence 
and well-lighted streets in deterring 
crime. It would be a mistake for policy 
makers in East Africa to treat CCTVs 
as the primary or major tool for com-
bating crime. CCTVs should be used 
to complement other security methods 
and tactics. CCTV cameras and associ-
ated technologies such as red-light cam-
eras, aerial cameras, public surveillance, 
dashboard and body cameras work best 
if  law enforcement have the necessary 
administrative capacity to administer 
and utilize them. That capacity includes 
ethical management in contracting and 
servicing, data analysis, archiving, re-
trieval, and reporting.
CCTVs are components of  technol-
ogy transfer, which require substan-
tial retooling to it local administrative 
cultures. Without these competencies, 
data generated from CCTVs might not 
count where it matters most (i.e. in judi-
cial litigation).
Privacy and the emerging surveil-
lance societies  
As East Africans seek to harness 
CCTVs for improved security and pub-
lic safety, concerns about privacy and 
the emergence of  a surveillance society 
are increasingly voiced. In Kenya, some 
members of  parliament questioned the 
efectiveness of  the CCTV surveillance 
platform when Kabete MP was killed in 
the central business district of  Nairobi 
and the CCTV appeared to be of  no 
immediate assistance to the police in 
tracking down his killers. Doubtful law-
makers felt that the CCTV system was 
not worth the money that had been in-
vested in it. 
Others have been more concerned 
about the privacy implications of  the 
CCTV platforms. Surveillance cam-
eras add to the increasing collection of  
person data by public and private sec-
tor not only in East Africa but globally. 
Arguably, the legal framework for the 
protection of  civil liberties and for the 
implementation of  surveillance plat-
forms such as CCTVs in African cities 
is weaker compared to that in many 
established democracies. For countries 
still struggling to establish democratic 
societies, some worry that these plat-
forms can be abused or rather used to 
curtail personal freedoms and liberty. 
A robust legal framework is needed to 
strike the right balance between security 
and privacy concerns. It is not clear that 
many East African countries have such 
robust frameworks. Such a framework 
would include clear guidelines on who 
holds and or has access to CCTV foot-
age, under what conditions and for how 
long. It would also include regulations 
on the security of  the platforms and the 
data they hold and on mechanisms for 
sharing the data. 
There are also administrative challeng-
es. System analysts and administrators 
must have the capacity to utilize the 
data generated from the CCTVs. Video 
analytics can be a complex exercise.  In 
a single year, more than 50,000 hours 
of  recordings are possible. Yet, the vol-
ume and variety of  data collected must 
be properly managed and processed. 
This requires efective organizational 
management that is often lacking in 
many public institutions in Africa. With 
CCTVs generating billions of  terabytes 
of  data, there must be efective and se-
cure means to collect, store and process 
this data, if  and when needed. With-
out appropriate management and skills 
in video analytics and organizational 
management, data will not be helpful to 
street-level and anti-crime policy imple-
menters. 
Lack of  professionalism has been iden-
tiied in the procurement, installation, 
administration and use of  the CCTVs 
in all the four East African countries. 
Emerging evidence suggests that in 
much of  East Africa, so far CCTVs 
have been primarily used in a reactive 
fashion: mostly forensic rather than 
pre-emptive purposes. Arguably, efec-
tive forensics work can also serve a pre-
emptive function, but CCTVs can be 
harnessed as a proactive, crime preven-
tion tool. For example, it is possible to 
use CCTVs creatively to ight corrup-
tion although this does not yet appear 
to be an explicit function of  any of  the 
CCTV platforms in the four East Afri-
can countries. 
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Background
A
frica’s economic develop-
ment is expected to take 
place within the context of  
ecological challenges (e.g. 
environmental pollution and degrada-
tion, natural and human induced haz-
ards, impacts of  climate change). Africa 
can ill aford the costly and antiquated 
development approach of  the past: 
‘economic growth irst, environmen-
tal clean-up later’. The environmental 
problems in India and China (e.g. severe 
air and water pollution, among others) 
should serve as a useful lesson for Afri-
ca’s development planners and thinkers. 
The African landscape has been sub-
jected to human-induced, long-term 
environmental deterioration. In both 
rural and urban areas, slash and burn 
practices and deforestation have caused 
depletion of  the rich top soil, among 
other ills. Further degradation of  the 
African ecosystem or ‘natural capital’ is 
likely to constrain the much desired eco-
nomic growth, even before the impacts 
of  climate change are factored in. 
The continent is highly vulnerable to 
natural and human-induced disasters. 
According to the World Bank, Sub-
Sahara Africa has been subjected to 
more than 1000 natural disasters during 
the last four decades. These disasters 
are expected to signiicantly increase 
in intensity and occurrence (http://
go.worldbank.org/UO0ESIRF10). 
Major urban centres in the economi-
cally fast-growing countries of  Africa 
are approaching or have exceeded their 
‘carrying capacities’ as a result of  a 
number of  population growth, chronic 
poverty and growing rural-urban mi-
gration. The result is signiicant envi-
ronmental stress, which is manifested in 
diferent ways in diferent places. The 
impacts of  climate change will amplify 
this environmental stress, with poten-
tially signiicant implications for Africa’s 
economic development, political stabil-
ity, social order and peace.
 
Natural hazards in Africa 
The major natural hazards in Sub-Sa-
hara Africa in the past have been hydro 
meteorological (e.g., drought, cyclones, 
looding) and geological and tectonic 
(volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.) 
in origin. Diferent parts of  the conti-
nent are potentially at risk from difer-
ent types of  natural hazards although 
some regions face multiple risks. 
• Hydro meteorological: The Sahel re-
gion is a narrow strip of  land along 
the southern margin of  the Sahara 
Desert from Dakar to the Red Sea. It 
is prone to protracted droughts and 
sporadic dust storms (Map 1).  The 
major decadal severe droughts and 
famine in eastern Africa (e.g., Ethio-
pia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, etc.) in 
1974, 1984, 1994, 2002, and in 2011 
afected millions of  people, livestock 
and the environment.
• Volcanism and earthquakes along 
the eastern Africa Rift system: The 
eastern Africa Rift extends from the 
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Afar Depression of  Djibouti, Eritrea, 
and Ethiopia in the north to Kenya, 
Uganda, DR Congo, Rwanda, Bu-
rundi, Tanzania, and Malawi in the 
Lakes Region of  eastern-central Af-
rica, and to Mozambique and South 
Africa in the southeastern part of  the 
continent (Map 1).  The Nyiragongo 
eruption in 2002 partially destroyed 
the town of  Goma in the DRC and 
displaced more than 350,000 people. 
The Ol Doinyo Lengai volcano in 
Tanzania and several recent erup-
tions of  lavas and ashes from the 
Afar Rift of  Ethiopia and Eritrea 
pose constant threats to population 
centers and to the environment. 
• Volcanoes, earthquakes and tsu-
namis: Coastal lowlands along the 
eastern continental margin of  Af-
rica from Somalia to South Africa 
and nearby islands (i.e., Madagascar, 
Comoros, Mauritius, Reunion, and 
Seychelles) in the western part of  
the Indian Ocean are always at risk 
(Map 1).  The most recent tsunami 
generated by the Sumatra, Indone-
sia earthquake of  December 2004, 
greatly impacted the region.  Moreo-
ver, most North African countries lo-
cated along the Nubia Plate bound-
ary are prone to earthquakes and 
tsunami hazards.
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I. NATURAL PHENOMENA: HAZARDS 
AND DISASTERS
Processes Hazards
1. Geological/tectonic Volcanoes
Poisonous gases (SO2, CO2, H2S, CH4, etc.)
Earthquakes
Landslides
Tsunamis
Lahars/debris low/looding
2. Hydro meteorological Hurricanes/cyclones/tornados
Floods
Extreme heat and heat waves
Droughts/famine 
Wildires
Dust storms
3. Biological hazards Epidemics/pandemic
Pest infestation
II. HUMAN-INDUCED HAZARDS AND DIS-
ASTERS CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Atmospheric (Anthropogenic impacts) Air pollution
Gas laring
2. Water (surface and groundwater) con-
tamination
Mine waste
Municipal/sewer
Irrigation outlow
Industrial/manufacturing waste water
3. Fires Forest lands, slash and burn
4. Land Toxic-waste dump/expired chemicals
Solid waste and sewage
Mining dump and erosion
Deforestation, erosion, dust storm
5. Societal conlicts and terrorism Armed conlicts, genocide, mass migration, failed states, etc.
Biological threats
Chemical threats
6. Technological hazards Hazardous materials 
Map 1. The map shows the major urban centres of  Africa and the regional locations of  potential natural hazard occurrences.  The major natural and 
human-induced hazards that have and are likely to impact most, if  not all nations in Africa are as follows.
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The International Council for Science 
Regional Oice for Africa (ICSU-ROA) 
has prepared a science plan for mitigat-
ing major natural and human-induced 
hazards and disasters in Sub-Sahara Af-
rica (http://www.icsu.org/africa). The 
plan focuses on assessing and managing 
geological hazards through the use of  
remote sensing. It also focuses on hydro-
meteorological hazards and disasters 
with special emphasis on the Sahel re-
gion. The plan also focuses on lood 
management in major river basins. 
The World Bank has established a dis-
aster risk management (DRM) team for 
Sub-Sahara Africa based on the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA). The HFA 
is a global framework for disaster risk re-
duction and management. The Bank’s 
initiative builds on the African Union’s 
Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management ratiied in 2004. This re-
gional strategy seeks to:
• Enhance risk and vulnerability as-
sessment across sectors using ad-
vanced early warning sensors and 
monitoring systems.
• Promote awareness of  natural and 
human-induced hazards and disas-
ters and support policy and institu-
tional building for DRM.
• Provide resources to mitigate and re-
duce risk factors.
• Expedite preparedness with con-
tingency planning, including cata-
strophic risk inancing tools.
• Rehearse emergency responses and 
readiness with respect to provision 
of  assistance during post-disaster 
events.
Independent initiatives
In addition to the international eforts 
described above, a number of  scientists 
from Africa, Europe, and the United 
States have embarked on concerted ef-
forts through collaborative research, 
training and mentoring to increase 
natural hazards preparedness in Africa. 
In 2002, a comprehensive assessment 
- ‘Geoenvironmental Hazards and Dis-
asters in Africa’ - was carried out at a 
workshop in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2009, 
an ‘Advanced Workshop on Evaluating, 
Monitoring, and Communicating Vol-
canic and Seismic Hazards in East Af-
rica’ was held at the Abdus Salam Inter-
national Center for Theoretical Physics 
(ICTP) in Trieste, Italy.  More than 80 
scientists and students from 30 countries 
in Africa, Asia, North and South Ameri-
ca, and Europe attended. About half  of  
the participants were from Africa. 
The meeting was full of  promise and 
energy. Participants developed action 
plans to tackle volcanic, seismic, and 
other natural hazards in Africa. The 
workshop ended with an ambitious ac-
tion plan to support immediate and 
long-term needs of  African geoscien-
tists, especially in research, infrastruc-
ture, and education.  The meeting 
recommended the creation of  regional 
data centers, Sub-Saharan volcano and 
earthquake observatories, and the es-
tablishment of  a geohazard PhD and 
Hazard mitigation and response in Africa
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MS programme at an African Uni-
versity.  
Addis Ababa University (AAU) in 
Ethiopia was selected to be the hub 
for the geohazard PhD programme. 
By 2012, the AAU team had devel-
oped a curriculum for the Geohaz-
ard PhD Programme. It was a robust 
and well-integrated interdisciplinary 
programme. Unfortunately, due to 
lack of  adequate resources, the pro-
gramme failed to take of although 
the initiative had a lot of  potential. 
It would have complemented ongo-
ing international eforts (e.g. ICSU-
AOR, the World Bank Africa DRM 
initiatives). The need for it is as strong 
today as it was in 2009.   Missed op-
portunities like this should not deter 
African professionals and friends of  
Africa from renewing eforts to estab-
lish regional or national centres for 
disaster risk mitigation and prepar-
edness.  
Disaster risk reduction and manage-
ment is critical to the future of  eco-
nomic development in Africa. Natu-
ral hazard mitigation seeks to reduce 
the risks of  catastrophic impacts 
through careful planning, efective 
regulation of  land use, and building 
procedures especially in large met-
ropolitan areas. Poor land use plan-
ning, especially in urban areas and 
bad development decisions are likely 
to lead to catastrophic destruction of  
life and property.  
In any case, there will be natural and 
man-made hazards and disasters in 
the future. Heightened awareness 
through education at local, regional, 
and national levels and advocacy for 
safer and sustainable developments 
can make a huge diference in dis-
aster risk management.  In the long-
term, the successes of  the national, 
regional, and continental initiatives 
will depend on whether African 
countries can train, recruit, and re-
tain skilled experts on natural hazard 
and disaster risk assessment and miti-
gation. Political commitment and 
action plans are required to develop 
functional institutions that are capa-
ble of  assessing potential threats from 
natural and human induced hazards. 
What should African countries 
do? 
 • Each country should formulate a 
nationwide plan and strategy that 
empowers local experts - national 
geological surveys agencies, uni-
versities, and emergency services 
- to develop databases of  all po-
tential natural and human-caused 
hazards at the local, district, pro-
vincial, and national levels.  
• At the regional level, countries 
that are likely to be afected by 
similar hazards and disasters 
should coordinate and integrate 
their resources.  Regional eco-
nomic, developmental, and secu-
rity organizations could play key 
roles in facilitating such collabora-
tion.  
• At the continental level, the De-
partment of  Human Resources, 
Science, and Technology of  the 
African Union should play a vital 
role as a coordinator of  the vari-
ous national and regional and in-
ternational eforts in this area.
The most important long-term op-
tion is to establish at least two Africa-
based higher-education (i.e. PhD) 
centres to provide hydro meteorologi-
cal and geological hazard studies and 
training.  One of  these centres could 
replace the failed geohazards PhD 
Programme at Addis Ababa Uni-
versity. The broad interdisciplinary 
prospectus that was prepared for 
the geohazard programme could be 
modiied to include courses related 
to volcanoes, earthquakes, landslides, 
and tsunamis within the eastern Afri-
can rift, the Cameroon Line, the is-
lands and coastal lowlands along the 
western parts of  the Indian Ocean, 
and North Africa.  The Sahel region 
of  West Africa would be an ideal lo-
cation for training future experts in 
hydrometeorology and related haz-
ards. These two programmes would 
lay the foundation for long-term ca-
pacity building in hazards and disas-
ter risk mitigation and management 
in Africa. 
The worldwide web provides a wealth 
of  information on all kinds of  natural 
and human-induced hazards and dis-
aster management. These are mostly 
prepared by the developed world 
(www.fema.gov/pdf/areyouready/
basic-preparedness.pdf). However, 
the basic guidelines are universally 
applicable:
• Developing emergency plans,
• Collecting and assembling disas-
ter supply kits,
• Learning where to seek shelter 
from hazards,
• Identifying rural/urban commu-
nity warning systems and evacua-
tion routes,
• Knowing relevant information 
from community and school 
plans,
• Learning what to do for speciic 
hazards, and 
• Practicing and maintaining emer-
gency plans,
• Establishing communication net-
works (i.e., mobile phone, social 
media, radio, TV, etc.).
If  Africa is to achieve sustainable 
growth and development, it will need 
to develop and implement an efec-
tive hazards and disaster risk and 
mitigation strategy. Ultimately, efec-
tive implementation of  such a strat-
egy will rely on skilled local expertise. 
It is time for the continent to invest in 
building capacity in this area. 
Dr. Giday WoldeGabriel is an Ethiopian-
American geologist at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in New Mexico, USA. He is 
also co-leader and chief  geologist of  the 
Middle Awash project, a multidisciplinary 
international research endeavor based at the 
University of  California, Berkeley, whose 
objective is to conduct geological and paleo-
environmental investigations and the eluci-
dation of  human origins and evolution in 
the Afar Rift of  northeastern Ethiopia. The 
international research team is responsible for 
the most signiicant discoveries of  about half  
of  the known early hominid species—fossils 
ranging in age from the recent past to about 
6 million years and providing temporal, 
spatial, and paleo-environmental contexts 
for these paleobiological records. The Mid-
dle Awash project team is responsible for the 
discovery and dating of  the most complete 
skeletal remains of  Ardipithecus ramidus at 
4.4 million years ago, which was published 
in a special issue of  Science in October 
2009. His areas of  specialization include 
ield geology, rift tectonics, volcanology, ge-
ochronology, paleo-environmental, and te-
phra studies.
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CLIMATE RELEVANT INNOVATION-
SYSTEM BUILDERS (CRIBS)
Dr David Ockwell, Deputy Director (Research), ESRC STEPS Centre, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography
University of Sussex, UK
Dr Robert Byrne, Lecturer, SPRU (Science Policy Research Unit), STEPS Centre and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 
School of Business, Management and Economics University of Sussex
For developing countries, the promise of  access to new climate technologies (includ-
ing low carbon energy technologies and technologies for adapting to climate change) 
has always been a key motivation for engaging with UN climate negotiations.
S
ub-Saharan Africa is a region 
whose aggregate greenhouse 
gas emissions are minimal 
but whose potential growth in 
emissions through ambitious economic 
development plans, and whose vulner-
ability to the impacts of  current and fu-
ture climate change, are signiicant. The 
region also has an urgent need to deal 
with the low levels of  access to modern 
energy services, an issue faced by two in 
every three people in the region – and 
an issue that access to low carbon en-
ergy technologies has a high potential 
to address (as highlighted by the UN’s 
Sustainable Energy for All initiative). 
For these reasons, the potential support 
that UN climate policy could provide to 
African countries in funding initiatives 
that enhance access to, and develop-
ment of, new climate technologies is 
highly signiicant.
In this short article, based on grounded 
research with partners in Africa, India 
and China, we articulate a concrete pol-
icy proposal for extending the existing 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Tech-
nology Mechanism to make it work for 
Africa. The proposal has the potential 
to make a real, long term diference to 
African countries’ access to, and devel-
opment of, climate technologies. We 
propose the implementation of  CRIBs 
(Climate Relevant Innovation-system 
Builders) – centres based on the ground 
in African countries as an extension to 
the existing Climate Technology Centre 
and Network (CTCN) under the UN-
FCCC Technology Mechanism. 
In an earlier edition of  the African 
Technopolitan, Professor Stefan Schep-
ers wrote about the value of  building 
“Innovation Ecosystems” in African 
countries as the key means through 
which to boost science, technology and 
innovation and ultimately economic 
growth and broader human develop-
ment across Africa. CRIBs, as a policy 
mechanism, is designed to do just this. 
Rather than “Innovation Ecosystems” 
we refer instead to “National Systems of  
Innovation” – an accepted term in the 
scientiic literature and one which can 
explain the economic success of  many 
diferent countries across multiple dif-
ferent socio-cultural and environmental 
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contexts in both the Global North 
and South.
Our hope is that African negotia-
tors will take this CRIBs proposal 
and run with it as one of  their key 
demands at the forthcoming UN cli-
mate negotiations in Paris in Decem-
ber 2015. 
One of  the most powerful boosts 
to addressing climate technology 
transfer and development under the 
UNFCCC came in October 2014 
at a meeting convened by the Tech-
nology Executive Committee (TEC) 
on strengthening National Systems 
of  Innovation in developing coun-
tries. This brieing suggests some key 
points for how the UNFCCC archi-
tecture could be extended in order 
to strengthen National Systems of  
Innovation in order to achieve more 
transformative rates of  climate tech-
nology transfer and development via 
the development of  CRIBs.
Our key policy recommenda-
tions are for:
• Long term funding to establish 
and run CRIBs under the UNFC-
CC as an extension to the CTCN
• Support to help countries design 
and establish CRIBs under the 
UNFCCC
• CRIBs to be demand-driven by 
Parties
• CRIBs to be housed within ex-
isting institutions in developing 
countries
• CRIBs to feed requests to the 
CTCN via National Designated 
Entities (NDEs)
The problem with current 
policy: Hardware inancing
It has long been recognised under 
the UNFCCC that the Convention 
should provide developing countries 
with support to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change, and to develop 
along low carbon, climate resilient 
trajectories. One of  the ways the 
UNFCCC is supposed to help this to 
happen is by supporting the transfer 
and development of  climate tech-
nologies (technologies for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation). 
However activities under the Con-
vention have failed to deliver at any-
thing like the speed or scale needed. 
So why hasn’t it worked? 
Research with our partners in Africa, 
India and China demonstrates a core 
reason is the current policy fram-
ing of  the problem as one requiring 
‘hardware inancing’.  Climate tech-
nologies are more expensive than 
conventional technologies, so market 
mechanisms – e.g. the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM), Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) funded 
eforts – help pay for technologies 
which might not otherwise be aford-
able. 
But these approaches ignore the most 
important prerequisite for countries 
to be able to absorb new technolo-
gies: technological capabilities.
Sowing seeds
Technological capabilities are like 
soil in a garden. Without initial ef-
forts to nurture the soil’s fertility, 
scattering seeds (bits of  technology 
hardware) is unlikely to lead to a 
lourishing garden (technological 
change and development). Moreo-
ver, commercial gardening contrac-
tors (technology investors) are un-
likely to invest efort in sowing seeds 
in unfertile gardens in the irst place. 
Hardware inancing mechanisms, 
therefore, serve to reinforce the 
comparative advantages of  diferent 
countries. The majority of  invest-
ment from the CDM, for example, 
went to countries with comparatively 
high levels of  existing technological 
capabilities such as China (60%) and 
India (11%).  Africa as a whole only 
received 3% and sub-Saharan Africa 
even less. The CDM also tended to 
fund established, close-to-market 
technologies rather than nurturing 
the development and uptake of  new 
technologies.
How National Systems of  In-
novation can help
So how do countries develop the 
technological capabilities they need 
to attract technology transfer and 
development? The key, according to 
decades of  research in the ield of  
Innovation Studies and more recent 
work on Socio-Technical Transi-
tions, is to focus on nurturing Na-
tional Systems of  Innovation (NSIs). 
NSIs can be understood as the gar-
dens within which the fertile soil is 
to be nurtured. They provide the 
context within which all processes 
of  technology development, transfer 
and uptake occur. NSIs encompass 
the network of  actors (irms, univer-
sities, research institutes, government 
departments, NGOs) within which 
innovation occurs, and the strength 
and nature of  the relationships be-
tween them. 
The idea of  nurturing the NSIs 
would begin to address the problem 
that hardware inancing can’t ix. It 
could underpin more sustained and 
widespread transfer and develop-
ment of  climate technologies. As 
such, it provides a powerful new fo-
cus for international policy.
A change in thinking: from 
gardens to gardeners
Innovation System Builders, key ac-
tors (individuals or institutions) who 
link actors and institutions up across 
niches of  climate technology activity, 
are pointed to in the above litera-
tures. These are the gardeners who, 
wanting their garden to prosper, pre-
pare fertile ground for leaps ahead 
in technological capability develop-
ment. Policy eforts could seek to 
fulil the role of  Innovation System 
Builders.
By convening the NSIs workshop, 
the TEC – responsible for overseeing 
implementation of  the UNFCCC’s 
Technology Mechanism – has sig-
nalled its interest in this powerful 
way forward for UN climate policy. 
What happens now?
The TEC will further consider NSIs 
in 2015, according to its 2014/15 
work plan. Nurturing NSIs will take 
efort and capacity, more in some 
countries and regions than others. 
Looking at the coverage of  existing 
mechanisms under the UNFCCC 
(mostly via the CTCN) and related 
initiatives – including the World 
Bank’s Climate Innovation Centres 
(CICs) and the various Development 
Bank initiatives funded by the GEF 
– we have a clear picture of  where 
the gaps are. 
Table 1 illustrates the coverage of  
existing mechanisms against the key 
policy goals which should direct ef-
forts at innovation system building. It 
disaggregates between national and 
international networking and adds 
an additional row to signify whether 
NSI building is an explicit part of  
any of  their remits at present. From 
the swathe of  yellow we can see that 
it would be possible, with incremen-
tal revisions to the existing remit of  
most of  these initiatives, to integrate 
NSI building across their activities.
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Table 1 – Coverage of  existing policy mechanisms against key elements of  building National Systems of  Innovation
Goal CTCN CIC ADB EBRD AfDB IADB
Explicit Innovation System 
Building focus? 
P P P P P P
Build networks (intl.) Y Y Y N Y Y
Build networks (national) P Y Y N P Y
Share learning P N P N P P
Shared visions P N P N P P
Support experiments P N P P P P
Key 
CTCN - Climate Technology Centre and Network; CIC – Climate Innovation Centres; ADB – Asian Development Bank ; 
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; AfDB – African Development Bank Group; IADB – Inter-
American Development Bank.
Y  • Yes – within existing remit 
P  • Potential – within, or with incremental changes to, existing remit and institutional structure 
N  • No – outside remit 
What needs to change in order to make 
this work? Under the UNFCCC, the 
key delivery mechanism is the CTCN. 
The TEC could make a recommenda-
tion to the UNFCCC Conference of  
the Parties (COP) for a new approach 
here. But the CTCN lacks capacity on 
the ground in Africa, and, indeed, in de-
veloping countries more generally. The 
CTCN’s National Designated Entities 
(NDEs) are generally stafed by civil 
servants with only a small proportion of  
their time allocated to the NDE role. 
The creation of  CRIBs is needed. These 
would be dedicated institutions on the 
ground in Africa focusing explicitly on 
building NSIs, understanding local ca-
pacities, and identifying opportunities 
to connect actors up across projects and 
programmes and sectors, linking up 
with and understanding technology us-
ers, and so on.  (Note, this is likely closer 
to Professor Ambuj Sagar’s and his col-
league’s original vision for what became 
the CICs, although their vision was for 
centres at a regional rather than nation-
al level – and it was exactly what was 
intended in the Sussex Energy Group’s 
proposal for the critical UN negotia-
tions in Copenhagen in 2009). 
Each CRIB would feed in requests to 
the CTCN via the NDE in their coun-
try. It would also link to, and learn 
from, CRIBs in other countries via the 
CTCN. It is a demand-driven model, 
with countries expressing their desire 
to establish a CRIB which would then 
be facilitated via support under the UN-
FCCC. This demand driven nature is 
critical. It provides African countries 
with the legitimate remit to inluence 
the UNFCCC architecture in ways that 
facilitate development in directions that 
are self-deined and luid, learning and 
evolving as they grow.
What is required under the UNFCCC, 
and what African negotiators must de-
mand, is that long term funding be 
made available to establish and run 
CRIBs. Support could also be made 
available to help countries to design and 
initially establish them. They would also 
beneit from their direct link into the 
CTCN, providing for further, in-country 
demand driven support. Ideally, CRIBs 
wouldn’t be new institutions, but would 
be run through existing institutions with 
appropriate expertise (e.g. universities, 
research organisations or NGOs). 
New opportunity and approach
There is an opportunity here for a new 
framing of  international climate tech-
nology policy around nurturing NSIs 
– an opportunity for an African driven 
and self-deined vision for making the 
UNFCCC work for them. Decades of  
empirical research support the idea 
that this policy framing would have sig-
niicantly more impact than one built 
around hardware inancing approaches. 
We look forward to positive steps for-
ward from the TEC in the months to 
come, to the creation of  Innovation-
System Builders, via the establishment 
of  CRIBs in developing countries, and 
to a new turn in international policy 
eforts that works for all countries, not 
just the few who have beneited to date 
through mechanisms like the CDM. 
How can it work?
For the peer reviewed scientiic basis to 
the proposal, please refer to our open 
access article in the journal Climate 
Policy http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/14693062.201
5.1052958#.VZEksesk_0c. 
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USING DATA TO 
TACKLE CLIMATE 
CHANGE
By Dr James Kimondo
Centre Director, Kenya Forestry Research Institute
F
or the last three years, govern-
ment oicials, academics and 
scientists in Kenya have been 
working with the Clinton Foun-
dation to overcome this problem by 
building SLEEK (System for Land-
based Emissions Estimation in Kenya). 
This programme is also supported by 
the Government of  Australia. 
The programme’s irst goal is to build a 
national GHG (greenhouse gas) Meas-
urement, Reporting and Veriication 
(MRV) system for the land-sector in 
Kenya. MRV systems are used by coun-
tries to track their GHG emissions and 
report changes to the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). They play an important role in 
helping tackle climate change by provid-
ing vital information about a country’s 
GHG emissions.  Currently, Kenya does 
not have a system for estimating emis-
sions in the land-sector. Without this, it 
is di cult to plan efective policies for 
reducing emissions. Furthermore, a ro-
bust MRV would enable Kenya to max-
imize the beneits from international 
programmes that seek to reduce emis-
sions through reduced deforestation and 
implementation of  green growth strate-
gies. SLEEK will allow Kenya to track 
its GHG emissions and removals in the 
land-sector and to report this accurately 
to the UNFCCC. 
The programme’s second key output 
is the development of  applications and 
supporting data acquisition infrastruc-
ture to make this information available 
in ways that can help Kenya address 
other vital socio-economic issues, such 
as food security, agricultural produc-
tivity and land-management.  Putting 
this data into the hands of  Kenyans in 
formats they can use could have pro-
found implications across the country, 
changing the way Kenya grows it food, 
manages it lands and protects its natural 
resources. 
How is SLEEK being built?
 SLEEK is being delivered by teams of  
scientists and other experts from a range 
of  institutions organized in Element 
Working Groups. This collaboration 
helps breaks down silos between agen-
cies and helps scientists work together in 
new, innovative ways. The programme 
is supported by a broader governance 
structure, with administration located 
in a Programme Management Unit and 
high-level strategic oversight provided 
by a Programme Steering Committee.  
The programme will bring together ive 
key data sets:
• Soil data, providing essential infor-
mation about soil nutrient and car-
bon levels; 
• Forest data showing where for-
ests were and are in Kenya, how 
much carbon is sequestered through 
growth, and information about the 
optimal conditions for growth;
• Weather data, collected from weather 
stations across Kenya;
• Information about Kenya’s key crops, 
including the conditions that change 
their growth patterns and how much 
carbon is stored by diferent crops; 
and 
• Land cover maps of  Kenya, showing 
how land-use has changed over the 
past thirty years.
To drive SLEEK, an integration tool 
called FLINT (Full Lands Integration 
Tool) has been developed by Govern-
ment of  Kenya and experts from the 
Clinton Foundation. This tool is able 
to analyze data sets to answer policy 
questions and guide the policy develop-
ment process. It does this by identifying 
changes in Kenya’s land-sector through 
remote sensing, and then using models 
to simulate the carbon luxes as a result 
of  this land-cover change. The tool has 
been built to be generic – which means 
that any other country will be able to 
adopt it, connect their own data and use 
it to meet their own policy goals. 
Challenges of  building SLEEK 
The road to building SLEEK has not 
been easy. It has taken time, efort and 
perseverance. A number of  key les-
sons can be generalized from the pro-
gramme, and can help inform similar 
projects that aim to build long-term 
data systems. 
Across Africa, accessing timely and accurate data in the land-sector is a challenge. 
Whether a decision maker wants to track changes in forest, a farmer wants to know what crop 
to plant, or a national climate change negotiator wants to understand a country’s emissions, all 
too often they are confronted by data that is fragmented, incomplete or inaccessible.  
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 Data is fragmented 
Countries like Kenya have signiicant 
stores of  data. However, often this data 
is fragmented and incomplete. Too 
many records are stored on paper, or 
have not been converted to a standard 
format that allows the data to be com-
pared over time. This is often a result 
of  the way various independent pro-
grammes collect data for their speciic 
purposes. Even when intensive research 
is undertaken in certain sites, there are 
few ongoing, comparable monitoring 
systems developed. This means that 
data sets are frequently very lumpy, 
with inconsistent methods and irregular 
timescales. 
The policy agenda is crowded 
and urgent 
Kenya, like most developing countries, 
confronts a wide range of  vexing policy 
challenges, from the provision of  high 
quality education to responsive health-
care, inclusive communities and jobs. As 
a result, prioritizing policies to address 
climate change will always struggle in 
this environment, as the impacts will be 
felt over decades. Equally, building ro-
bust data-systems within governments 
requires long-term decision-making and 
a signiicant level of  technical invest-
ment before beneits are realized. 
Data systems are complex 
Building data-systems is always a com-
plex undertaking, and the SLEEK ex-
perience so far is no diferent. These 
systems require innumerable decisions 
to be made across government depart-
ments and institutions and many hur-
dles to be overcome.  SLEEK has ben-
eited from drawing extensively on the 
experience of  other countries. However 
the complexity remains a continuous 
challenge. This problem is not unique 
to MRV systems – all data systems need 
to make decisions across a range of  in-
stitutions.   
WHAT LESSONS TO CONSIDER 
IN BUILDING BIG DATA SYS-
TEMS LIKE MRV?
Building strong foundations with-
in a country
The irst step in building any system that 
will be sustainable within government is 
to build strong foundation and aware-
ness within the country. SLEEK has 
been careful not to impose itself  on top 
of  pre-existing government structures. 
Instead, the development has respected 
and reinforced existing mandates. This 
has been supported by a careful, long-
term engagement with experts across 
the country – working at steady, accom-
modative pace that gave all stakeholders 
a chance to be involved. 
Fill the gaps 
SLEEK has undertaken extensive eforts 
to identify the gaps that exist in datasets 
and to put in place programmes to ill 
these gaps. In many cases, data exists 
but is not in a usable format. For exam-
ple, the programme has digitized over 
1.7 million climate records at the Kenya 
Meteorological Service, which were 
previously stored in paper formats. This 
has greatly expanded Kenya’s digital 
climate record, improving the service’s 
capacity to analyze and understand 
Kenya’s climate. 
The programme has also strengthened 
the capacity of  Kenyan scientists to de-
velop and use models that are able to 
provide insight in crops, soils and forests 
in Kenya. The programme has devel-
oped interfaces that will make it easier 
for scientists to use a key soil model 
called the Rothamsted Carbon Model 
(Roth-C). Previously, scientists had to 
have detailed knowledge of  the model’s 
operation, however with the new inter-
faces they are able to access the model 
much more easily.
These user-friendly interfaces will con-
tinue to be developed for all key models 
used in SLEEK. The development of  
these interfaces has been supported by 
the provision of  training by some of  the 
most well respected research institutions 
in the world, which has brought global 
knowledge to Kenya. Finally, SLEEK 
has provided signiicant funding to de-
velop new datasets. This is fundamental 
to illing the gaps in data, and to create 
a comprehensive system that can deliver 
the results needed by Kenya.  
Improve the return on investment 
MRV systems are essential for tackling 
climate change. However, as discussed, 
they compete with a range of  other 
pressing needs. To overcome this, data 
systems need to over-perform by deliv-
ering a high rate of  return on invest-
ment for a wide range of  beneiciaries. 
In SLEEK, this has meant ensuring that 
the scope of  activities is broad enough 
to address challenges across govern-
ment, well beyond simply providing 
emissions estimation results. Harnessing 
data to meet development challenges 
creates champions across government, 
and fosters the political will to keep a 
system running long after donor fund-
ing has ceased.
Make the data matter to people 
SLEEK has been explicitly designed to 
help address a range of  socio-economic 
issues such as food security, agricultural 
productivity and land-management. 
This will primarily be done through 
the development of  programmes and 
applications. Kenya has already recog-
nized that there are a wide range of  ap-
plications that could be developed using 
SLEEK data. The Clinton Foundation 
has worked with the Government of  
Kenya to scope an initial set of  appli-
cations which would have a signiicant 
beneit for Kenya.  
For example, by bringing together cli-
mate data, crop information and maps 
of  Kenya’s soils there is the capacity 
to help provide information about the 
best crop to grow in a particular area. 
This information can be disseminated 
through SMS, information programmes 
or table applications. The data collect-
ed by SLEEK can also help overcome 
challenges in programmes that haven’t 
succeeded for a lack of  reliable data. 
For example weather index-based crop 
insurance has been di cult in Kenya 
due to a lack of  access to weather data. 
SLEEK will help provide access to this 
information through certiied weather 
maps that are timely, accurate and ac-
cessible. SLEEK can also help connect 
local databases with national infrastruc-
ture. For example, a proposed forest 
tracker will help Kenya’s forest manag-
ers track deforestation and identify ar-
eas for reforestation. Communities will 
also be able to use this tool to help plan 
their own reforestation projects, and 
will be able to estimate the income they 
could generate by selling carbon reduc-
tions to others who want to ofset their 
impact on the environment. 
These three applications are an indica-
tion of  the possibilities that can result 
from the SLEEK data collection pro-
cess. Continuing to identify and capital-
ize on these datasets will be a key op-
portunity for all Ministries within the 
Government of  Kenya. 
Making data systems sustainable 
SLEEK was born out of  a need to track 
emissions in Kenya. However, mak-
ing the system sustainable required 
the reach of  the programme to extend 
beyond these initial aims. The lesson is 
that data-systems in Africa can’t be re-
stricted to narrow goals – instead, they 
have to address a range of  national de-
velopment priorities. This lesson applies 
beyond MRV, and can help inform pro-
grammes across the developing world.
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E-GOVERNMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT IN KENYA
In October 2012, Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) 
launched a digital portal. NEMA’s e-EIA system has the potential to yet again rein-
force Kenya’s status as one of  Africa’s most technologically adventurous countries.  
T
he cornerstone of  e-governance 
has always been utilization of  
information and communica-
tions Technology (ICT) in the 
delivery of  equitable and eicient pub-
lic services as required by citizens and 
organizations. The ‘e’ in e-government 
refers to the enabling technology and 
is not the primary focus – that remains 
on ‘government’. The goal is to eradi-
cate poverty and disease, improve liter-
acy, protect the environment, enhance 
transparency and accountability, em-
power citizens and accelerate economic 
development. Without radical commit-
ment by governments to leverage the 
opportunities presented by enabling 
technology, the digital age is unlikely to 
provide lasting solutions to fundamental 
social and economic challenges.
African countries are still largely natural 
resource based economies. 
Many are highly susceptible to the 
negative efects of  environmental deg-
radation. A review of  EIA systems con-
ducted by the United Nations Econom-
ic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 
collaboration with Capacity Linkages 
for Environmental Assessment in Af-
rica (CLEAA) (UNECA, 2005) revealed 
that while African countries have made 
signiicant eforts to implement EIA 
legislation, the institutionalization of  
EIA has been slower in Africa than else-
where in the world. Limited capacity to 
manage, utilize and disseminate infor-
mation efectively is one of  the major 
challenges.  Others include corruption, 
poor quality EIA reports, inadequate 
EIA review and Environmental Man-
agement Planning (EMP). 
Innovative and efective use of  ICTs, in 
the form of  e-environmental govern-
ance has the potential to address some 
of  these challenges. According to the 
UN E-Government Survey of  2014, for 
the irst time, all the 193 UN Member 
States have achieved online presence. 
130 countries have made eforts to pro-
vide environmental information online, 
Sharon Mirrella Wakhu, PhD Candidate
University of Shanghai for Science & Technology (USST)
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23 of  which are in Africa. Tunisia, 
Mauritius, Egypt, Morocco and 
Seychelles lead the middle income 
economy countries while Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Rwanda are at the fore-
front in the low income economy 
category. A diverse array of  digital 
channels including national web-
sites, Wide Area Network (WAN), 
mobile applications, e-participation 
features (social media, crowdsourc-
ing and Short Message Service – 
SMS) and dedicated Open Govern-
ment Data portals are now actively 
in use for the provision of  services 
and environmental information by 
environmental agencies in Africa. 
Kenya’s e-EIA system
The Kenyan e-EIA system was de-
veloped by the National Environ-
mental Management Authority 
(NEMA) in 2012. It was predicated 
on the assumption that the integra-
tion of  ICTs in the management 
and implementation of  the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
process has the potential to trans-
form environmental regulation and 
protection. The e-EIA system aims 
to:
• improve the quality and eicien-
cy of  service delivery 
• simplify operational procedures
• enable access to NEMA services 
throughout the country
• promote productivity through 
tracking and monitoring of  pro-
gress
• minimize administrative and op-
erational costs 
• enhance public participation and 
consultation
• reduce avenues for corruption 
through transparency and ac-
countability
The e-EIA system was developed in-
house by the ICT department after 
an assessment of  the requirements 
and consultation between environ-
mental experts and ICT profession-
als at NEMA. It is an integrated 
Government-to-Citizens / Govern-
ment-to-Business / Government-
to-Government (G2C/G2B/G2G) 
model. 
The e-EIA system has enabled the 
automation of  the following ser-
vices:
• Registration of  EIA experts:
• application for registration as 
an environmental impact assess-
ment/audit expert
• application for license to practice 
as an environmental impact as-
sessment/audit expert
Environmental Impact Assess-
ment review:
• submission of  environment im-
pact assessment project report
• submission of  environment im-
pact assessment study report
• application for variation of  envi-
ronmental impact assessment li-
cense
• notiication of  surrender of  en-
vironmental impact assessment 
license
Compliance and Enforcement 
(waste management, noise, 
biodiversity, water quality and 
ozone depleting substances):
• Environmental Licensing
• Environmental Auditing
• Environmental Inspection
•  Environmental Incident Man-
agement and Disaster Prevention 
through a 24hr dedicated hotline
• Environmental reporting: NEMA 
publishes the annual State of  the 
Environment (SoE) report which 
provides updates on various envi-
ronmental issues afecting Kenya 
in relation to the rest of  the re-
gion and the world. The report 
is available for download on the 
NEMA website. Other online 
publications and resources are 
also available such as the NEMA 
Magazine, EIA regulations, poli-
cies and procedures, EIA experts 
register with contact details and 
samples of  approved EIA study 
reports for reference purposes.
The user interface of  the NEMA 
e-EIA system is web based and ac-
cessible to the public. The back-end 
application has an inbuilt worklow 
management system (WfMS), mak-
ing it possible for all applications and 
submissions to be tracked online. 
Links to related government agen-
cies (Ministry of  Environment and 
Natural Resources, Kenya Mete-
orological Department, Department 
of  Resource Surveys and Remote 
Sensing (DRSRS) and the Mines & 
Geological Department can also be 
accessed on the web platform. For 
payment purposes, information on 
the speciic bank account to be used 
is provided on the site.  
To date, NEMA has not undertaken 
a comprehensive beneits evaluation 
exercise so the degree to which the 
e-EIA system has inluenced EIA 
performance, service quality, op-
erational eiciencies and public par-
ticipation remains to be established. 
However, at a glance, it would ap-
pear that operations at the agency 
are now modern, traceable and rela-
tively more eicient. Productivity 
and accountability of  the staf has 
increased. With more transparent 
procedures, it is hoped that instanc-
es of  corruption and unnecessary 
delays will reduce. For project pro-
ponents and EIA experts, perhaps 
the biggest gains have been realized 
through the remote submissions and 
applications system. 
*The author is currently undertaking a 
PhD in Information Management and 
Information Systems at the University of  
Shanghai for Science and Technology. She 
is also working as a Senior Manager in 
the International Business Development 
Section at SS-GATE, a UNDP Project 
based in Shanghai that provides technology 
implementation support services by lever-
aging extensive networks and resources of  
international development organizations in 
support of  SME/Innovator/Local Com-
munity projects implemented under the UN 
South-South development agenda.
Without radical commitment by 
governments to leverage the opportunities 
presented by enabling technology, the 
digital age is unlikely to provide lasting 
solutions to fundamental social and 
economic challenges.
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ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY IN AFRICA
Dr. Richard Munang, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Robert Mgendi, UNEP
Africa’s vulnerability to climate change coupled with the region’s socio-economic de-
pendence on climate sensitive sectors underpinned by healthy ecosystems means the 
adaptation imperative for the continent is no longer debatable.
T
he IPCC 4th assessment re-
port (IPCC AR4) documents 
that Africa is among the most 
vulnerable regions to climate 
change, with wide ranging impacts 
impinging on its key economic sectors 
recorded in the IPCC’s 5th assessment 
report (IPCC AR5), the 1st Africa Ad-
aptation gap report (AAGR1), and 
more recently, the 2nd Africa adapta-
tion gap report (AAGR2) released early 
2015 among other notable publications. 
Among sectors at risk include health-
care, water resources, infrastructure, 
energy, tourism, ecosystems and agri-
culture, which employs up to 60% of  
labour in Africa, yet is 98% rain fed, 
hence vulnerable to climate change. In 
addition, climate impacts of  looding 
and sea level rise on rapidly urbanizing 
African cities is also noted by the IPCC 
AR5 as a major developmental concern. 
  
WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR SEC-
TORS DRIVING AFRICA’S 
ECONOMIES?
Agriculture and isheries
In agriculture, climate change is linked 
to potential declines in yields of  ma-
jor staples in Africa. The World Bank 
reports that in SSA, by the 2030s, 
droughts and heat will leave 40% of  
the land now growing maize unable to 
support the crop, while rising tempera-
tures could cause major loss of  savanna 
grasslands, thereby threatening pasto-
ral livelihoods. The implication is that 
by 2050, depending on the sub-region, 
the proportion of  the population under-
nourished is projected to increase by 25 
– 90% compared to the present. 
The AAGR1 reports that climate 
change efects on crop yields for key 
staples in the continent point to mean 
yield changes (reductions) by the 2050s 
of  -17% for wheat, -5% for maize, -15% 
for sorghum, and -10% for millet. On 
precipitation, northern and southern 
Africa regions are projected to experi-
ence particularly strong declines, with 
a projected decrease in annual precipi-
tation of  5 – 20%. This while 95% of  
food in SSA is grown under rain fed 
agriculture.  
The AAGR2 mirrors indings of  the 
IPCC AR5, noting serious implications 
of  yield reductions for key staples in the 
continent leading up to 2050. For in-
stance under a 20C warming scenario, 
West Africa will experience 7% reduc-
tion in maize yields, the Sahel will expe-
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rience 13% and 11% reductions respectively 
for maize and millet, Central Africa will ex-
perience 13% reduction in maize yields, and 
southern Africa 11% reduction.  For a 30C 
world, the Sahel is projected to sufer 40% 
reduction in millet yields, a major staple in 
this region.
In isheries, climate change is projected to 
result in substantial reduction in marine ish 
production and decline in ish protein sup-
ply in West Africa by the 2050s. Fisheries are 
a vital source of  food/nutrition security and 
livelihoods in this region. Economic loss to 
this region as a result of  reduced catches by 
2050 under a 2°C warming scenario is pro-
jected at 21% of  annual total landed value 
baseline to 2000 (from USD 732 million in 
2010/11 to USD 577 million, using con-
stant 2000 dollars) and a 50% decline in 
isheries-related jobs. Côte d’Ivoire, Gha-
na, and Togo are projected to sufer the 
greatest impacts on their landed values 
with up to 40% declines.
Energy sector
In the energy sector, climate change has 
been identiied as a signiicant driver of  
water shortages in hydro-power systems, 
with impacts recorded in high potential 
areas like Southern Africa, Kenya, Tan-
zania (rainfall variability contributing to 
64% decline in water levels in Mtera dam 
which supplies 50% of  hydropower in Tan-
zania) and the DRC. The AAGR1, AAGR2 
as well as the IPCC AR5 document that en-
ergy generation in Africa will be impacted 
negatively by climate change induced rain-
fall variability as well as temperature in-
creases. Most energy production methods 
used in Africa require signiicant amounts 
of  water, either directly, such as hydro-
generation or indirectly, as coolants in ther-
mal plants and for other operations. Some 
countries, including Zambia, Namibia and 
Mozambique, rely almost exclusively on hy-
droelectric sources for their electricity pro-
duction, whereas the rest of  the continent 
relies primarily on thermo-electrical sources 
such as coal, oil or gas. Both these methods 
require signiicant amounts of  water. As wa-
ter levels in rivers continue to decline and 
incidences of  heat extremes continue to sour 
due to climate change, hydroelectric dams 
and the cooling systems of  thermoelectric 
power plants may experience production 
disruptions, resulting in disruptions in ener-
gy supply and constricting economic growth 
in the continent. 
These impacts would be catastrophic con-
sidering the continent’s current energy pov-
erty situation, where only 219 million out of  
915 million people have access to electricity 
and the total number without access is ris-
ing. The fact that two-thirds of  the region’s 
population lacks access to electricity is un-
dermining eforts to achieve more rapid so-
cial and economic development in the con-
tinent. In addition, about 65% lack access 
to clean energy for cooking. On the business 
front, some 10 million medium-sized en-
terprises lack access to electricity. In addi-
tion, frequent power shortages cost African 
economies 1 – 4% in lost GDP annually. In 
Kenya for instance, at least 50 power out-
ages occur annually. 
Human health
In healthcare, changes in temperature and 
precipitation patterns as well as extreme 
events such as droughts, loods, storm surges, 
and heat waves are projected to undermine 
human health in Africa through increased 
incidences of  physical injury, infectious dis-
eases through shifts in disease vectors as well 
as undernourishment. The AAGR1 pro-
jects that the rate of  undernourishment in 
the Sub-Saharan African population would 
increase by 25-90% with a warming of  1.2-
1.9°C by 2050 relative to a 2010 baseline. 
Current trajectory points to a 40C warming 
scenario, signaling potentially dire conse-
quences. The gradual shift in temperature 
and rainfall may also have a signiicant efect 
on the geographic range of  many diseases. 
For instance, malaria is expected to disap-
pear from some areas and spread into others 
that were previously inhospitable to malaria 
vectors and pathogens. The IPCC AR5 ob-
serves that climate change is expected to af-
fect the geographic range and incidence of  
malaria, with contractions and expansions, 
and increasing and decreasing incidence. 
The AAGR2 reports with signiicant coni-
dence that highland areas, especially in East 
Africa, could experience increased malaria 
epidemics due to climate change. In addi-
tion, climate change is linked to changes 
in leishmaniasis epidemics in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with spatial spread to peri-urban 
areas and to adjacent geographic regions, 
possibly due to changing rainfall patterns. 
In addition, studies have linked the chang-
ing climate to increased incidences of  Ebola 
through a complex interaction of  human, 
environmental and climatic factors.  
In isheries, climate change is projected 
to result in substantial reduction in marine 
ish production and decline in ish protein 
supply in West Africa by the 2050s.
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Water sector
In the water sector, which also supports 
biodiversity in general as well as the 
agriculture and energy sectors, climate 
change is expected to cause many Af-
rican countries that are already facing 
water shortages to experience increased 
water stress in the coming decades, with 
reductions in both surface and ground 
water resources. For a warming of  2 – 
40C, much of  Sub-Saharan Africa is 
projected to experience 60-80% reduc-
tion of  surface runof by 2100, rela-
tive to a baseline of  1961 – 1990. For 
ground sources in the period 
the period 2041-79, at a 20C 
warming scenario, ground-
water recharge rates are pro-
jected to decrease by 30-70 
in North Africa and south-
western Africa compared to 
a 1961-90 baseline. 
Impacts in the water sector 
are also projected to im-
pinge on agriculture, with 
projected declines in water 
available for agriculture at-
tributed to climate impacts 
on the water sector. It is 
projected that for a warm-
ing scenario of  3.50C above 
pre-industrial levels, in the 
period 2070 – 2099, the 
total blue and green water 
(BWGW) available for agri-
culture in Africa will decline 
by more than 10% relative 
to the 1971 – 2000 period. 
Tourism, coastal cities 
and infrastructure
Currently, over 25% of  Af-
rica’s population lives within 
100 km of  the coast and 
over 50% lives in low elevation 
coastal zones in urban areas, account-
ing for 11.5% of  the total urban popu-
lation of  the continent. Going forward, 
urban population in Africa is projected 
to triple by 2050, increasing by 0.8bil-
lion. Some cities are projected to swell 
by up to 85% of  their current size by 
2030. The impact of  climate change 
on urban Africa will incrementally have 
implications on an increasingly signii-
cant proportion of  the continents popu-
lation. 
Sea level rise and looding in cities is 
projected to result in signiicant socio-
economic loss for African countries, 
through displacement of  populations in 
coastal cities, damage to infrastructure 
and disruption of  economic activities 
such as tourism. Average sea level rise 
is projected higher along Africa’s coast 
line than the global average. By 2100 
for an over 40C warming scenario, 
while average global rise is projected at 
approx. 70cm, sea level rise in Africa is 
projected to reach 80cm. The impacts 
of  this rise without adaptation eforts 
are grim. The AAGR2 records that sea 
level rise will put over 10million at risk 
of  looding in large coastal cities, of  
Mozambique, Tanzania, Cameroon, 
Senegal, Egypt, Morocco among oth-
ers by 2050, not to mention the ensuing 
damage to infrastructure and disruption 
in food supply to urban areas, exposing 
populations to elevated food prices.
In eastern Africa, the IPCC AR5 pro-
jects the impact of  coastal looding due 
to sea level rise in Kenya by 2030 to af-
fect 10,000 - 86,000 people, with asso-
ciated economic costs ranging between 
USD 7 - 58million. In the coastal city 
of  Mombasa, by 2030 the population 
and assets at risk of  1 in 100-year return 
period extreme water levels is estimated 
to be between 170,700 - 266,300 inhab-
itants, while economic assets, including 
infrastructure at risk is between USD 
0.68 – 1.06billion. For neighboring 
Tanzania, in its capital Dar-es-Salaam, 
the population and economic assets at 
risk of  1 in 100-year return period ex-
treme water levels by 2030 range be-
tween 30,300 - 110,000 inhabitants and 
economic costs range between USD 
35.6 – 404.1million. 
Additional risks are recorded for the 
key tourism sector, through climate im-
pacts on ecosystems and biodiversity 
where shift in ecosystem ranges and loss 
of  biodiversity is projected to result in 
loss in touristic attractions and conse-
quently, a decline in the number of  visi-
tors. In addition, extreme temperatures 
are projected could render 
summertime and even of-
peak seasons less pleasant 
thus deterring would be 
tourist.   The AAGR1 re-
cords that revenue gener-
ated from tourism will be 
directly afected by damage 
to infrastructure due to seal 
level rise and looding and 
changes in the length and 
quality of  climate-depend-
ent tourism seasons. 
The Nile Delta of  Egypt, 
which is particularly vul-
nerable to inundation and 
saltwater intrusion asso-
ciated with sea level rise, 
provides a classic example 
of  the potential impact 
of  sea-level rise on tour-
ism. Rising sea levels is 
projected likely to damage 
recreational tourism and 
beach facilities, in addition 
to inundating coastal fresh-
water lagoons and salinat-
ing groundwater resources. 
In Alexandria, a key tourist 
city, submersion of  tourist 
sites is projected to increase 
from the current level of  28% to 62% 
with a sea-level rise of  1m, and valuable 
cultural sites could be placed at risk by 
storm surges.
Population growth exacerbating 
climate risks
Africa’s rapidly growing population also 
presents an additional challenge. Cur-
rently, SSA’s population stands at ap-
proximately 856 million. It is estimated 
that by 2050, it will more than double to 
approximately 1.7 billion and represent 
roughly half  of  the additional global 
population. In terms of  age, SSA has 
the youngest population in the world. 
Young people aged 15 – 25 represent 
more than 60% of  the continents total 
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population. Poverty among these youths 
is rife. More than 70% of  the youths live 
on less than USD 2 per day, and youth 
unemployment is high with 60% youth 
unemployment in Africa. Going for-
ward, it is approximated that 350 mil-
lion young people under the age of  25 
years will be entering the labor market 
by 2035.
This portends more mouths to feed, 
more jobs to create and an impera-
tive for inclusive sustainable economic 
growth. In addition, the millions of  un-
employed youth constitute an impend-
ing threat to stability in the 
continent, a possibility ac-
knowledged by the African 
Union. The continents cli-
mate sensitive sectors must 
deliver opportunities to em-
power these youth.
The growing population, 
while it can be leveraged as 
a demographic dividend if  
appropriately harnessed by 
creating jobs, also means 
increased pressure and de-
mand on ecosystem services 
underpinning food, water, 
energy, biodiversity, and 
other socio-economic inputs 
and the need to sustainably 
manage them for future gen-
erations. Considering the 
threat of  climate change on 
these inputs and the need to 
create jobs, adaptation and 
climate resilient develop-
ment policy making is more 
than a matter of  good com-
mon sense for the continent. 
It is an urgent imperative to 
guarantee socio-economic 
growth well into posterity.
Adaptation policy imperative
As recorded above, climate change is 
projected to signiicantly impact Afri-
ca’s economic growth negatively. Con-
sequently, the need for climate change 
adaptation being a central component 
of  sectoral developmental policy plan-
ning and implementation is urgent to 
safeguard Africa’s future development. 
  
Cost of  adaptation 
While the need to invest in climate ad-
aptation cannot be overemphasized, the 
costs are astronomical. The AAGR2 ob-
serves that under the current trajectory, 
mitigation eforts are not in tandem for 
a below 20C warming scenario by 2050. 
Rather, the current track could lead to 
an above 40C average global tempera-
ture rise by 2100. The implication is that 
Africa’s adaptation costs could hit USD 
100billion annually by 2050. Cumula-
tively, the AAGR2 reports that Africa’s 
adaptation costs for the “below 20C” 
and “over 40C” warming scenarios are 
projected to exceed USD 1trillion by 
the 2060s. It further adds that even with 
efective adaptation, the cost of  residual 
damage is expected to be double the ad-
aptation costs in period 2030-2050.
Investing in ecosystems – poten-
tial panacea for climate adapta-
tion and job creation
While the need to adapt to climate 
change is a developmental imperative 
for the continent, the prohibitive costs 
are alarming. Furthermore, in light of  
diminishing oicial development assis-
tance (ODA) (as share of  total external 
inancing, declined from 38% in 2000 to 
27% in 2014) to the continent, the need 
for sustainable inancing strategies for 
the continent is urgent. One way Africa 
can ensure sustainable inancing for ad-
aptation is by looking at adaptation as 
a business, not only as a developmental 
issue per se. Africa needs to invest in 
economic opportunities that climate ad-
aptation presents, and ensure creation 
of  incomes and jobs in the process.
Investing in ecosystems and ecosystems 
based adaptation (EbA) will be key for 
Africa because ecosystem services such 
as water, hydrologic regulation, soil fer-
tility, biodiversity, climate change adap-
tation etc. underpin Africa’s economic 
sectors like energy, tourism, agriculture 
to name but a few, that are vital at 
achieving inclusive growth. Africa can 
go a long way in ensuring environmen-
tally sustainable and socially inclusive 
economic growth – creating jobs and 
income opportunities thus eradicat-
ing poverty, ensuring food security for 
its citizens, ensuring 
climate resilience us-
ing environmental 
resources, all while 
simultaneously en-
suring the environ-
ment is conserved 
- by using afordable 
and accessible  eco-
system based means. 
This by making sure 
African ecosystems 
continue to provide 
these services well 
into the future by 
putting in place de-
velopment policies 
and strategies, that 
protect them and 
sustainably utilize 
them to achieve sus-
tainable industrial 
development. Such 
policies should target 
all economic sectors, 
and especially the 
climate sensitive sec-
tors demonstrated as 
underpinning eco-
nomic growth in the 
continent. 
The agriculture sector deserves special 
mention. It currently employs up to 
60% of  labor in the continent, includ-
ing women producing up to 80% of  the 
food. This sector occupies a unique po-
sition to enhance inclusive growth, job 
creation and alleviate hunger and pov-
erty in the continent, if  its full potential 
is unleashed holistically. 
This can be done by embracing an 
agriculture paradigm, that seeks to op-
timize agricultural productivity along 
the entire value chain, - from on-farm 
productivity by applying ecological ag-
riculture / ecosystem based approaches 
that not only increase yields but also 
enhance ecosystem productivity and 
In isheries, climate 
change is projected 
to result in substantial 
reduction in marine ish 
production and decline 
in ish protein supply 
in West Africa by the 
2050s.
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climate resilience of  communities to be-
yond farm-gate value addition strategies 
where agribusiness is unleashed through 
embracing technology to reduce post-
harvest losses (PHLs) (PHLs accounted 
for USD 48billion worth of  food lost 
in the continent in 2010) through stor-
age, improve market access for farmers 
using mobile and other online innova-
tions, implement food processing, etc. 
and in the process create many jobs and 
increase incomes along this value chain. 
Actualizing this holistic paradigm will 
be the overriding theme of  the upcom-
ing 2nd food security conference to be 
hosted by UNEP in collaboration with 
ACTS and other partners in July 30-31, 
2015.  
African agriculture and agribusiness is 
estimated, could be worth USD 1trillion 
by 2030. An agribusiness private sector 
working alongside government could 
link farmers with consumers and cre-
ate many jobs. Further, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in African agriculture 
is projected to grow from less than USD 
10billion in 2010 to more than USD 
45billion in 2020. In addition, growth 
in this sector can reduce poverty twice 
as fast as growth in other sectors. Africa 
should capitalize on this.
Opportunities inherent in ecological ag-
riculture approaches and agribusiness 
value chains have been demonstrated in 
a number of  countries, both by enter-
prises and individual entrepreneurs. In 
taking these opportunities, incomes are 
generated and poverty reduced.
In Zambia, farmers increased crop 
yields by 60% by switching from mono-
culture practices to intercropping and 
other sustainable methods. Through 
agroforestry, smallholder farmers also 
produce more diverse crops, which 
means they can potentially serve a 
wider market and earn more incomes. 
By incorporating marketing services as 
a value addition strategy in their en-
terprise, the improved crop yields and 
diversity can be leveraged to service a 
larger market and enhance incomes to 
these farmers.
In Uganda, SESACO Foods Company 
is leveraging on value addition along 
the food supply chain. By this, the com-
pany employs 80, 55 being women, and 
generates monthly revenues averag-
ing USD 39,000. In the same country, 
AGROWAYS (U) LTD., ofers cleaning, 
drying, grading, and storage services to 
small holder farmers at afordable pric-
es. Through this value addition, farmers 
are reducing post-harvest loss.  
Cameroon’s Mewanko Farm has set-
up an online marketplace for farm-
ers to sell fresh produce in a scheme it 
hopes will increase the income of  13 
million people. Altogether, a number 
of  mobile innovations that link farm-
ers to potential markets already exist, 
and include MLOUMA in Senegal, 
ESOKO in Ghana, and POULTRY 
GUIDE in Uganda among others. In 
Nigeria, a fruit processing enterprise, 
REELFRUT, managed to expand to 
20 retail outlets within three months of  
establishment. The enterprise processes 
and packages health snacks made from 
freshly dried fruits – mangoes and pine-
apples. 
Across West Africa, integrated soil fer-
tility management (ISFM) across over 
200,000 ha has resulted in yield increas-
es of  33-58% over four years, improv-
ing food security and accompanying 
revenue increases of  179% for maize 
and 50% for cassava and cowpea. Spe-
ciically, ISFM using micro-dosing has 
been applied by about 500,000 small 
holders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ni-
ger, with associated increases in millet 
and sorghum yields of  44 – 120% along 
with 50 – 130% increases in family in-
comes.
Appling storage as a value addition 
strategy, the hematic bag has demon-
strated its efectiveness in West and 
Central Africa by registering cumula-
tive savings for the region of  about 
USD 500 million annually. Individual 
entrepreneurs and the youth are also 
creating jobs by leveraging ecosystem 
services. In Ethiopia, a young farmer is 
applying irrigation, and in the process, 
produces fruits and vegetables on 25ha, 
and cereals on another 12ha, and em-
ploys 50 young persons.  In Lesotho, a 
young entrepreneur is leveraging live-
stock production to generate income, 
create employment, ofer training ser-
vices and expand into additional busi-
nesses in other sectors
In addition to agriculture, the impor-
tance of  ecosystem services to African 
countries is manifest in a number of  
other sectors. In Rwanda, by investing 
in ecosystem productivity, the country 
has seen an improvement in its tour-
ism sector and energy generation with 
increased incomes and jobs created. 
On tourism, Rwanda, by sustainably 
managing its ecosystems, is leverag-
ing its unique position as the home of  
the mountain gorilla, a major tourist 
attraction to reap huge economic ben-
eits. The country’s booming tourism 
industry, which now accounts for the 
biggest share of  national GDP, is driven 
primarily by the country’s iconic gorilla. 
After a decline in tourism in the 1990s, 
gorilla visitation has since increased 
from less than 1200 tourists in 2000 to 
a record of  7417 visitors in 2004. With 
visitors paying USD 375 each to see the 
gorillas, these tourists have generated 
over USD 3 million in revenue every 
year since 2005. This has also contrib-
uted to the creation of  many new jobs 
associated with the management and 
maintenance of  the National Park and 
its related touristic activities.
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In the energy sector, wetland restoration 
in rural Rwanda has also improved live-
lihoods and created alternative forms 
of  employment. Ecosystem restoration 
eforts estimated at USD 149,670 have 
resulted in increased water levels which 
also led to the construction of  a 2.1 MW 
hydro power station and jobs for rural 
residents with multiplier efects for oth-
er socio-economic activities. Rwanda 
is showing that countries stand to gain 
exponential economic beneits if  eco-
systems are kept healthy and productive
In Togo the rehabilitation of  two dams 
having a combined storage capacity of  
94,000 m3 of  water, has made it pos-
sible to rehabilitate 30 hectares of  land. 
If  the water is used to grow vegetables 
(Example Tomatoes), it is possible to 
harvest at least two crops in one year. 
With potential yields of  30 tons per hec-
tare for each harvest, a farmer working 
a holding of  one hectare can harvest 60 
tons of  tomatoes per year, which nets 
USD 30,000 at the price of  USD 0.5 
per kg of  tomatoes. 
In Seychelles 40 m3 of  water was har-
vested from roof  catchments of  schools 
and stored in plastic tanks. In one school 
there was a saving on water bills of  USD 
250 per month. This means that in one 
year the school would save USD 3,000. 
If  all the 10 schools covered by the pro-
ject saved similar amounts in water bills, 
the intervention will save the schools 
from paying USD 30,000 in one year 
which is a big economic impact.
In Tanzania a project to develop a 
manual of  best practices on sustainable 
utilization of  woodlot forest products 
generated huge beneits at the grass 
roots, community level. Farmers in 
Makete district where the project was 
undertaken earn between TAS 20,000 
and 5,000,000 depending on the size 
of  woodlot. By following and imple-
ment the guidelines, farmers were able 
to achieve and sustain tree densities of  
at least 1,000 trees in one hectare. Con-
sidering each mature tree can give a net 
proit of  TAS 27,840, it implies that in 
one hectare the farmer is able to get net 
proit of  TAS 27,840,000. 
At the global level, investing in biodiver-
sity and ecosystems services can yield an 
estimated return worth over USD 21-72 
trillion every year - comparable to the 
World Gross National Income of  USD 
58 trillion in 2008. Africa should not be 
left out of  this billion, or better trillion 
dollar industry.
Policy options – putting adaptation at 
the center of  development policy and 
practice 
From the foregoing, it is demonstrable 
that:
• Africa needs to climate proof  its de-
velopment for posterity by ensuring 
climate adaptation becomes part and 
parcel of  sectoral developmental pol-
icy making;
 • Africa needs to ensure its de-
velopment policies ensure invest-
ment into conserving and sustainably 
managing its ecosystems, whose ser-
vices constitute a resource base that 
underpins its key economic sectors; 
 • And related to the above, con-
sidering the cost implications of  cli-
mate adaptation, Africa should con-
sider policies geared toward deining 
adaptation as a business to guarantee 
the sustainability of  eforts. The aim 
in the continents adaptation meas-
ures should be to ensure unlocking 
of  income generation, savings and 
job creation opportunities in the var-
ious climate sensitive sectors. 
The continent needs to ensure its devel-
opment policies are contextualized to 
climate change. This calls for policy in-
terventions that will ensure a structured 
vertical up scaling of  climate change 
adaptation strategies into the decision 
making level in individual countries and 
their implementation. These policy op-
tions should address current bottlenecks 
to achieving vertical scale and imple-
mentation of  climate adaptation in the 
continent.
Adaptation Implementation in Af-
rica– Driving Policy Changes and 
Going beyond Talk 
(a) Financing and cost – beneit 
evaluation 
Clearly estimate total cost and beneit 
of  implementing EbA and other ad-
aptation strategies at sectoral level and 
establish sources of  funds to ensure ac-
tivities to be captured in policy are ac-
companied by requisite national budg-
etary allocation. For a start, countries 
can set aside a share of  the irst rising 
diaspora remittances to speciically fund 
adaptation initiatives. Diaspora remit-
tances are forming a signiicant propor-
tion of  domestic inancing in Africa. 
Projections to 2016 suggest that remit-
tances could rise to over USD 41 billion, 
up from USD 32 billion or around 2% 
of  continental GDP in 2013. In addi-
tion, economic growth, iscal reforms 
and improved domestic tax collection 
and management is resulting in im-
proved revenues for countries. For in-
stance, tax revenues in Africa reached 
USD 527.3billion in 2012. Additional 
reforms such as scraping unnecessary 
tax expenditures, e.g. oil subsidies and 
unnecessary incentives could recoup 
more funds. Case in point, fuel subsidies 
in Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana cost 
these economies USD 7.5billion, USD 
600million and USD 276million re-
spectively in 2011, accounting for 30%, 
12%, and 3% of  budgets in these three 
countries respectively. Considering 
that 65% of  subsidies in Africa beneit 
the richest 40% of  households hence 
achieve minimal social justice, phasing 
In isheries, climate change is projected 
to result in substantial reduction in marine 
ish production and decline in ish protein 
supply in West Africa by the 2050s.
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them out would results in additional 
revenues that could be dedicated to i-
nance climate adaptation. 
(b) Researching environment and 
development interactions 
There is a need to demonstrate that 
climate adaptation matters are tied to 
development to give them the neces-
sary impetus in decision making cycles. 
Research Institutions, relevant line min-
istries and other stakeholders should 
intensify eforts to clarify the inter-link-
ages between ecosystems and socio-eco-
nomic development to ensure policy is 
backed by scientiic research. Research 
should be undertaken with the explicit 
objective of  inluencing policy decisions 
and providing recommendations on the 
best way forward on implementation.  
(c) Leverage data and knowledge 
management to bridge the Science 
– policy – action gap 
There is a need for environmental lead 
agencies and think-tanks to improve 
environmental information systems as 
a basis for sound decision making. The 
IPCC AR5 records that making climate 
change information more reliable and 
accessible is one of  the most pressing 
and cross-cutting adaptation needs in 
the continent.
Currently, the gap between science and 
policy explains the lack of  climate proof  
policy making in the continent. Policy-
makers need demonstrable evidence 
so they can build support for climate 
change being part of  sectoral and de-
velopmental policy at the national level. 
Creating accessible information dissem-
ination tools, that dispense timely, accu-
rate, reliable and user friendly scientiic 
climate information demonstrating the 
imperative of  having adaptation as part 
and parcel of  sectoral developmental 
policy will go a long way in bridging 
this gap.
Think-tanks, the private sector, research 
and educational institutions, NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations at 
national, regional and international 
levels should work in partnership with 
African governments to create physical 
databases at regional and national levels 
and enhance networking, collaboration 
and information sharing between states. 
Once these are set, information man-
agement will have to cover both genera-
tion of  accurate and actionable content, 
as well as its dissemination to all levels 
of  application, from public policy to 
the private sector, NGOs, CBOs, gen-
eral public in grass roots, where unre-
stricted information sharing should be 
embraced and accessible media used. 
Apart from online media implied ear-
lier, print media tools, including policy 
briefs, working papers, project reports 
and periodic newsletters could also be 
used to disseminate information.   
(d) Enhancing education and 
training 
Countries should ensure that essential 
human resources exist, or be devel-
oped, to undertake the integration of  
adaptation strategies, including EbA 
into socio-economic development at 
various stages of  the decision-making 
and implementation process. Educa-
tionalizing EbA at the institutions of  
higher learning across the continent is 
vital. Universities and colleges should 
consider internal policies that en-
sure curricula of  academic dis-
ciplines that are climate reliant, 
e.g. water resources, agriculture, 
energy etc. are reviewed to include 
speciic courses on climate adapta-
tion strategies, including EbA and 
how to contextualize them to the 
respective developmental sectors. 
 
At policy level, systematic train-
ing of  policy makers - government 
personnel, planners and managers 
should be done on a regular basis, 
to ensure they are abreast with the 
latest in climate change and EbA 
strategies, so they can then include 
it in their sectoral policies. 
(e) Promoting public aware-
ness 
Non-governmental actors, such as 
CBOs, CSOs, NGOs, the donor 
community, national human rights 
institutions, the media and the 
international community, should 
promote awareness in the public at 
large, as well as in specialized circles, of  
the importance of  considering adapta-
tion and socio-economic development 
in an integrated manner, and should es-
tablish mechanisms for facilitating a di-
rect exchange of  information and views 
with the public. An informed public 
will then demand from their leaders at 
the policy level, that climate adaptation 
strategies, including EbA be part and 
parcel of  development policy at both 
national and sub-national.    
(f) Strengthen national institu-
tional capacity and inter sectori-
al corporation and coordination  
Considering that impacts of  climate 
change on ecosystem services are cross 
sectorial, and responding to them will 
require multi-sectorial approaches, gov-
ernments, in cooperation, where appro-
priate, with international organizations, 
should strengthen cross sectoral plan-
ning and decision making capacity for 
all climate dependent sectors to ensure 
integration of  adaptation strategies, 
including EbA and appropriate coordi-
nation mechanisms during implemen-
tation. Attention should be given to 
breaking silos and moving away from 
sectoral approaches where they prove 
counterproductive, and progress to-
wards full cross-sectoral coordination 
and cooperation. 
(g) Invest in youth education
Government, the donor community 
and academic institutions should also 
put in place appropriate policy meas-
ures that will incentivize youth invest-
ment in climate change adaptation and 
EbA related courses at undergraduate 
level. This can be through appropriate 
policy to govern scholarships ofered 
to ensure adequate scholarships are 
availed for such courses. This can be 
extended to post graduate level. It will 
be vital in creating a critical mass of  
informed potential policy makers, who 
can then efect a generational paradigm 
change on policy toward adaptation 
and EbA once they assume these posi-
tions in the future. 
(h) Invest in women in agricul-
ture
Besides agriculture being the biggest 
employer in Africa, absorbing up to 
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60% of  labor, women are a signiicant 
constituency in Africa’s agriculture, 
which is a climate dependent sector. 
They produce up to 80% of  the food 
consumed in the continent. Yet they are 
disadvantaged in accessing key inputs 
and factors of  production such as land, 
capital, credit, extension services, at 
times due to cultural practices. In inte-
grating adaptation and EbA into policy 
in climate dependent sectors such as ag-
riculture and making it the norm, there 
is need to ensure women, who produce 
most of  the food are appropriately fa-
cilitated. Airmative action policies to 
ensure their access to training, credit 
and assets/land ownership will be vi-
tal to enhance their productivity, and 
hence productivity of  the sector as a 
whole. It is also important to recognize 
in these policies that women smallhold-
er farmers are involved in agricultural 
production as well as care work which 
include activities such as fetching wa-
ter, irewood, child care among others 
which takes a signiicant proportion of  
their time. Policies should therefore be 
integrated, addressing both care work as 
well as agricultural production. 
  
(i) Technology transfer policy 
Technology is a vital ingredient in 
means of  implementing climate adapta-
tion strategies, including EbA. The do-
nor community, NGOs, and CSOs have 
traditionally played a capacity building 
role to compliment action by govern-
ment, research and educational institu-
tions and even private sector. This role 
should be harnessed to facilitate transfer 
of  requisite knowledge and technologies 
needed for action in various climate de-
pendent sectors by government, private 
sector, educational and research institu-
tions. To actualize this, an appropriate 
policy, that would incentivize transfer 
of  new equipment, material, technical 
skills etc. such as zero rating equipment 
import for climate adaptation, will be 
pivotal.
(j) Unleash Africa’s of-grid 
renewables potential to enhance 
energy access and ‘adaptation as 
a business’
Energy is a vital input to socio-econom-
ic development. The current low grid 
electricity coverage in the continent can 
be an opportunity to incentivize of-grid 
energy solutions leveraging renewa-
bles and creating business opportu-
nities for “solar-preneurs”. While 
of-grid fossil fuel based solutions 
such as house hold kerosene light-
ing cost households USD 4–15 per 
month, renewables would cost sig-
niicantly less at USD 2 per month 
to run solar lighting systems. Here 
in lies a business opportunity that 
‘solar-preneurs’ are cashing in. As 
an example, in rural Kenya, a ‘solar-
preneur’ is creating incomes by sell-
ing a variety of  solar based products. 
A solar lamp costs USD 10, while 
a solar kit including panel, battery, 
wires and light bulbs costs around 
USD 150. Additional examples ex-
ist across Africa. In Tanzania, solar 
charging kiosks are earning monthly 
proits of  USD 75-150. In addition 
to individual entrepreneurs, larger 
enterprises are also leveraging this 
potential, with annual earnings of  
up to USD 20million. 
This demonstrates that resilience 
building eforts at the grass roots can 
realize income opportunities for com-
munities and medium sized enterprises. 
Considering that analysts at the Inter-
national Energy Association (IEA) be-
lieve the sun could be the world’s largest 
source of  power by 2050, Africa should 
be on track to cash in on this eminent 
future by putting in place favorable 
policies to incentivize renewables based 
private enterprise. These should include 
tax based incentives such as zero-rating 
tax on all necessary imported renewable 
energy technologies, including relevant 
equipment, tools, spares etc., as well as 
non-tax incentives such as appropriate 
policies to standardize technology and 
practice in the sector, appropriate policy 
to govern partnerships such as public-
private partnerships that may be pivotal 
in achieving scale, policies creating spe-
cial economic zones among others. 
Way Forward 
Climate Change adaptation is an urgent 
imperative that needs to be made a cen-
tral pillar of  development policy mak-
ing in Africa. The continent’s develop-
ment is tied to highly climate sensitive 
sectors including energy, agriculture, 
tourism among others and these sectors 
are underpinned by healthy ecosystems. 
With a growing and increasingly youth-
ful population signifying increasing 
pressure on the continent to deliver its 
development promise, adaptation is   an 
urgent imperative and should be put in 
the vision of  Africa’s development to 
ensure that:
• The growing and increasingly youth-
ful population is empowered through 
job creation in the productive sectors 
to facilitate realization of  a demo-
graphic dividend.
• The continents ecosystems continue 
providing services that underpin sec-
toral development to safeguard de-
velopment well into posterity. 
Regardless of  the great adaptation need 
for the continent, the associated prohib-
itive cost needs to be addressed. In light 
of  declining international inancing, 
the need for a sustainable approach to 
domestic inancing, to fund initiatives is 
an area that needs to be given attention. 
Considering that policy is the biggest 
inluencer and driver of  change, policy 
measures to ensure climate adaptation 
can be vertically up-scaled to become 
part and parcel of  development policy. 
Building on the proposed policy options 
presented herewith can address inade-
quacies in the group areas of  inancing, 
knowledge management, education, 
technology transfer, among others.  
It is only when climate change adapta-
tion strategies are part of  development 
strategies in key economic sectors in the 
continent that achieving sustainable 
development canons can be practical 
for the collective beneit of  the African 
people.   
*Dr. Richard Munang is the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Africa 
Regional Climate Change Coordinator.  He 
tweets as @mtingem. Mr. Robert Mgendi is 
the Ecosystem-based Adaptation Programme 
Oicer with the UNEP’s Regional Oice for 
Africa Climate Change Programme. The views 
expressed here are those of  the authors and do 
not necessarily represent those of  the institution 
with which they are ailiated
At policy level, 
systematic training 
of policy makers - 
government personnel, 
planners and managers 
should be done on a 
regular basis, to ensure 
they are abreast with the 
latest in climate change 
and EbA strategies, so 
they can then include it 
in their sectoral policies. 
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 Vantage Point Consulting is committed to generating African perspectives and content from socioeconomic development analysis to generating insights on African masculinities. We provide highly customized consultancy services that illustrate and are rooted in African innovation, ingenuity and insights. 
 Economic Research and Analysis  
Focus on Africa  We conduct research and analysis on 
economic developments in Africa particularly in the areas of:   Development Economics  Economic Policy  Investment in Africa  Impact Investment  Corporate Social Responsibility  For more content go to: http://anzetsewere.wordpress.com/ 
Expertise in African Masculinities 
Male Psychology and Manhood  We provide analysis on African 
Masculinities and male psychology, generating unique insights and cutting edge thinking on the topic.  We offer Advisory Services for organisations interested in developing 
creative approaches to Gender in Africa that involve or target men.   We provide training on male psychology for corporate clients and schools.  For more content go to: https://menunedited.wordpress.com/ 
Communications and Human Resource 
Development 
Bespoke Solutions 
 With expertise in Communications we create customized solutions to company communications needs.    We also develop bespoke solutions for developing organization Human Resources with a focus on building cohesive teams and positive work environments.  We have a particular focus on gender and 
multiculturalism in the workplace. 
For more information contact: 
 Vantage Point Consulting PO Box 52218-00200 Nairobi, Kenya   tel: +254 722 455 839 email: anzetsew@gmail.com 
Clients include: 
  Deloitte  Ipsos Synovate  The Nation Media Group  Heinrich Boell Foundation  Ushahidi  Premier Kenya 
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THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR AND 
SCIENCE IN 
AFRICA
By Dr Álvaro Sobrinho, 
Angolan businessman and philanthropist, 
and Chairman of the Planet Earth Institute
I
t has more than half  the 
world’s fastest growing econ-
omies, including Angola, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda 
and Nigeria. The latter, Africa’s 
largest economy, is projected to 
expand by 4.9 per cent in 2015.
However, despite Africa’s recent 
economic growth, there is a sig-
niicant and telling disconnect 
between business communities 
and scientists on the continent. 
Technical knowledge is not 
keeping pace with economic 
growth, and businesses in Africa 
regularly complain about the 
lack of  technically skilled local 
candidates. In fact, the most re-
cent PwC Annual Global CEO 
survey found that 90 percent of  
CEOs in Africa are highly con-
cerned about the low availabil-
ity of  key competencies on the 
continent.
This problem extends to aca-
demia. According to a 2014 
World Bank report, scientiic 
output has nearly doubled in 
sub-Saharan Africa in the last 
decade, with the region increas-
ing its share of  global research 
output from 0.44 per cent in 
2003 to 0.72 per cent in 2012. 
The report goes onto suggest 
that the quality of  this research 
has also improved. However, at 
less than 1 per cent – and given 
the rapid growth of  many Af-
rican economies and the many 
signiicant development chal-
lenges they face - much more 
needs to be done to increase 
science, technology, engineer-
ing and mathematics (STEM) 
research capacity on the conti-
nent.
Furthermore, while scientiic 
research output has increased, 
there has not been the same 
increase in registered innova-
tion. Sadly, no African country 
featured in the top 20 countries 
for patent applications in 2013, 
according to the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). Though progress has 
been made, in many African 
countries protection of  intellec-
tual property (IP) is still under-
developed. Weak enforcement 
Though recent headlines have called into question the 
‘Africa rising’ narrative, the continent’s budding reputation 
as an emerging economic powerhouse remains strong. 
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of  IP rights in national court systems, 
as well as a lack of  education as to how 
to register ideas, means the majority of  
the continent’s would-be entrepreneurs 
and innovators are reluctant or unable 
to protect their ideas.
The problem is not a lack of  potential 
or ambition, but a lack of  appropri-
ate competencies. Employers surveyed 
across 36 African countries as part of  
the African Economic Outlook Report, 
repeatedly stated that the mismatch in 
technical and industrially relevant skills 
was more concerning than an overall 
lack of  skills. Of  course, such skills mis-
matches highlight the poor quality of  
education across much of  sub-Saharan 
Africa, but also crucially, the absence of  
linkages between the education systems 
of  the continent and its employers.
Consider the agriculture sector, un-
doubtedly one of  Africa’s most impor-
tant industries. Currently, the sector 
contributes 13% of  the continent’s 
GDP, yet only 2% of  African students 
study agriculture at the university. Most 
worryingly, Africa contains 60% of  the 
world’s uncultivated land suitable for 
crops, but appears to lack the scientiic 
expertise to leverage this resource.
Why is this? In recent decades, major 
international donors and policy makers 
have prioritized primary and secondary 
education. This has detracted from in-
vestment in tertiary education in some 
African countries. Providing higher 
education in technical ields can be far 
more expensive than the social sciences, 
forcing increasingly impoverished pub-
lic education institutions to cut training 
in these areas. At the same time, busi-
nesses have focused on short-term gains, 
considering investment in technical and 
scientiic skills as too time consuming, 
and opting for the ‘easy’ but unsustain-
able approach of  parachuting in the 
necessary expertise, often from Europe 
and North America, and at great ex-
pense.  All of  this has created a higher 
education system that is out of  sync 
with local industry needs, and mostly 
geared towards producing public sector 
managers. As Harvard’s Prof. Calestous 
Juma has said, ‘‘today’s African univer-
sities are factories that churn out civil 
servants’.’
As the leading source of  job creation, 
the private sector can and should take 
a leading role, helping African countries 
create high quality STEM graduates 
and researchers. They should partner 
with local universities to improve the 
quality and relevance of  STEM cur-
ricula. What’s more, private companies 
can use their inancial resources to help 
universities provide physical resources 
to deliver this training. This would al-
low companies to reduce the risk of  in-
vesting in workforce training, as well as 
help universities to market themselves as 
destinations for ambitious students.
Businesses should also provide young 
scientists with inancial assistance so that 
they can pursue postgraduate and post-
doctoral training in African universities, 
by increasing industry focused schol-
arships and placements. Major global 
players including IBM are doing so with 
its IBM-Research in Kenya, which has 
established a new resident scientist pro-
gramme for schools in Kenya and other 
African countries. The applicants are 
leading scientists and researchers from 
pre and post-doctoral backgrounds, as 
well as from academia, government, or 
industry, and work with IBM research-
ers in the physical lab environment. 
Such initiatives allow private companies 
to build a pipeline of  skilled local talent 
and give young Africans the tools they 
need to create solutions to the conti-
nent’s most pressing development chal-
lenges. 
Innovative collaborations such as this 
require open communication between 
local education institutions, tasked with 
preparing students adequately for the 
workplace, and the private sector, look-
ing to secure employees with skills that 
can help their businesses grow. Cur-
rently, there is lack of  communication 
and mechanisms for dialogue between 
these groups - something that the Planet 
Earth Institute is determined to change. 
With the help of  our partners, we are 
advocating for a strong business-led 
academic agenda in Africa, focusing on 
how the private sector can best drive sci-
entiic and technological development, 
working directly with governments re-
sponsible for creating the right policy 
environment, and academia and civil 
society to support sustainable and inclu-
sive growth across the continent.
I have long sought a new approach for 
business in Africa and have recently 
embarked on an exciting programme 
of  work with the World Bank. Person-
ally, I will be leading a new group of  
ten ‘African Business Champions for 
Science’, made up of  inluential igures 
from industry with a passion for sci-
ence, technology and innovation on the 
continent, and who will become a loud 
voice for the change we want to see. The 
group was formally outlined in a Call 
to Action at the ‘Partnership for Skills 
in Applied Sciences, Engineering and 
Technology (PASET)’ Regional Forum 
in 2014, in Dakar, Senegal. The World 
Bank is facilitating the PASET initiative, 
which seeks to help meet Africa’s skills 
needs in Applied Sciences, Engineering 
and Technology (ASET) for the socio-
economic transformation of  Africa. 
Myself  and the other Champions will 
work alongside African governments, 
the PASET Steering Committee (com-
prising three African Ministers from the 
Education sector – Ethiopia, Rwanda 
and Senegal and the World Bank); and a 
high-level Consultative Advisory Group 
(comprising of  scientists and academ-
ics).
The Africa Business Champions met 
at the 25th African Union Summit of  
Heads of  State and Government in 
South Africa in June 2015. During this 
important gathering, we outlined our 
plans for a number of  projects, includ-
ing support for a new Regional Scholar-
ship Fund for PhDs, with an ambitious 
goal of  producing 10,000 African PhDs 
in the next ten years. We want these 
PhDs to be working with local business-
es from the start, with work placements 
and sponsored research, to ensure the 
work undertaken by students is useful 
to local economies and industries. Sci-
entists need to know and understand 
business, and young entrepreneurs must 
know the value of  science. Projects 
like this can help create not just a new 
generation of  scientists, but a new gen-
eration of  scientiic leaders, able to turn 
ideas, inventions, patents and research 
into jobs, security and prosperity.
We know this can work. I would en-
courage Africa to seek inspiration from 
the most innovative international mod-
els. As Prof. Juma points out, consider 
the example of  South Korea’s Phang 
University of  Science and Technology 
(POSTECH). POSTECH was actually 
the brain child of  Prof. Hogil Kim, the 
founding president of  the university 
and Tae-Joon Park, chair of  the Pohang 
Iron and Steel Company (POSCO). 
While POSCO’s initial goal was to train 
world-class engineers for its own opera-
tions, POSTECH now has a major role 
in educational reform in Korea and is 
recognized as a leader in science and 
engineering education in Asia. 
Given that 11 million young Africans 
expected to enter the job market each 
year for the next decade, businesses can 
have all the scientists, engineers and 
technicians they need on their doorstep. 
But only if  they properly collaborate 
with and invest in the institutions that 
train them. 
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PROMOTING BASIC SCIENCES IN AFRICA
Prof. George O Amolo, Nicholas W Makau and Joseph Z Mapelu
Department of Physics, University of Eldoret
Box 1125, Eldoret 30100, Eldoret
B
asic science is the driving force 
behind engineering and tech-
nology the world over. The two 
latter disciplines are often re-
ferred to as applied sciences. The prev-
alence of  strategic national laboratories 
and institutes has catalyzed manufac-
turing industries and economic devel-
opment in advanced economies. These 
laboratories/institutes have established 
a scientiic culture that over generations 
has churned out a large number of  ex-
pertise in basic sciences. Close collabo-
ration between scientiic institutes and 
industry has led to job creation and the 
formation of  spin-of companies. 
Many African countries have visionary 
plans that seek to harness application 
of  science and technology for econom-
ic development. Notably, many of  these 
countries are looking for ways to efec-
tively engage their growing youthful 
population in productive activities. Sec-
tors such as agriculture that have tradi-
tionally performed well in the past are 
not creating enough jobs nowadays to 
accommodate the growing population. 
Harnessing science and technology for 
development will require that Africa in-
vests in training a new generation in ba-
sic and applied sciences. The Scientiic 
Mentorship Programme at University 
of  Eldoret (previously, Chepkoilel Uni-
versity College of  Moi University) seeks 
to do just that. The programme was 
started 8 years ago and is now managed 
by the Computational Materials Sci-
ence Group (www.uoeld.ac.ke/cmsg/). 
The goal of  the programme is to iden-
tify brilliant, self-driven undergraduate 
students in basic sciences and encour-
age them to proceed to graduate school 
in Kenya or elsewhere. 
The identiication process begins by 
scouting for potential mentees from the 
2nd year of  undergraduate study and 
monitoring their academic progress 
through the inal year. By the end of  
the 4th and inal year, the most likely 
candidates are shortlisted. The formal 
selection process is based on academic 
performance, motivation and gender 
balancing.
The programme has a second dimen-
sion which seeks to attract back home, 
students who go to study overseas. The 
programme aims to attract 2 or 3 stu-
dents who have attained their PhDs 
abroad, and engaging them in the 
mentorship of  the next generation of  
graduates. Dr Korir Kiptiemoi (second 
from left) being welcomed back home 
to join the programme after his PhD in 
Torino, Italy.
Success stories
The programme had humble begin-
nings. In the beginning, the students 
were supported by the initiators them-
selves. However, since 2009, the Uni-
versity of  Eldoret has received support 
from the National Commission for 
Science, Technology and Innovation 
(NACOSTI) in Kenya and the Emerg-
ing Nations Science Foundation (ENSF, 
Trieste, Italy).  Students who have 
gone through this programme are now 
spread across the world. After 8 years, 
the programme has gone through a full 
cycle and now has two pioneer men-
torship students who recently attained 
their PhDs. Some of  those who have 
proceeded to PhD are Dr Emily Aradi 
and Dr Cecil Ouma who recently grad-
uated from the University of  the Wit-
watersrand and University of  Pretoria, 
respectively.
Conclusion
It takes about a decade to train a stu-
dent from the BSc to PhD in basic sci-
ence. The initiative by the Scientiic 
Mentorship Programme supplements 
eforts of  Kenya and other African na-
tions to harness science and technology 
for development. However, many Af-
rican countries have not yet taken the 
necessary bold steps to train manpower 
that will sustain the scientiic and tech-
nological base of  their visions for devel-
opment. The Mentorship Programme 
is one model for accelerating Africa’s 
capacity building in basic and applied 
sciences. 
Mentees, from left to right: Valid Mwatati, Jus-
tin Omeri, Peris Ngeywo, Benson Kamau and 
John Ogot in front of  the Administration Block, 
University of  Eldoret.
The coordinator (extreme left) of  the programme 
with mentees for 2014 on their irst day
Dr Emily Aradi and Dr Cecil Ouma during 
their PhD graduation ceremonies
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KENYAN INNOVATORS 
DEVELOP THE FIRST LOCAL 
ANTIMALWARE SOFTWARE
B
unifu Technologies is an indus-
try innovation leader in Kenya. 
It has developed more than 30 
products since it was founded 
in 2011. Among these is Bunifu Sniper 
Anti-Malware, reportedly the irst Anti-
virus software developed in Kenya. The 
Bunifu Sniper Anti-Malware was intro-
duced in the Kenyan market on 16th 
May 2014. 
Bunifu Technologies is run by a small 
group of  young Kenyans:
• Wilberforce seguton – Team Leader
• Kimutai Kipngetich – Lead Soft-
ware Engineer
• Elisha kiptukyo – Business Develop-
ment Manager
• Emmanuel Yatich – Graphics De-
sign
• Winston Komen – Virus Database 
Administrator
• Komen Solomon –Social Media 
Manager
• Keith Korir – System Analyst & 
Malware Researcher
• Isaac Kiplagat – Software Quality 
Assurance Manager
• Amos Chepchieng – Software Devel-
oper
Dr. Cosmas Ochieng, the Executive Di-
rector of  ACTS interviewed Mr. Keith 
Korir, Bunifu Technologies’ System An-
alyst and Malware Researcher.
CO: Why Bunifu Sniper? 
KK: Bunifu sniper is one among many 
products that our company has devel-
oped. Our products derive their names 
from their ‘functions’. A sniper is a high-
ly trained marksman, with specialized 
training in high-precision, surveillance 
and target acquisition. These are key 
traits of  our antivirus product, hence 
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the name Bunifu Sniper Antivirus.
CO: How long did it take you to de-
velop this product?
KK: It has taken us more than 2 years. 
The team started working on Bunifu 
Sniper in February 2012, but this was 
preceded by the development of  various 
modules and utilities including:
• Bunifu antipiracy module
• Swochei duplicate ile Scanner
• Bunifu C# File search DLL (Library)
• Tiondo wireless framework
CO: Has the product been inde-
pendently tested by a third party?
KK: Prior to its launch, Bunifu Sniper 
antivirus underwent months of  test-
ing and trials internally (i.e. within the 
company) and externally. A computer 
science class of  80 students in one of  
the public universities took part in the 
testing and debugging process. Several 
institutions and customers have also 
used the product and provided product 
reviews. Most of  the reviews are from 
technology enthusiasts, Magazines (e.g. 
CIO Magazine, Tech Moran and The 
Kenya Engineer) and software distribut-
ing vendors such as CNet and softonic. 
The product has also been proiled in 
the media, including The East African 
Standard and Kiss TV in Kenya. 
CO: How much did it cost to pro-
duce Bunifu Sniper?
KK:  The time and efort of  9 people 
working on the same thing for two and 
a half  years. Factor in oice space and 
running expenses. So yes, we faced a 
number of  changes: (a) Lack of  funding 
for the research and (b) Lack of  a fully 
equipped virus testing lab/ unit. Work-
ing in Baringo rather than Nairobi had 
its challenges. For one, internet connec-
tion in Baringo isn’t great.
CO: What are the key features and 
strengths of  Bunifu Sniper?
KK: It comes with a number of  unique 
features:
• Shared Protection – Ability to scan 
shared LAN iles and folders
• Recovery tool– it repairs and restores 
corrupted iles and documents
• Immunity tool - for pen drive and 
system drive vaccination.  
• Directory Navigation Guard or 
DNG
• Anti-piracy Licensing module for pi-
racy protection.
• Automated removable media scan. 
• File & Folder Lock & unlock (Utility 
Add-on)
• Registry Scan
• Heuristic Engine
• Proactive real time surveillance
• Clip board paste protection
• Zipped ile scan capability
• Zipped ile extraction protection
• Fast scan engine
• Virus activity logs & Graphical Re-
porting
CO: System requirements?
KK: At a minimum:
• Speed of  1 Ghz
• 1GB of  RAM (2GB Recommended )
• 1 GB of  free memory in Drive
• A CD/ DVD Drive is required (For 
Hardcopy installs)
• Internet Connection (For Activation)
CO: How much does it retail for, and 
where can one buy it?
KK: The product is available from 
our website www.bunifusniper.com or 
www.bunifu.co.ke . It is also available in 
hardcopy from authorized dealers and 
distributors. The product comes in two 
variants:
• A single user for 1 PC (retailing at 
Kshs 1000) 
• 3 Users for 3 PCs (retailing at Kshs 
1800)
CO: Your target customers? 
KK: Our target customers are PC own-
ers, companies and governments. So far, 
we have had over 2500 downloads from 
our e-commerce portal. We have also 
registered downloads through software 
distributing vendors such as CNet and 
softonic. Most of  our hardcopy sales 
have been local, but we have an aggres-
sive expansion strategy for the East Af-
rican market and beyond.
CO: What do you need to expand 
or grow?
KK: We have a ready product and a 
dedicated team backing it. What we 
need to fast track growth is capital. We 
are currently looking for an investment 
partner who will help us grow from a 
mid-sized company to a global player 
servicing the entire African continent 
and beyond.
CO: How would you characterize 
the future of  the software industry 
in Kenya? 
KK: The future of  the industry is 
bright. There are so many talented peo-
ple in the industry here in Kenya. The 
problem is lack of  capital. There are so 
many start-ups in the industry but they 
come and go very quickly due to lack 
of  inancing. The government could do 
more to create enabling conditions. I 
also wish we had more angel investors 
or venture capitalists over here. Local 
innovations and solutions need to be 
celebrated and promoted.
CO: What other products do you 
ofer?
KK:
• Sikizi DRE system: This is Africa’s 
irst Direct Recording Electronic 
system. It provides for instant voting 
and tallying of  polls through several 
electronic platforms, namely; SMS, 
Android and Desktop.
• Droid PC: This is Africa’s irst re-
mote desktop utility. It allows seam-
less connectivity between your com-
puter and telephone no matter the 
location.
• RoboCrawl: This is a forensics tool 
helping web developers and admin-
istrators to assess the presence or 
absence of  vulnerabilities in web & 
server applications.
• Penetration testing: Assessing vulner-
abilities in an organization’s IT infra-
structure. Our pen test team would 
simulate real attack scenarios while 
leaving traces in vulnerable areas.
• Red team Assessment: A type of  as-
sessment aimed at simulating the 
types of  attacks carried out by ma-
licious users and criminals when 
targeting an organization’s physical 
infrastructure.
• Cloud security assessment: helps 
organizations to ind suitable cloud 
service providers and packages that 
suit their requirements and ensure 
security of  the services 
Website: www.bunifu.co.ke
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RETHINKING AFRICAN 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
Prof Gideon B.A Okello*
(MD, FRCP, MRCP, MBBS, D.T.M.S&H, CBIOL, MIBIOL (LONDON), FAAS, FTWAS)
Professor of Medicine & Senior Consultant Physician
Former Director of Medical Services, Kenya
Former Dean Faculty of Medicine University of Nairobi.
Historically, healthcare planning and management in sub-Sahara Africa has 
been informed and driven by the burden of  communicable diseases. Non-com-
municable diseases have been viewed as a problem for rich countries.
C
ontrary to this conventional 
opinion, Africa increasingly 
faces a ‘double’ disease bur-
den of  communicable and 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). 
According to the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) data on Global Burden 
of  Diseases, two thirds of  deaths from 
communicable diseases occur in Sub-
Sahara Africa. These include: tuber-
culosis, Hiv/Aids, diarrheal diseases, 
measles, malaria and lower respiratory 
infections, perinatal conditions and nu-
tritional deiciencies. Twenty percent of  
these deaths occur among children un-
der ive years of  age while thirty percent 
of  all deaths occur among ages 15-59. 
Approximately 1 in every 20 adults in 
SSA lives with HIV. There were 34 mil-
lion people living with HIV globally in 
2011, with 69 percent of  these in SSA. 
Malaria killed 600,000 thousand people 
in 2010, a majority of  them being Afri-
can children. 
The WHO data also shows that Africa 
is undergoing an epidemiological tran-
sition from communicable to NCD dis-
ease burden. NCDs are not passed from 
person to person. The four main types 
of  NCDs are cancers, diabetes, cardio-
vascular diseases (e.g. heart attacks and 
stroke) and chronic respiratory diseases 
(e.g. chronic obstructed pulmonary dis-
ease and asthma). The WHO projects 
that 28 million people in Africa will die 
from a chronic disease over the next 
10 years. The WHO also projects the 
rate of  increase of  deaths from chronic 
diseases to surpass that from infectious 
diseases, maternal and perinatal condi-
tions and nutritional deiciencies more 
than four-fold over the same period. 
Changing demographics, globalization 
of  unhealthy lifestyles and behavioural 
habits, rapid and informal urbaniza-
tion, physical inactivity, harmful con-
sumption of  alcohol and tobacco are 
some of  the contributing factors to the 
rise in NCDs in Africa.
African health care systems are ill-
equipped to deal with the NCDs. Few 
African countries have invested in the 
healthcare infrastructure and expertise 
necessary for the control and manage-
ment of  NCDs. Secondly, the health-
care costs for NCDs such as cardiovas-
cular diseases, cancers and diabetes are 
often beyond the reach of  many people 
in Africa given the general levels of  pov-
erty in the continent. The NCDs can 
and often drive people into poverty.
African health care systems are barely 
equipped to handle communicable dis-
eases. The inability of  health care sys-
tems in West Africa to efectively cope 
with the recent outbreak of  the Ebola 
virus disease exposed weaknesses of  
these systems. Considering that the con-
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tinent is facing a growing double burden 
of  communicable and non-communica-
ble diseases, a rethink of  Africa’s health-
care priority setting, planning and sys-
tems management is needed.
The growing burden of  both commu-
nicable diseases and NCDs hinders 
the pursuit of  poverty reduction and 
sustainable development, including the 
attainment of  both the UN Millennium 
Development Goals and the proposed 
post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals. Both communicable and non-
communicable diseases must thus be 
viewed as ‘development issues’.
Africa needs to reassess its current and 
future health priorities and to re-design 
its health systems, plans and investments 
accordingly. The continent will need to 
take two sets of  interrelated actions: (a) 
ind ways to harness well proven cost 
efective strategies that have worked 
well elsewhere especially but not exclu-
sively in the North, and (b) re-orient its 
healthcare systems towards control and 
management of  NCDs alongside com-
municable diseases.
Africa has not made the most of  exist-
ing medical interventions, technologies 
and innovations. Existing interventions 
could prevent up to 63 percent of  all 
infections in Africa. Examples of  avail-
able cost-efective interventions include 
ORT (Oral Rehydration Therapy) to re-
duce deaths from diarrhea in children, 
prenatal care and skilled birth attend-
ance, universal immunization against 
childhood illnesses, DOTS strategy for 
controlling Tuberculosis and free avail-
ability of  ARVS (Anti-retroviral) drugs 
for HIV/Aids, given the extreme pov-
erty of  many of  those afected by HIV/
Aids. Improved surveillance and track-
ing of  infections to points of  origin 
would lead to signiicant improvements 
in controlling the spread of  Sexually 
Transmitted Infections (STIs).
Vaccine Preventable Diseases which in-
clude Diphtheria, TB, Tetanus, Pertus-
sis, Polio, Measles, Rubella, Hepatitis 
B, Yellow Fever, Meningococcal disease 
and Japanese encephalitis can all be 
eradicated by ensuring that all children 
have access to the vaccines. The per-
centage of  children not vaccinated is as 
high as 20-60% in some African coun-
tries. In many African countries the vac-
cines are fully donor funded! Imagine 
what would happen if  donor funds sud-
denly ‘dried up’!
Malaria remains one of  the main causes 
of  death in Sub-Sahara Africa. It causes 
9 percent of  all deaths and kills more 
than one million children in Sub-Saha-
ra Africa. All or most countries outside 
Africa have successfully controlled the 
disease through a combination of  pre-
ventive measures and treatment strate-
gies. Africa is hindered by weak and 
poor public health systems and infra-
structure. 
DOTS is the cornerstone of  TB con-
trol as it entails diagnosis with positive 
sputum sample, short-course treatment, 
regular drug supplies and systematic 
monitoring to evaluate outcomes for 
every patient. More than 99 percent of  
all global maternal deaths occur in de-
veloping countries, principally in Africa. 
Health spending would have to be more 
than tripled to provide the basic mater-
nal and child health care package along 
with special intervention related to Neo-
natal survival. 
In a nutshell, Africa can signiicantly 
reduce its disease burden by efectively 
harnessing available interventions or 
cost efective measures that have worked 
elsewhere. This however requires com-
petent health care systems – stafed 
with skilled experts, adequately funded, 
transparently and accountably man-
aged, and making the most of  commu-
nication and information technologies 
(including health management infor-
mation systems). Many of  these meas-
ures would also work for the control 
of  non-communicable diseases includ-
ing: cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, 
various cancers and injuries. Ischaemic 
heart disease, heart failure and strokes 
are common and the associated risk fac-
tors such as obesity, high blood pressure, 
physical inactivity and salt intake and 
smoking are also on the increase. Some 
of  the cancers common in Africa in-
clude those of  cervix, liver and stomach 
and are associated with the preventable 
risk factors namely chronic infection 
with human papilloma virus, Hepatitis 
B and Helicobacter Pylori, respectively.
Besides harnessing available technolo-
gies, interventions and practices to 
combat the rise of  both communicable 
and non-communicable diseases, the 
continent needs to invest in health re-
search, technology and innovation; dis-
ease surveillance and tracking systems, 
improved health management informa-
tion systems; human and physical capi-
tal; and eicient and efective organiza-
tion and management of  health care 
systems. 
That is, the pillars of  a good health care 
system in Africa would consist of  the 
following:
• Information, Surveillance and Re-
search
• Management of  Health Services
• Human Resources
• Financing
Information and Surveillance
Health information is usually obtained 
from seven major sources:
• Vital events: - births, deaths etc.
• Health services statistics
• Clinical information on patients
• Services provided to the patients
• Diagnoses of  diseases
• Public Health Surveillance for dis-
eases trends and out breaks
• Census data
• Periodic household surveys
• Resource tracking of  human re-
sources
• Research for generation of  new 
knowledge about diseases
Management of  Health Services:
In the management of  health care, par-
ticular attention must be paid to the 
quantity, quality and equity of  services 
provided.
Human Resources:
This is investment in the people provid-
ing health care, such as doctors, nurses, 
public health experts, etc. It is key to 
good health care provision. It should be 
managed well to ensure improved skills, 
to prevent, diagnose and treat illnesses. 
Financing:
It is important to mobilize suicient 
funds and to use the funds well. These 
are not easy but are critical to good 
health care. In Africa there is the prob-
lem of  inadequate funding of  health 
care such as provision of  vaccines. Do-
nors have no obligation to help Africa.
Finally I must emphasize that these 
four pillars necessary for a functional 
good health care system are very weak 
in Africa especially Sub-Sahara region. 
There is clearly a need for more funding 
in Africa. Some disease epidemics such 
as Ebola, Yellow Fever, and Marburg 
Fever are found almost exclusively in 
Africa. There is a need for collaboration 
in eforts to eradicate these diseases. To 
combat the dual disease burden, Afri-
can countries need a comprehensive ap-
proach to healthcare. This extends be-
yond the narrow conines of  the health 
sector to include education, agriculture, 
inance and economic planning and 
even foreign afairs. 
*Prof  Okello is the Vice Chair of  the ACTS 
Governing Council and the Chair of  the Ex-
ecutive Committee of  the ACTS Governing 
Council
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WHY THE AFRICAN 
UNION SHOULD BE 
DISBANDED
Prof. S.N. SANGMPAM
Syracuse University
One enduring project of  Pan-Africanists is an All-Africa union as the solution to Africa’s
underdevelopment.  They view the lack of  such a union as one of  the major causes of  the continent’s 
underdevelopment predicament.  From Nkrumah to the Organization of  African Unity (OAU) and the 
African Union (AU), their disagreements have been about the means and ways of  achieving this goal.  
In their view, the development of  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is inseparable from that of  North Africa.  I 
argue that this is not and should not be the case, because SSA socioeconomic outcomes and their caus-
es diverge organically from those of  North Africa. The AU should be dismantled.  SSA should political-
ly reconstitute itself, without North Africa, into a self-sustaining, organically integrated Unifederation 
better suited to address its twin problems of  underdevelopment and over-politicization of  the state.
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Introduction
T
he ‘Arab Spring’ of  2011 was 
instructive. Although many of  
the regimes (Yemen, Bahrain, 
Syria, and Egypt) used force 
against their populations, only Libya 
provoked NATO’s bombardment in 
support of  the armed internal opposi-
tion against the Gaddai regime. (Only 
later, due to a diferent set of  geopoliti-
cal reasons, was Syria subjected to inter-
national military pressure). The internal 
opposition and NATO bombardment in 
Libya provoked three noteworthy reac-
tions.  First, there was spontaneous and 
relatively uncoordinated support for the 
Gaddai regime by the masses in some 
SSA countries.  Second, the AU ex-
tended tepid support to the Gaddai re-
gime and timidly proposed a cease-ire 
between the regime and its foes.  Third, 
the AU-proposed cease-ire was rejected 
of hand by the Libyan armed opposi-
tion, whose members are supposed to 
be part of  AU.  
Both the AU’s tepid support and the 
opposition’s rejection of  the cease-ire 
contrasted with Gaddai’s vocal support 
for AU and his bigger inancial contri-
bution to the organization in the 2000s. 
Gaddai’s leadership was instrumen-
tal in the birth of  AU.  The irst major 
move toward the union was the Sirte 
Declaration in Libya in 1999.  After the 
Constitutive Act of  the African Union 
was adopted in Lome (Togo) in 2000, it 
was in Sirte again that the establishment 
of  the Union was proclaimed in 2001 
before the oicial birth of  the Union in 
South Africa in 2002.  Libya’s inancial 
contribution to AU and SSA countries 
under Gaddai was quite impressive.  In 
addition to its 15 percent share of  the 
AU budget (of  about $257 million in 
2011), Gaddai’s Libya paid the mem-
bership fees for some very poor coun-
tries that could not aford it. This raised 
Libya’s contribution to the AU annual 
budget to about one-third of  the total. 
By some estimates, Gaddai’s Libya pro-
vided about $97 billion to SSA in invest-
ments and aid.
  
The overall reactions to Gaddai’s de-
mise in October 2011, however, re-
vealed that, despite Gaddai’s impact 
on the pauperized masses in some SSA 
countries because of  his inancial lar-
gesse, his investments in AU have not 
paid of.  It is almost a sure bet that after 
Gaddai, there will be no strong support 
left for AU in North Africa, let alone in 
Libya. The lack of  payof for Gaddai’s 
support for AU is both a symptom of  
and a metaphor for the organization’s 
lack of  usefulness in African Afairs.  
The ‘Exceptionalism’ Of  SSA and 
the Limitations of  the African 
Union
With a few exceptions, Africa obtained 
its independence in the 1960s - later 
than South America and Asia. Natural-
ly, South America and Asia founded re-
gional organizations before Africa did. 
This was the case with the Arab League 
in 1945 and the Organization of  Ameri-
can States (OAS) in 1948.  Another re-
gional grouping in Asia, the Association 
of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
was created in 1967, four years after 
Africa’s continental organization, OAU, 
was founded in 1963. All these regional 
organizations rested on functional inte-
gration that promoted solidarity, eco-
nomic cooperation, peace and security, 
and the protection of  the sovereignty of  
the member states. 
Africa’s type of  grouping difers from 
the three others in two major respects: 
membership and objectives.  Africa’s 
grouping was and remains continen-
tal, encompassing the whole African 
continent as opposed to subregional 
groupings in Asia.  And unlike OAS, 
it is entirely made of  developing coun-
tries.  It has more member states (ifty-
four countries) than any other regional 
grouping in the world.  Although Afri-
ca’s functional integration and coopera-
tion resembles that of  South America 
and Asia, its speciic objectives difer 
from theirs.  Explicitly, Pan Africanists 
have sought to solve the severe socioeco-
nomic and political underdevelopment 
of  Africa.  To grasp this diference, one 
needs to bear in mind that Africa’s lir-
tation with continental grouping has 
had four phases.  All four lead back to 
Kwame Nkrumah, the irst president 
of  Ghana, who passionately called for 
the total uniication of  the African con-
tinent.  
Nkrumah was so painfully aware of  the 
deep political and socioeconomic un-
derdevelopment and deprivation of  Af-
rica that he looked to the US, the Soviet 
and West European models of  political 
organization for answers.  He shunned 
the models of  grouping ofered by Afri-
ca’s fellow Third world regions of  South 
America and Asia.   High premium was 
put on solving the severe state of  un-
derdevelopment of  Africa.   Nkrumah’s 
project faced stif opposition from his 
African peers and their foreign backers. 
To bridge the gap between Nkrumah 
and the opposition, the OAU was cre-
ated.  The OAU constituted the second 
phase in Africa’s quest for continental 
grouping.  It was a ‘compromise rec-
ognition’ of  Nkrumah’s rationale and 
prime reason for the uniication project: 
the severe socioeconomic and political 
underdevelopment of  Africa and the 
need to solve it.   The third phase in the 
process was the commitment to the idea 
of  functional economic cooperation 
among African countries.  Subregional 
economic organizations were its pillars. 
No fewer than 200 subregional eco-
nomic organizations have been created 
in Africa since independence.   
The OAU and its auxiliary subregional 
economic organizations had some suc-
cess in the decolonization of  the conti-
nent.  Overall, however, they failed as 
an institutional framework for Africa’s 
development.  Several well-known rea-
sons account for the inadequate perfor-
mance of  the OAU and the subregional 
economic institutions.  They need not 
be rehearsed here but will be referred to 
below.  Worth repeating is the fact that 
the OAU and its subregional ofshoots 
consecrated the principles of  national 
sovereignty, sanctity of  colonial borders, 
and non-interference in other states’ in-
ternal afairs.  Although they were not 
the core reason for its failure (as I will ar-
gue), these principles undermined at its 
core the political and economic policy 
goal around which revolved the Pan Af-
rican project.  Deprived of  any efective 
means of  policy implementation, in-
cluding inancial contributions by mem-
ber states, the OAU could not pursue 
any consistent and efective policies that 
would meet its enunciated goals.  
Against this backdrop of  failure and of  
the deterioration of  the African socioec-
onomic situation, the AU was launched 
in 2002 to replace the OAU.  The AU 
constituted, thus, the fourth phase in 
the African quest for continental group-
ing.  It was in efect Nkrumah’s revenge 
against his peers.  Indeed, the socio-
economic standing of  Africa had so 
deteriorated in the years after Nkrumah 
passed away, from the 1970s onward, 
that there was now the incontrovertible 
recognition of  the implacable socioeco-
nomic and political situation that Nk-
rumah wrestled with in his days.  Most 
commentaries lauded the advent of  the 
AU because of  its potential, as a politi-
cal union, to inally help Africa emerge 
as a force that can solve its problem of  
severe underdevelopment.  The AU’s 
Constitutive Act itself  stressed the need 
to accelerate the socioeconomic devel-
opment of  Africa via a common vision 
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of  a united and strong Africa.  This 
required strengthened and empowered 
common institutions.  
Thus, through its four phases of  conti-
nental grouping, Africa distinguishes it-
self  from South America and Asia.  Un-
like these two, it is the only developing 
region that has consistently and explic-
itly in the post-1945 period called for a 
continental political union to deal with 
its predicament.  It has done so not only 
through an intellectual articulation of  
the problem as in Nkrumah’s and many 
other writings, but also through its art-
ists and populace.   More is expected 
of  Africa’s grouping eforts because 
there is a recognition, however vague 
and intuitive in most cases, of  the ex-
ceptional socioeconomic ills of  Africa. 
Unfortunately for Pan Africanists, the 
AU is the wrong answer.  
Like any big organization or institu-
tion, the AU was bound to experience 
‘growing pains.’  Since its launch-
ing in 2002, the AU has not had a 
smooth sailing.  It has faced budget 
shortfalls and it has not been able to 
put in place some of  its agreed-upon 
institutional organs. Many of  the ex-
isting ones have not functioned well. 
In 2004, an audit revealed a case of  
gross mismanagement and embez-
zlement of  seven million dollars ear-
marked for a ‘Conference of  African 
and Diasporan Intellectuals’ that was 
supposed to provide the intellectual 
impetus and cover for the AU.  The 
relation between the president of  AU 
Commission and the 54 African heads 
of  state has been fraught with con-
licts and misunderstandings.  A clear 
manifestation of  this was the row and 
split between the former president of  
the Commission, Alpha Oumar Kon-
are, and the heads of  state on the issue 
of  democracy in Togo, Central African 
Republic and Mauritania.  Konare held 
steadfastly to the principles of  democ-
racy, human rights, and the respect of  
the rule of  law and constitutions to the 
chagrin and annoyance of  many heads 
of  state.  They either maintained the 
undemocratic status quo or opposed 
him on the basis of  the ‘African reality.’ 
The New Partnership for African De-
velopment (NEPAD), designed to serve 
as the connecting bridge between AU 
and Western and industrialized democ-
racies that promised economic and po-
litical assistance to AU, has not lived up 
to the expectations.  Personality clashes 
among the main African protagonists 
of  NEPAD, divergent agendas, and the 
inability of  Western countries to keep 
their promises have brought NEPAD to 
a screeching halt. 
The 2012 marathon election (four 
rounds) of  the new president of  AU 
Commission once more revealed the 
split between ‘Francophone’ and ‘An-
glophone’ countries as each camp sup-
ported its own candidate.  In the end, 
the Anglophones won; the South Af-
rican Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the 
former wife of  President Zuma, was 
elected.  More importantly, perhaps, the 
two tactical and policy positions held by 
two major views of  AU have negatively 
impacted it.  Although all heads of  state 
signatories to the Constitutive Act of  
AU profess their commitment to an-all 
Africa political union, they hold two dif-
ferent views about how to implement 
this policy. On the one hand are the ad-
vocates of  the fast track approach (e.g., 
Senegal under Abdoulaye Wade). They 
argue for the immediate institutional 
implementation of  the political union 
since, in their view, the failure of  the 
OAU and the advent of  the AU neces-
sitate such an approach.  On the other 
hand, there are those (e.g., South Afri-
ca) who prefer a step-by-step approach 
similar to the one followed by the Euro-
pean Union. They warn against a rush 
to political union and hold to national 
sovereignty.  
Yet these ‘growing pains’ are not the 
reasons why I argue that the AU is the 
wrong answer and should be disman-
tled. Many of  these di culties are to 
be expected. In any case, they are sec-
ondary reasons that are subordinated 
to deeper problems. To better grasp 
these deeper problems or reasons, it is 
worth saying irst what they are not. 
First, as just stated, I do not call for the 
dissolution of  AU because of  the grow-
ing pains experienced by AU. Second, 
one oft-mentioned reason for skepti-
cism about building an all-Africa union 
is the sheer geographical and demo-
graphic size of  Africa.  Skeptics argue 
that the AU cannot administratively 
manage the whole continent of  Africa 
that lacks infrastructure and eicient 
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bureaucracy. However, this reason lacks 
strength; it is not why the AU should 
be dismantled.  India and China have 
larger populations than the whole conti-
nent of  Africa.  Yet both have been able 
to administer their territories with some 
eiciency.  Moreover, the idea of  a con-
tinental union was born to precisely ad-
dress the issue of  lack of  infrastructure 
in Africa.  Lack of  infrastructure can-
not, therefore, be a deterrent to conti-
nental union.    
Third, discontinuation of  the AU 
should not be because of  the ive issues 
generally invoked about the failure of  
the OAU and its auxiliary subregional 
economic organizations:  (1) the low 
level of  trade exchange among African 
countries; (2) a plethora of  subregional 
organizations that supersede each oth-
er; (3) unpaid dues by member states; 
(4) political instability and conlicts, and 
(5) attachment to national sovereignty 
at the expense of  the regional or con-
tinental organizations, which results in 
the failure to apply policy agreements. 
We know that these ive issues implicitly 
justiied OAU’s replacement by the AU. 
By replacing the OAU, the AU is sup-
posed to solve or to have solved these is-
sues.  In reality, however, the AU cannot 
and has not been able to solve the ive 
issues.  The inability of  the AU to solve 
them stems from the fact that these is-
sues are symptoms of  deeper problems. 
Only by explaining and solving these 
deep-rooted problems can we help cure 
the symptoms. The ive symptoms are, 
therefore, not the reason why I propose 
the dissolution of  AU.        
Fourth, the reason for dissolving AU is 
not because North Africa is made of  
‘Arabs’ and SSA of  ‘Blacks,’ and the 
masses of  North Africa feel more at-
tached to the Arab world than to ‘Af-
rica.’  The expected diminishing sup-
port for the AU in North Africa after 
Gaddai is not the reason either.  To be 
sure, there is a ‘racial’ and cultural split 
between North Africa and SSA.  Deny-
ing it is disingenuous.  President Nasser 
of  Egypt, a strong Pan Africanist, held 
misguided views about SSA that he re-
garded as the ‘Dark Continent’ to be 
civilized and dominated by Egypt.  His 
Pan Arabism trumped his Pan African-
ism.  Gaddai, a visceral proponent of  
African uniication via the AU at the 
time of  his death, espoused in the early 
days of  his rule an aggressive policy of  
land grabbing and regime destabiliza-
tion toward SSA countries in the name 
of  Arab nationalism.  In reaction to this, 
Mobutu, the former dictator of  Congo-
Kinshasa, attempted to take the leader-
ship of  ‘Negro Africa’ away from Arabs 
in an attempt to counter the Arab pen-
etration of  SSA.  
In fact, Gaddai’s wholesale embrace of  
a union with SSA came as a reaction to 
his many failures to create political un-
ions with Arab leaders in North Africa 
and the Middle East, including with 
Syria.  At an Egyptian exhibit in the 
American city of  Houston, the Egyptian 
representative once proclaimed to the 
chagrin and consternation of  African 
Americans that the mummies represent-
ed Egyptian culture and history and not 
‘African culture.’  He sought to distance 
ancient Egyptian civilization from SSA. 
In an attempt to diferentiate itself  from 
SSA, Morocco once sought member-
ship in European Union only to be told 
that it was not a European country. By 
the way, Morocco ended its member-
ship in OAU/AU long ago over Western 
Sahara.  Among the North African pop-
ulace, the split from SSA is perhaps best 
illustrated by the Libyans who chanted 
‘We are native Arabs, not Africans’ 
when Gaddai announced to them in 
2000 the creation of  the AU.  As a Lib-
yan respondent, who does not think of  
himself  as ‘African,’ put it in a survey by 
BBC News on January 23, 2004, ‘98% 
of  Libyans are against any African Un-
ion.’ Africans, he opined, have brought 
sufering to Libyans by spreading HIV 
and AIDS.  These sentiments are shared 
by many Egyptians and other North Af-
ricans, who do not want to be associated 
with SSA, preferring to proclaim their 
‘Arabness’.  Nevertheless, this racial and 
cultural split is not a reason why I argue 
that manage the AU does not meet the 
requirement as an institutional response 
to North Africa and SSA.  After all, 
one inds just as many anecdotes about 
North Africans proclaiming their Afri-
can proclivities and connections to SSA. 
One is reminded of  Algeria’s former 
president Ouari Boumedienne’s retort 
to the Arabs: ‘If  you force me to choose 
between the Arab world and Africa, I 
choose Africa.’  And despite his misgiv-
ings, Nasser was closer to Nkrumah’s 
views than were many Nkrumah’s own 
SSA peers.  
None of  the above four reasons explains 
why the AU should be dismantled be-
cause they are all secondary reasons. 
They are symptoms of  and subordi-
nated to more systemic and organic 
causes on which SSA and North Africa 
diverge.  The AU should be dismantled 
because it is an institutional mismatch 
between SSA and North Africa created 
by diverging organic causes.  The no-
tion of  ‘organic causes’ will be deined 
in the next section.  In order to do so, 
however, some comparative discussion 
about SSA socioeconomic outcomes is 
irst in order.  
Recently there has been much eupho-
ria about ‘Africa, the next Asia,’ ‘Af-
rica’s robust growth,’ and the ‘decrease 
of  Africa’s poverty level.’  The claim 
is that SSA socioeconomic diferences 
with North Africa and other regions are 
being erased. The euphoria emanates 
from ‘Afro-optimists’ and Sinophiles 
who extol the merits of  China’s invest-
ments in Africa as the path to SSA de-
velopment. Their optimism lows from 
Africa’s share of  foreign direct invest-
ments and the sectoral growth achieved 
in some SSA countries in recent years 
(IMF projected about 5.5 percent of  
growth rate in 2012).  In 2011, for ex-
ample, foreign direct investment to Af-
rica grew by 27 percent.  Most of  the 
growth has been spurred by the export 
of  raw materials and minerals, such as 
oil, copper, cobalt, and agricultural cash 
crops.  From 2002 to 2007, the share of  
raw materials in GDP for Africa was 24 
percent, by far the leading sector.  Ex-
ports of  raw materials have stimulated 
growth in other sectors, including gov-
ernment spending.  No surprise that by 
2014, China, the most important ben-
eiciary and consumer of  raw materials, 
had invested more than $100 billion in 
Africa.  A side efect of  this has been 
China’s involvement in infrastructure 
building in SSA countries.  
True as all this may be, the Afro-opti-
mists would be well advised to temper 
their euphoria.  Africa has experienced 
this type of  commodity boom in the 
past (notably in the late 1960s-early 
1970s) only to go bust when conditions 
changed.  Moreover, the reliance on 
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commodities and its attendant infra-
structure is not historically a novelty 
for Africa either. One needs not be an 
apologist of  colonialism to recognize 
that European colonial rule did gener-
ate tremendous growth in many of  the 
colonies.  Belgian Congo, South Africa, 
Rhodesia, Kenya, and Egypt are ex-
amples.  In these countries, much of  
the growth was spurred by commodity 
exports, minerals and cash crops.  And 
expectedly, the level of  infrastructure in 
these countries, especially around the 
areas that produced the raw materials, 
was higher than elsewhere. Yet colonial 
economic growth and its attendant in-
frastructure did not prevent SSA from 
becoming the ‘poorest region’ of  the 
world.  The issue here is not colonial 
exploitation or Chinese exploitation. 
Rather, Afro-optimists fail to properly 
account for the reasons why SSA is ‘the 
poorest region’ and lags behind its fel-
low ‘Third World’ peers.  They crave 
for ‘some good news from Africa’ and 
are eager to toot the horn for just about 
any shred of  positive economic activ-
ity.  Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism 
should give way to ‘Afro-realism.’   
The reality is that, although SSA still 
shares many socioeconomic traits with 
North Africa, Asia, and South Ameri-
ca, it stands alone at the bottom of  the 
comparative scale.  Its socioeconomic 
indicators lag behind those of  North 
Africa and all other developing regions, 
even when the current Arab Spring-
generated crisis is taken into account. 
SSA oft-repeated cases of  ‘success’ are 
very small countries (e.g., Botswana or 
Mauritius) with no major impact on 
the overall development of  SSA.  South 
Africa is so beset by Apartheid-era-in-
duced internal poverty that its economic 
attraction to the struggling populations 
of  other SSA countries is fraught with 
dangers of  xenophobia and violence 
against these migrant populations. The 
data in table 1 tell the story of  Afro-
realism. 
YEAR SSA* MNA* SA/EA* SAM*
1960-2003 GDP(in 2000 US $) 511 2140 283 3168
Life Exp 47 64 56 66
Inf   Mort 105 78 74 35*
Poverty % Change** +20 --- -21/-43 -1
1988-2003 GDP Change** -20 +197 +103 +206
Life Exp Change** -2 Yrs +3 Yrs +4 Yrs/+1 Yrs +2 Yrs
2003-
2009
GDP Index (1980=100 98 125 201/259 112
Life Exp 50 69.5 64/71 73
Inf  Mort 94.5 34 62/24 22.5
Pol Strife Index (AV) 42.5 35 39/40 33
Peace Index 96 78 75 83
2010 GDP in $ (AV) 2270 3565*** 7530**** 7556
2011 GDP in $ (AV) 2442 4279*** 13611**** 8084
2010 HDI Rank (AV) 141 87*** 86**** 79
2011 HDI Rank (AV) 155 99*** 98**** 84
SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa; MNA=Middle East &North Africa; SA=South Asia; EA=East Asia; SAM=South America. 
** Change from previous year.
*** North Africa by itself.
**** Asia as a whole
111 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
The data clearly show that SSA has 
lagged behind North Africa and all 
other developing regions in all the indi-
cators since 1960—except Asia’s early 
GDP. Pan Africanists either are una-
ware of  the reality conveyed by these 
data or simply ignore it. As a result, they 
rely on three erroneous premises. First, 
they invoke the geographical contigu-
ity between North Africa and SSA to 
advocate a common union for the two 
subregions.  Certainly, the importance 
of  territorial contiguity is not to be dis-
counted in regional groupings.  How-
ever, North Africa’s contiguity to SSA 
is not enough of  a reason for a conti-
nental union with SSA.  Mali, Senegal, 
or Niger may be geographically closer 
to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia than 
they are to Kenya, Malawi, or Congo-
Kinshasa; but their GDP per capita 
(average $714) are closer to those of  the 
latter three SSA countries than they are 
to the three North African countries (av-
erage $4246).  Contiguity does not seem 
to close the gap. 
Second, Pan Africanists rely on the ‘Afri-
ca as a great power’ assumption, accord-
ing to which, to be heard in the world 
and to fend of Western or other forms 
of  colonial domination, the whole con-
tinent of  Africa must be united to create 
continental strength.  In truth, fending 
of imperialist encroachment is not ex-
clusively African.  It is the goal of  all 
developing regions, and should not de-
termine why an all-Africa political union 
is needed.  Assuming that all developing 
regions are equally successful in fending 
of imperialism via their regional group-
ings, there still remains the gap between 
SSA and the three other developing re-
gions.  The issue for Africa is not how 
continental strength will deter and fend 
of Western powers, but rather why SSA 
lags behind North Africa and its peer 
developing regions and how to solve this 
lag.  Creating a union between SSA and 
North Africa on the basis of  the colonial 
shared experience does not answer this 
question, and is not the solution.  
Third, because political and economic 
unions (e.g., USA, EU) have been suc-
cessful in other regions of  the world, Pan 
Africanists assume that a similar union 
will solve the African predicament.  A 
glaring aspect of  this imitation today is 
the pairing of  EU and AU.  Not only is 
‘African Union’ an imitation of  ‘Euro-
pean Union’ in naming, the Constitutive 
Act and Charter of  AU are modeled af-
ter EU.  So are AU institutional organs. 
Lost in this imitation is the question of  
whether the problem to be addressed 
and solved by the continental institution 
in Africa is the same as that addressed by 
EU.  More importantly, is the problem to 
be solved the same in North Africa and 
SSA?    
Geology, Politics and the SSA-
North Africa Divide
To assess the validity of  the institutional 
solution proposed by Pan Africanists in 
the face of  SSA lagging socioeconomic 
development, one needs to delve into 
the relationship between socioeconomic 
outcomes, institutions, and politics.  The 
AU is an institution.  Institutions involve 
some well-deined organizational pat-
terns, regular rules and procedures gov-
erning the behaviour of  groups or col-
lectivities.  Although they suppose some 
routinization and stability, institutions 
are made.  They do not just occur out 
of  the blue.  They are an outcome of  
a ‘situation’ that requires or necessitates 
their existence. There are many ‘situa-
tions’ that can necessitate the existence 
of  an institution. In most cases, how-
ever, POLITICS and its consequences 
are the main triggers.   Politics is a so-
ciety-rooted competition over property, 
resources, goods, services, values, and—
as a crucial corollary—political power. 
Because of  the competition involved, 
politics generates diferential or unequal 
socioeconomic outcomes.  Moreover, it 
triggers the building of  institutions de-
signed to structure the competition, to 
deal with its efects, and, more impor-
tantly, to solve or respond to the prob-
lems that the collectivities involved in 
the competition face.  
Herein lies the relationship between 
politics and institutions.  Politics makes 
institutions, including the state. By con-
trast, institutions can only shape and 
mold politics in return without being 
ubiquitous self-made agents or the pro-
112 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
genitor of  politics as institutionalists 
would have it. Therefore, with respect 
to tackling socioeconomic problems, 
institutions that work best are those 
that meet one major criterion.  They 
must be tailored to relect the prevailing 
brand of  politics in society and to re-
spond directly to its socioeconomic con-
sequences.  As an All-Africa institution, 
the AU does not meet this requirement 
with regard to SSA and North Africa. 
The reason is the vast diference in so-
cioeconomic outcomes between SSA 
and North Africa that politics imposes 
and why it imposes these diferential 
outcomes.  Therefore, in order to pro-
pose an institutional format that solves 
the SSA predicament, we need to pay 
attention to politics and its diferential 
socioeconomic efects in North Africa 
and SSA.  
What, then, caused SSA politics and 
its consequences to diverge from North 
Africa’s?  The deinition of  politics 
provided above suggests that politics is 
inseparable from the type of  society in 
which political competition takes place. 
Resources, goods, and values, which are 
the objects of  the competition, are so-
ciety-based.  Politics is ultimately tribu-
tary to and structured by the physical, 
ecological, anthropological, and histori-
cal backgrounds of  society. This specii-
cation helps explain why politics in non-
Western or developing countries difers 
from politics in Western countries.  And 
given that politics determines institu-
tions and the state itself, the diference 
in politics also explains why political in-
stitutions and the state in Western coun-
tries difer from those in non-Western/
Developing countries.  This is so even 
when these institutions are formally and 
in appearance similar to those of  West-
ern countries. Even routine and regular 
elections do not eliminate these difer-
ences as events have shown over and 
over again.  
Regardless of  their level of  economic 
development or regime type (democrat-
ic or authoritarian), developing coun-
tries share a common property, over 
politicization. The latter deies liberal 
compromise in the political competi-
tion of  non-Western countries.  It dis-
tinguishes their political outcomes from 
those of  Western countries. Their state, 
in contradistinction to the liberal demo-
cratic state in Western countries, is an 
over politicized state.  Liberal compro-
mise (and not just any type of  compro-
mise) means that a basic compromise 
about the values, beliefs, and goals 
of  the political community has been 
reached, taking of the table irresolvable 
issues.  As a result, political competition 
leads to institutional/procedural and 
policy compromise and relative stability. 
Over politicization is the opposite of  
liberal compromise.  It is a pattern of  
political behavior that relects the ab-
sence of  compromise in politics. Be-
cause irresolvable issues are not of 
the table, basic compromise is hard 
to reach. As a result, politics does not 
lead to institutional/procedural and 
policy compromise.  Hence, the general 
tendency toward institutional instabil-
ity and ‘deviations’ from the Western 
norm.  Space prevents a full elaboration 
of  these points here.  But liberal com-
promise does not suggest that ‘political 
crises’ do not occur in the West.  
SSA shares over politicization with 
North Africa, Asia, and South America, 
but to diferent degrees and with varia-
tions.  Variations in their politics and its 
socioeconomic efects are due to varia-
tions in physical, historical, and anthro-
pological backgrounds of  their respec-
tive societies.  What are the backgrounds 
or factors that have shaped SSA varia-
tions in politics? Methodologically and 
logically, SSA lagging socioeconomic in-
dicators suggest that they are not caused 
by a factor SSA shares with the other 
developing regions.  It cannot be the 
Cold War, imperialism, colonialism, the 
world capitalist system, neocolonialism, 
deterioration of  the terms of  trade, de-
pendency on foreign aid, inadequacy of  
aid, price control/protectionism, or the 
generic ‘bad governance,’ all factors that 
all developing regions have in common. 
These shared factors cannot explain 
why (only) SSA has diverged from other 
developing regions. It stands to reason 
that exceptional factors or backgrounds 
explain why SSA has diverged in its pol-
itics and, hence, in socioeconomic terms 
from its peers. ‘Exceptional’ means that 
these factors either exist in all develop-
ing regions, including North Africa, but 
display a very unique feature in SSA, 
or exist only in SSA and not at all in 
the other regions. Compared to North 
Africa (and Asia and South America), 
SSA has exceptional physical, histori-
cal, and anthropological backgrounds 
that shaped its society in a peculiar way, 
with severe implications for its brand of  
politics.  There are four such exception-
al factors: (1) geoecology, (2) ethnic dis-
persal and profusion, (3) slavery, and (4) 
low precolonial socioeconomic outputs. 
Only a skeletal outline is provided here. 
Geoecology 
The geoecology of  SSA demarcates 
itself  exceptionally from that of  the 
other regions in a negative way.  Partly 
because of  its northern boundary im-
posed by the Sahara desert and its con-
sequent almost total coninement within 
the tropics, SSA maintains a physical/
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geographical unity among its subregions.  As a 
result, the overall tropical climate, soil, vegeta-
tion and ecosystems of  SSA are more closely 
shared by its subregions and countries (except 
the Cape in South Africa) than is the case in 
Asia and South America.  Compared to the two 
regions, SSA is the most tropical. It has the few-
est beneits associated with temperate climate, 
monsoon, and with high lands.  It has the most 
rainforest negatives, the most savanna negatives, 
the most desert impact, the fewest fertile river 
banks/valleys, the highest soil limitations for 
production, the fewest navigable rivers, and the 
most landlocked countries (except Central Asia). 
SSA holds the irst 
rank in all tropical in-
fectious diseases (river 
blindness, bilharzia, 
sleeping sickness, 
Guinea worm, yellow 
fever, yaw disease, ma-
laria, HIV, Ebola).  In 
short, Asia and South 
America hold a geo-
ecological advantage 
over SSA. 
The overall climatic 
impact on North Af-
rica difers sharply 
from the impact on 
SSA for two reasons. 
First, the efects of  the 
desert are mitigated in 
North Africa by mas-
sive mountain ranges. 
They soften the nox-
ious efects of  the de-
sert and shield North 
Africa’s populations 
from its taxing impact. 
SSA lacks comparable 
number of  mountain 
ranges and these ben-
eits.  Although East Africa has higher moun-
tains (e.g., Kilimanjaro in Tanzania and Mount 
Kenya towering respectively 19,340 feet and 
17,058 feet), their efects are mostly conined to 
speciic areas in Kenya, Tanzania and, to an ex-
tent, Uganda.  This is a small area of  SSA.  East 
African Mountains have no positive impact on 
the Sahel countries.  In North Africa, the efects 
of  mountains are also distributed over a rela-
tively small area; but they are felt by almost all 
North African countries.   Due to its high eleva-
tions, North Africa, unlike SSA, is not home to 
the disease-causing tsetse ly that attacks cattle 
and livestock and is the main vector of  sleep-
ing sickness in humans.  Although malaria has 
occurred in North Africa, this has been of  the 
least fatal variety.  North Africa does not have 
the SSA speciic type of  malaria-causing mos-
quitoes that carry and transmit the very lethal 
pathogen Plasmodium falciparum.  
The second reason has to do with the real im-
pact of  the desert on the populations and their 
livelihood.  It turns out that such an impact is 
far more negligible in North Africa than in SSA. 
Vast areas of  the North African countries afect-
ed by the desert are empty.  As a result, the ma-
jority of  North African populations live in the 
cities in the northern end of  the countries, along 
the Mediterranean coast.  Or they are concen-
trated in the most fertile areas of  the countries, 
such as the Nile Valley in Egypt and the Tell re-
gion, a hilly region, in Algeria.  This means that, 
despite the desert, the majority of  the North Af-
rican population lives in the Mediterranean cli-
mate, a transitional climate between dry tropical 
and temperate climate. It difers from the SSA 
predominant climate cluster, and makes North 
Africa’s climate resemble that of  Chile in South 
America and California in the US.  Due to the 
Mediterranean climate, North Africa is much 
more productive than the Sahel and other SSA 
desert-afected countries.  Unlike SSA, with its 
record-breaking landlocked territories, all North 
African countries have direct access to the sea, 
which has economic and commercial implica-
tions.  
SSA exceptional geoecology is, thus, over-
whelmingly negative and more taxing on people 
than in North Africa and other regions. Argu-
ments that take geocology seriously are easily 
and often inaccurately dubbed ‘deterministic.’ 
No sin of  determinism has been committed 
here.  Although there is some direct cause-to-
efect relation between SSA geoecology and its 
socioeconomic outcomes, I do not draw such a 
direct causal relation.  Instead, SSA exceptional 
geoecology helps us deine three intermediate 
exceptional factors (variables) that it generated. 
The three intermediate factors more directly 
cause variations in SSA politics.  As already 
mentioned, they are (a) ethnic profusion and the 
attendant ethnic horizontal relations, (b) slavery, 
and (c) low precolonial socioeconomic outputs.  
Ethnic Dispersal and Profusion   
SSA does not have the monopoly on ‘tribes.’ 
North Africa and other developing areas have 
‘tribes’ as well.  Yet ethnicities in SSA and North 
Africa do not shape politics the same way be-
cause of  their diferential historical and anthro-
pological fates. What explains this diference is 
not colonialism as often claimed with much ex-
aggeration, but the exceptional nature of  SSA 
geoecology.  Historians agree that the ethnic 
distribution of  Africa was more or less set be-
tween the 7th and 11th centuries, although it 
continued up to the 19th century. The ethnic 
distribution involved higher levels of  dispersals 
and migrations of  peoples than in most other 
regions because of  the geoecological constraints 
they faced.  In most cases, poor soil conditions, 
diseases, drought and famine set the limits to 
the population density. Quarrels ensued, and 
the result was new migrations and ethnic splits. 
The most famous migration in SSA is the Bantu 
migration.  In West Africa, in addition to Bantu 
It stands to reason that 
exceptional factors 
or backgrounds 
explain why SSA 
has diverged in its 
politics and, hence, in 
socioeconomic terms 
from its peers.
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migration, “changes resulted 
from many small, essentially 
kin-based groups searching for 
more advantageous places to 
live.  Soil, fertility, water supply, 
and distribution of  disease, par-
ticularly sleeping sickness and 
river blindness, undoubtedly 
inluenced settlement patterns 
as much then as they did later. 
The preferred locations devel-
oped as population centers, 
where many of  the languages 
within the Atlantic, Mande, 
Gur, Kwa, Benue-Congo, and 
Adamawa-Ubangi branches of  
Niger-Congo originated.”  
In Central, East and Southern 
Africa, the very slow move-
ment of  the Bantu from East 
Africa to Southern Africa (6 
km/year) and the limited fertil-
ity of  soils explain the dispersal 
of  populations in small settle-
ments along the way.  North-
east arid ecology dictated the 
Cushitic Somali migrations 
from southwest Ethiopia and 
northern Kenya.  Pastoral-
ism and splits in ‘clans’ were 
outcomes.  Geoecology also 
provoked the Oromo migra-
tions from the south of  the Rift 
Valley in search of  new graz-
ing lands for cattle.  The result 
was two types of  ethnic disper-
sal: those who remained in the 
south and assimilated Oromo 
groups dispersed throughout 
Ethiopia and Kenya.  Geocolo-
gy-rooted migrations and con-
licts among Western Nilotic 
Nuer, Dinka, and Luo explain 
the dispersal of  Luo and Luo-
associated groups, such as the 
Acholi, Lango, and Alur.  The 
famous Shaka-Zulu-driven 
social and political revolution 
that engulfed the Nguni people 
from the late 18th century to 
the mid-19th century and that 
reordered the ethnic composi-
tion and structure of  the whole 
Southern Africa up to Tanza-
nia in East Africa had its origin 
in the ecological imbalance, 
drought, and dwindling land 
resources for herding. Wars 
broke out and made new ethnic 
groups or amalgamated others. 
By contrast, the ethnic disper-
sal in North Africa was cir-
cumscribed and much more 
limited by two very 
powerful factors.  First, 
the continental dispersal 
of  populations that fol-
lowed the Sahara desic-
cation had reduced the 
territorial space over 
which North Africans 
could settle. The popu-
lation concentration in 
cities along the Medi-
terranean and Atlantic 
coasts and in the fertile 
valley did not allow for 
a vast ethnic dispersal of  
people.  Second, because 
the Phoenician, Roman, 
Arab, Ottoman, Portu-
guese colonization and 
invasions occurred centuries 
and even thousands years ago, 
they had created a settlement 
pattern in North Africa that 
deterred the type of  ethnic pro-
fusion that occurred in SSA. 
Given the type of  colonial rule 
and its longer time span, these 
diferent groups came to co-
exist in a form of  settlement 
colonies, in which the invad-
ers reordered the indigenous 
Berber social life politically 
and religiously/culturally.  The 
integrated social order that 
emerged out of  this reordering 
became vertical, dominated 
hierarchically by the invaders, 
notably the Arabs.  The ‘Arab 
tribe’ imposed its hegemony 
over all other indigenous Ber-
ber groups—which explains 
Berber revolts and resistance 
from time to time without suc-
ceeding in controlling power. 
This ethnic verticality difers 
fundamentally from SSA eth-
nic horizontality (I return to 
this concept below).   
Thus, geoecology caused a 
higher dispersal, profusion, 
and number of  ethnicities in 
SSA than in North Africa and 
the two other developing re-
gions.  There are about 4600 
ethnic groups in SSA. North 
Africa (minus Western Sahara 
and Mauritania), by contrast, 
counts about 96 groups, most 
of  which are Berber.  In other 
words, SSA has about 48 times 
the number of  ethnicities of  
North Africa.  It displays an 
‘anomaly’ when compared to 
other regions.  Indeed, SSA 
has had historically the low-
est average population density 
of  the three comparative re-
gions (18/sq.km vs 25/sq.km 
in North Africa, 31/sq.km in 
South America, and 70/sq.km 
in Asia); yet it has the high-
est number of  ethnicities.  By 
comparison with North Africa, 
Asia and South America, SSA 
ethnicity/population ratio is 
higher.  There are far more eth-
nic groups per population clus-
ter in SSA than it is the case in 
North Africa and the two other 
regions.  This ethnic dispersal 
and profusion was exacerbated 
by slavery, thus further distanc-
ing SSA from North Africa.  
Slavery   
SSA did not hold a monopoly 
on slavery either.  Slavery has 
existed in almost all continents. 
Yet, by any standard, slavery 
in SSA was exceptional be-
cause of  its three exceptional 
features.   First, slavery in SSA 
was the largest intercontinental 
forced migration in modern 
history.  It difered from all the 
others by its highest rate of  
mortality and social disloca-
tion.  Second, its impact was 
not conined to SSA but ex-
tended to all the continents, ex-
cept Oceania.  In all of  them, 
there were sellers and buyers 
of  SSA slaves.  Third, its efects 
have persisted and endured in 
SSA did not hold a monopoly on 
slavery either.  Slavery has existed 
in almost all continents.  Yet, by 
any standard, slavery in SSA was 
exceptional because of its three 
exceptional features.
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all the continents up to the 21st century 
as attested to by refugees (e.g., Soma-
lia ‘Bantu people’ in the US), political 
debates, and the intractable socioeco-
nomic low status of  and discriminatory 
practices against the descendants of  
SSA slaves in all the continents.  What, 
then, explains the exceptional nature of  
slavery in SSA?  
The answer is SSA exceptional geoecol-
ogy.  Consider the ive major reasons 
imputed to SSA itself  by historians to 
explain slavery: (1) lack of  private prop-
erty, (2) the active participation of  SSA 
precolonial rulers in the slave trades, (3) 
better epidemiological resistance to dis-
eases by SSA slaves, (4) the Ham Curse, 
and (5) SSA precolonial states’ weak-
ness and inability to fend of slavers. 
All ive resulted from SSA harsh geo-
ecology.  For space reasons, I make 
only barely skeletal points.  In SSA, 
slaves were used by some individu-
als/rulers and by lineages.  Why this 
reliance on slaves?  Because of  SSA 
formidable geoecology, a special pre-
mium was put on land.  This forced 
the dispersed ethnic groups to opt 
for communal land ownership. In-
digenous slavery compensated, thus, 
for the lack of  private property in 
land by serving as a source of  private 
wealth for some individuals/rulers; it 
also served as a source of  extra labor 
power for lineage members to allevi-
ate the burden of  the lineage and its 
members within such a forbidding 
environment. This situation imparted 
to SSA indigenous slavery its distinct 
character.  Because some individu-
als and lineage members depended so 
strongly on this geoecology-induced 
wide and deep indigenous slavery sys-
tem, SSA rulers easily participated in 
slave trades when goaded by Arabs and 
Europeans.  As for the other three caus-
es, suice it to mention that the epide-
miological advantage of  African slaves 
and the Ham Curse, which is linked to 
the black skin color, are direct by-prod-
ucts of  SSA geoecology that imparted 
to people of  SSA their phenotype and 
diferential resistance to the parasites 
and disease load.  Unfortunately for the 
people of  SSA, these saviour attributes 
made them vulnerable to slavery and 
biblical distortions.  Geoecology also 
explained why ‘strong states’ emerged 
in South and Southeast Asia to fend 
of slavers but not in SSA.  Asian states 
emerged in a fertile environment of  in-
termediate tropical zone as opposed to 
the equatorial wet zone.  In SSA, ever-
wet and most tropical environment and 
the attendant ethnic dispersal could al-
low mostly only fragmentary and small 
states unable to fend of the encroach-
ing slavers.   Thus, geoecology imparted 
to SSA slavery its exceptional nature 
(I do not discount Arab and European 
responsibility).  This explains why its ef-
fects also difer from those of  slavery in 
other parts of  the world.
Slavery’s major impact on SSA was not, 
as often maintained, the demographic 
loss or the fostering of  autocratic rule. 
Although these did occur, their impact 
is exaggerated.  Instead, slavery had 
three particularly severe internal con-
sequences for SSA: (1) it reinforced the 
higher ethnic dispersal and profusion 
caused by SSA geoecology in all the 
subregions of  SSA; (2) it worsened the 
fragility of  traditional economic organi-
zations and the low outputs; and (3) it 
devalued SSA and its people.   
Slavery devalued SSA and its people in 
two major ways.  The irst way is the 
devaluation by outsiders, that is, people 
from all the other regions of  the world. 
The reasons for this are twofold.  The 
slave ideology contained in itself  the 
venom of  the devaluation of  the peo-
ple in SSA.  In addition, the presence 
of  SSA slaves in Europe, the Americas, 
North Africa, the Middle East and Asia 
had established the ‘objective basis’ for 
the denigration of  SSA, their land and 
culture of  origin.  The second slavery-
derived type of  devaluation is self-de-
valuation by the people of  SSA them-
selves.  This behaviour has deep roots in 
slavery and is tied up to the tale of  the 
white revenants.  The wealth obtained 
from the slave trade by Arab and Eu-
ropean slave traders so impressed the 
Africans that they explained it through 
the social death of  the slaves: When 
slaves were taken to the Americas and 
the Arab world, they died.  And as spir-
its, they reappeared as White revenants 
with massive wealth.  This tale or myth 
derived from the reality of  slavery of  
centuries ago has become ‘part of  the 
culture.’  The wealth and magic of  the 
‘white man’ are held in higher esteem, 
and one can accede to it only through 
sorcery-sanctioned death of  a human 
being.  Consider here the ritual killings 
of  Albinos in Tanzania, Uganda, Ken-
ya, Burundi and Congo for wealth mak-
ing.   Their ‘white-like’ body parts are 
representative of  ‘white wealth.’ Slavery 
did not create sorcery, but it fortiied it. 
The death of  slaves and of  the sorcerer’s 
victim, which turns them into ‘white’ 
and wealth, is the symbolic devaluation 
of  the Africans by Africans themselves 
in the face of  the ‘white man’s’ wealth 
and prestige.  Because myths become 
routine, they acquire structural strength 
by becoming ‘reality.’  Both the intelli-
gentsia and the populace in SSA recog-
nize the daily empirical manifestations 
of  this situation.  A Ghanaian returnee 
best summed it up: ‘Nothing pleases a 
Ghanaian worker more than to have a 
white boss.  The more abusive the boss, 
the better and the more endearing the 
staf are to them.’  He contrasted this at-
titude to the aversion of  the same Gha-
naian workers and populace to value 
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their fellow Ghanaian bosses.   Slavery-
derived devaluation of  SSA by both 
outsiders and the people of  SSA them-
selves creates a complex of  superiority 
for the outsiders and of  inferiority for 
the people of  SSA.
Precolonial Fragile Economic Or-
ganizations and Low Outputs    
Harsh geoecology had a negative im-
pact on SSA ability to build viable eco-
nomic organizations.  It is no mystery 
why food production did not take place 
as early as was the case in Asia and the 
Nile Valley in Egypt.  The paucity of  
domesticable native plant species, the 
much smaller area suitable for indig-
enous production, and the often stingy 
climatic zones deterred such an occur-
rence.  The very features that made 
SSA geoecology exceptionally negative 
required a survival and subsistence type 
of  economic activities at 
the expense of  vibrant 
forms of  production. 
Ethnic dispersal exacer-
bated and codiied this 
fragile and subsistence 
economy.  Geoecology 
and ethnic dispersal de-
termined both the rela-
tions of  production that 
came to rest on commu-
nal ownership of  the land 
and the attendant tech-
nology that remained ru-
dimentary.  
For its part, slavery reinforced the frag-
ile traditional economy through gen-
eralized insecurity that prevailed from 
roughly the 16th to the 19th centuries. 
It also stunted the SSA productive 
forces, and strengthened ethnic disper-
sal. The dispersal had implications for 
state formation and centralization that 
impacted negatively the long-term eco-
nomic development. To be sure, pre-
colonial economies were not uniform 
throughout SSA. Trade-led economies 
of  West Africa, for instance, fared 
better than elsewhere.  Nevertheless, 
compared to North Africa, Asia, and 
South America, SSA, as a whole, had 
depressed socioeconomic outputs by the 
time of  European colonialism.  Coloni-
al rule’s economic transformations did 
not alter this gap.  By 1960, economic 
outputs (in GDP) were, on the average, 
$16,467 for North Africa and $3, 761 
for SSA.  
Organic Nature of  Politics and its 
Modiiers in SSA
Thus, geoecology generated three in-
termediate exceptional factors:  ethnic 
dispersal and profusion, slavery, and 
low precolonial socioeconomic outputs. 
The three have a direct impact on SSA 
politics.  They modify politics by means 
of  three exceptional direct manifesta-
tions.  First, ethnic dispersal and pro-
fusion manifest themselves directly in 
the form of  ethnic horizontal relations. 
Ethnic horizontal relations are exclusive 
to SSA and are not observed in North 
Africa (Asia and South America).  They 
difer from ethnic vertical relations in 
North Africa, Asia, and South America. 
Ethnic vertical relations are pyramidal, 
unequal, and dominated by one ‘ethnic’ 
group politically, economically, and so-
cially (e.g., Arabs in North Africa and 
the Middle East, Europeans or Mesti-
zos in South America, Han Chinese in 
China, Kinhs in Vietnam, Indo-Aryans 
in India).  Unlike in North Africa, Asia, 
and South America, in SSA European 
or pre-European colonization never suc-
ceeded in reordering ethnic vertical re-
lations, except temporarily in Southern 
Africa and Sudan.  As a contrasting re-
sult, ethnic horizontal relations charac-
terize SSA.  Ethnic horizontal relations 
rest on assumed and built-in equality 
among ethnic groups.  The expecta-
tion is that no single group dominates 
the others by controlling political power 
exclusively; power is potentially accessi-
ble to all ethnic groups.  This assumed 
equality begets demands by each ethnic 
group—however small—to be given (or 
to take) equal chance to control politi-
cal power.  This may take the form of  
violent overthrow or rigged or fair elec-
tion, even though the outcome does not 
necessarily relect this equality.  Second, 
the direct manifestation of  low socioec-
onomic outputs is a more extreme form 
of  socioeconomic deprivation and com-
petition in SSA than obtains in North 
Africa (and Asia and South America). 
The comparative data in Table 1 above 
partly relect this extreme deprivation. 
It deeply and diferentially shapes the 
SSA brand of  politics.  Third, slavery’s 
double devaluation of  SSA and its peo-
ple manifests itself  directly in the form 
of  a higher level of  insecurity and in-
feriority complex of  the SSA political 
leadership than is the case in North Af-
rica (and Asia and South America).   It 
adds, unlike in North Africa (Asia and 
South America), an extra layer on top 
of  the colonial devaluation that SSA 
shares with all colonized non-European 
peoples.  It has deep modifying implica-
tions for SSA politics.  
Thus, ethnic dispersal and profusion, 
low precolonial socioeconomic outputs, 
and slavery modify and impact politics 
in SSA through their three direct mani-
festations: ethnic horizontal relations, 
more extreme form of  socioeconomic 
deprivation and competition, and high-
er level of  insecurity for the political 
leadership.  They explain why the socio-
economic consequences 
of  politics in SSA difer 
from those of  North 
Africa (and Asia and 
South America).  The 
three intermediate fac-
tors and their three 
manifestations form an 
organic and systemic 
whole in four speciic 
ways.  
First, they all relate to 
and bear the imprint 
of  SSA exceptional 
geoecology.  Second, 
the three determine and reinforce each 
other:  Ethnic dispersal and fragile 
precolonial  economies prevented the 
emergence of  ‘strong’ states to fend of 
slavery; slavery, in turn, exacerbated 
ethnic dispersal and the fragility of  
precolonial economies; ethnic disper-
sal codiied and put its imprint on tra-
ditional economies (e.g., collective land 
ownership and subsistence), which, in 
turn, reinforce ethnic dispersal by pro-
voking the overuse and degradation of  
the land and soils and, hence, the mi-
grations of  the populations to new set-
tlements. Third, the three factors are 
found in all SSA subregions. Although 
the three and the underlying geoecol-
ogy may display variations in individual 
countries, they impact directly or indi-
rectly all SSA countries alike.  Fourth, 
their three attendant manifestations 
(i.e., ethnic horizontal relations, the 
more extreme form of  socioeconomic 
deprivation and competition, and acute 
form of  inferiority complex) are found 
and directly afect politics in roughly 
the same way in all SSA countries.  Be-
cause of  these four traits, the three fac-
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tors and their manifestations constitute 
the organic causes of  SSA politics.  As 
such, the organic causes of  SSA politics 
are to their variations in individual SSA 
countries what the trunk of  a tree is to 
the branches.  Attempts to save one or 
several dying branches of  an infected 
tree remain inefective unless one treats 
the infected trunk of  the tree.
The organic causes of  politics have 
organic consequences as well for SSA. 
They make politics in SSA as a whole 
exceptional when compared to politics 
in North Africa and the other develop-
ing regions.  This process is more com-
plex than can be analyzed here given 
space constraints.  Suice it to say that 
because of  these organic causes, poli-
tics, which is by deinition conlict-rid-
den, acquires in SSA a more Hobbesian 
character than in the other developing 
regions. Liberal political com-
promise, generally di cult to 
reach in developing regions, 
is made even more so in SSA. 
Because politics makes and 
shapes the state, exceptional 
politics in SSA makes its state 
exceptional as well.  Herein 
lies the diference between 
the SSA variant of  the over 
politicized state and that of  
North Africa (and of  Asia 
and South America).  This 
explains why in SSA the insti-
tutions of  the state have been 
more predatory and viciously 
appropriated by some groups 
or individuals—often and almost always 
tied up to ethnic claims and interests; 
why extreme forms of  political bufoon-
ery verging on sadism have occurred 
there (e.g., Idi Amin, Bokasa, Doe, Aba-
cha); why SSA has brewed more civil 
wars than any other developing region 
in the recent postcolonial period; why 
it has a higher political strife index and 
lower peace index than the other devel-
oping regions; why in the ‘consolidated 
democracy era,’ SSA has witnessed the 
larger number of  military coups  and 
coup attempts (e.g., Mauritania, Guin-
ea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, 
Mali, Central African Republic, and 
coup attempts in Benin, Malawi, South 
Sudan, Congo-Kinshasa, and Lesotho); 
and why there are more so-called  ‘failed 
states’ in SSA than in the other develop-
ing regions.  [As a historically speciic, 
concurrent, and multistate ‘revolution,’ 
the ‘Arab Spring’ and its ramiications 
in the Middle East and North Africa are 
not considered here in the comparison.]
By deinition, the state is the institution-
al format through which public poli-
cies are taken to tackle the problems of  
socioeconomic development. In SSA, 
this viciously Hobbesian character of  
politics and its variant of  the over politi-
cized state prevent the state from acting 
as the catalyst for development.  The 
cumulative impact of  this exceptional 
politics on the state explains the gap in 
socioeconomic outcomes between SSA 
and North Africa (and other developing 
regions) in table1.   What, then, is the 
solution?
Unifederation as the Organic In-
stitutional Solution   
The socioeconomic consequences of  
politics in SSA are, thus, diferent from 
those of  North Africa.  Their causes 
are organically embedded in the SSA 
fabric, and systemically afect all SSA 
subregions and countries, albeit with 
local variations. Therefore, the design 
of  the institutional format apt to solve 
SSA socioeconomic predicament needs 
to relect and respond to these organic 
diferential causes and consequences 
of  politics.  In light of  this, the natural 
impulse to let each SSA country fend 
for itself  and solve its own development 
problems loses its rationale.  This in-
cludes the impulse to rely on ‘ethnicity’ 
as the basis for political reorganization 
in each country.  Ethiopia, the irst SSA 
country to clearly subscribe to the strat-
egy of  reorganizing the polity on the 
basis of  ‘ethnicity,’ has not moved away 
from the collective fate of  other SSA 
countries.  Solutions to individual SSA 
countries may temporarily impact local 
variations and alleviate some aspects of  
the predicament.  But they will not solve 
the problem for organic SSA.  Like the 
treated branches of  an infected tree that 
cannot survive unless the trunk of  the 
tree is treated, the temporarily relieved 
countries will not extricate themselves 
from the SSA organic socioeconomic 
predicament unless the organic causes 
of  politics they share with other SSA 
countries are dealt with. For the mani-
festations and causes of  the SSA predic-
ament resemble the Greek mythological 
hydra, the gigantic monster with nine 
heads, all of  which were anchored by 
a central immortal head.  As one head 
was cut of, two grew in its place.  Only 
by burning out the roots and severing 
the immortal central head from the 
body did Heracles destroy the monster.  
Whatever country-based solution is pro-
posed to SSA socioeconomic ills will not 
be able to sever the immortal central 
head of  the hydra.  It will not treat the 
infected trunk of  the tree.  For example, 
the socioeconomic situation of  Congo-
Kinshasa was relatively better than 
that of  Rwanda before the 1990s.  So 
was that of  Cote d’Ivoire compared to 
its neighbors.  Today both the Congo 
and Cote d’Ivoire (the Congo 
more so) are ‘basket cases’ be-
cause failure to solve Rwanda’s 
and Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors’ 
problems has re-infected the 
Congo and Cote d’Ivoire via 
ethnic political strife.   South 
Africa may have a stronger 
economy, but failure to solve 
the socioeconomic plight of  its 
neighbors haunts it via deadly 
xenophobia against its ‘fellow 
Africans.’   Kenya may be the 
‘economic power house’ of  
East Africa, but the Somalia’s 
imbroglio has come to haunt 
Kenya via terrorist attacks. 
The need to respond to the organic so-
cioeconomic outcomes in SSA and their 
causes requires that the response be or-
ganic as well.  
On the other hand, the common pitfall 
of  the Pan Africanists is to be oblivious 
of  the speciically organic nature of  the 
SSA predicament and its diferences 
from North Africa’s situation.   As a re-
sult, they rely wrongly on an all-Africa 
continental solution.  The concept of  
organic SSA militates against all-Afri-
ca institutional solutions that emulate 
those proposed in other (developed or 
developing) regions.  It prevents us from 
likening poorer Eastern Europe’s entry 
into EU to the AU situation between 
SSA and North Africa.  Unlike West-
ern Europe, North Africa’s economic 
situation, although better than SSA’s, is 
structurally incapable to bear the bur-
den of  SSA.  But more importantly, be-
cause North Africa does not share the 
organic causes of  SSA politics, AU, the 
institution designed to solve the efects 
of  this politics, cannot succeed in doing 
Solutions to individual SSA countries 
may temporarily impact local variations 
and alleviate some aspects of the 
predicament.  But they will not solve 
the problem for organic SSA. 
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so.  Therefore, the diference between organic 
SSA and North Africa requires the administra-
tive and political separation of  SSA from North 
Africa.  It cries out for the repudiation of  the 
African Union and for the urgent need to or-
ganically tackle the predicament for SSA as a 
separate whole.   
The institutional separation of  SSA from North 
Africa helps to tackle the organic causes of  SSA 
socioeconomic lag.  This can be accomplished 
only through a successor institution to AU that 
best responds to the organic causes and conse-
quences of  SSA exceptionally Hobbesian poli-
tics.   The state, is such successor institution for 
two reasons.  First, the state is the institution 
through which public policies are devised to 
tackle the problems of  socioeconomic develop-
ment. Second, because the state in SSA is the 
direct institutional consequence of  the excep-
tionally Hobbesian brand of  politics.  Through 
it are generated extremely negative socioeco-
nomic outcomes.  To make the SSA socioeco-
nomic situation positive, the direct institutional 
response to this brand of  politics and its atten-
dant type of  state is a diferent type of  state.  
Indeed, although the state and its institutions 
are made and determined by politics, the state 
and its institutions mold politics in return.   Yet 
we now know that the SSA situation rests on 
a paradox.  On the one hand, the causes of  
exceptional politics and its negative impact on 
the state and on socioeconomic outcomes are 
organic and applicable to the whole region of  
SSA; on the other hand, the states themselves 
are ‘national’ and ‘sovereign.’  The challenge 
is to make the state as regionally organic as 
the causes of  exceptional politics.  This would 
allow the state to structure and mold politics 
positively in return for SSA as a whole.  Such 
a revolutionary transformation of  the state, 
which makes it the center of  decisions for the 
whole SSA, requires that the national state lose 
its sovereignty.  
Neither the OAU nor the AU ofers any theo-
retical, comparative, and organic basis to repu-
diate national sovereignty.  Under the new state 
arrangement, by contrast, national sovereignty 
is rendered, on theoretical and comparative 
grounds, indefensible by the organic causes 
of  SSA politics.  In contrast to the European 
Union model copied by AU and the generally 
loose and functional integrative model that 
guides most regional integrations, SSA should 
rely on a tight integrative model that relects 
its organic exceptionalism.  A tight integrative 
model assumes unique sovereignty of  the inte-
grative state as opposed to multiple sovereign-
ties of  the constitutive states.  It rests on rear-
ranging the SSA political space by dismantling 
the highly ‘negative’ national states to allow 
their transformation into a SSA organic state.  
Let me resort to a neologism to refer to this new 
institutional format as a Unifederation.   By 
Unifederation I mean a reconigured and uni-
ied political and territorial body.  Its local and 
subregional entities make no claim to complete 
sovereignty as in AU and as in other regional 
groupings in the world.  They do not claim 
complete but progressively delegated sover-
eignty as in EU.  Nor is their claim about ‘resid-
ual sovereignty,’ which is the source of  interpre-
tative frictions between the federal government 
and the states in the US.  Rather, local and sub-
regional entities are decentralized under the 
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complete and uniied sovereignty of  a 
newly constituted SSA multi-territorial 
state.  In most regional groupings, insti-
tutional decisions are either not bind-
ing or loosely and selectively binding. 
The new institutions attached to the 
SSA organic state, by contrast, impose 
sovereign and constraining obligations 
to all members.  It also means that ter-
ritorial borders separating the previ-
ously sovereign countries loose their 
meaning as a new geo-spatial space is 
created.  Although Unifederation has 
much in common with federalism, it 
is historically unique.  It maintains 
the decentralization and practical au-
tonomy of  its constitutive entities while 
deriving its unique sovereignty from 
the organic nature of  the causes of  the 
SSA predicament.  The Unifederation 
relects SSA exceptionalism. 
Payofs and Feasibility of  the 
Unifederation  
As the center of  decisions for the whole 
SSA, targeting roughly the same prob-
lems in all SSA subregions, the Unifed-
eration becomes the means through 
which a uniied and purposeful pol-
icy can tackle, beyond national varia-
tions, the organic factors that modify 
politics negatively in SSA.  There are 
four speciic payofs.  First, the unifed-
eral organic state provides the political 
framework and means to tackle SSA 
socioeconomic lag.   Because the low 
socioeconomic outputs are for a major 
part due to SSA harsh geoecology, it is 
almost impossible for individual coun-
tries to solve the problem.  The unifed-
eral organic state remedies this situa-
tion by being the center of  decisions for 
the whole SSA.  It provides resources 
and coordination in the transformation 
of  the traditional economies.  It allows 
diferent subregions of  SSA to com-
pensate for their speciic geoecological 
disadvantages by beneiting from the 
geoecological advantages of  the other 
subregions.   Because of  its rearranged 
socioeconomic space, the unifederal 
state reduces ethnic dispersal and hori-
zontal relations; it, thus, transforms the 
traditional forms of  economic organi-
zations.  Only within such a rearranged 
space can the much-talked about and 
much-needed land reform, improve-
ment in rural agricultural production, 
and the upgrading of  human resources 
and skills can succeed in SSA.  A suc-
cessful integrated industrialization is 
possible only with these improvements.
Most studies on globalization cite SSA 
as the region the least integrated into 
the current global economy.  Because 
it is a better institutional solution, the 
Unifederation accommodates glo-
balization better than does AU or in-
dividual countries.  It uses its unique 
sovereignty to dictate the direction and 
goal of  SSA integrated involvement in 
the world markets as opposed to be-
ing dictated serially by global actors. 
Moreover, the Unifederation allows a 
more vibrant and open economic and 
political system, a bigger and organi-
cally integrated geographical space, 
and a larger and more skilled popula-
tion.  These conditions favor globaliza-
tion’s information technology, foreign 
investments, international travel, trade, 
inancial markets and the movement of  
capital in SSA.   
As a second payof, the Unifederation 
sets up conditions for democratiza-
tion through territorial reorganiza-
tion.  By rearranging the geopolitical 
and economic space at the SSA level, 
the unifederal organic state frees the 
competing groups from their depend-
ence on the national negative and in-
strumentalist state.  The freeing leads 
to broader and multiterritorial political 
coalitions within the unifederal larger 
space.  Previously competing ethnic 
groups at the national state level, who 
are easily mobilized by the potentially 
equal access to political power ofered 
by ethnic horizontal relations, have 
now to contend, at the unifederal lev-
el, with many other groups of  similar 
strength or coalitions of  many groups 
from all the subregions of  SSA.  The 
Unifederation deprives ‘tribalist’ pro-
tagonists of  the individual country-
based territorial, economic, and po-
litical conditions that make their equal 
search for political power attractive 
and destructive.   Ethnic horizontality-
built-in equality is very sensitive to any 
semblance of  ‘domination’ by any eth-
nic group within the conines of  the na-
tional state; unifederal broader political 
coalitions allay these fears.  In short, the 
Unifederation dilutes the conditions 
that invigorate the equal ethnic claims 
to political power at the national level. 
It renders them inofensive.   This cre-
ates a perfect or semi-perfect equilib-
rium of  political forces.  The result is 
a search for compromise, which begets 
democracy.  Democratic politics is the 
surest breeder of  inclusively vibrant so-
cioeconomic institutions. 
Third, because it rearranges the SSA 
space, democratizes it, and stands as 
the center of  sovereign decisions, the 
Unifederation helps eliminate the 
conditions that breed strife, civil wars, 
Indeed, 
although the 
state and its 
institutions 
are made and 
determined 
by politics, 
the state and 
its institutions 
mold politics 
in return. 
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militarism, and undemocratic behaviors. 
It fosters peace.   Hence disappears the 
need for costly military assistance or in-
terventions by the US and other SSA 
‘partners.’  By transforming the socioec-
onomic fortunes of  SSA, the Unifedera-
tion improves the standard of  living of  the 
populace, enhances security, and deters 
the conditions that have emboldened Is-
lamists and Al Qaeda in SSA.  Moreover, 
the consequent socioeconomic outcomes 
of  the Unifederation reduce the need for 
US and other foreign powers’ develop-
ment assistance (as was the case with US 
assistance to Europe, Japan, and to South 
Korea). The Unifederation helps, thus, 
reach the goal of  Pan Africanists—de-
terring foreign encroachments—without 
resorting to the ill-conceived continental 
union with North Africa.
Fourth, the Unifederation addresses the 
issue of  SSA inferiority/superiority com-
plex.  SSA extreme form of  economic 
deprivation exacerbates the slavery-de-
rived devaluation of  the African self; the 
expected socioeconomic payofs of  the 
unifederal organic state have the added 
beneit of  curing the people of  SSA of  
their complex of  inferiority vis-à-vis the 
economically better-endowed outsiders. 
Beyond this, the Unifederation deters 
and eliminates the policy consequences 
of  the acute insecurity and inferiority 
complex felt by the political leadership. 
Likewise, it deters the superiority com-
plex of  the outsiders.  Indeed, Unifed-
eral broader political coalitions and the 
attendant equilibrium of  political forces 
deprive the political leadership of  its 
three main allies in enacting inferiority 
complex-driven policies: They constrain 
the leader’s freedom of  arbitrary actions; 
take away the usually exorbitant power 
and inluence that superiority complex-
imbued expatriates have over the inse-
cure and inferiority complex-stricken 
political leaders;  and render insigniicant 
the leader’s ethnic support and complic-
ity in allowing this inluence to 
prevail. 
AU-driven ‘uniication of  Af-
rica’ is a pipe dream.  Not so 
much because it is di cult to 
implement as because it will 
not solve SSA lagging socio-
economic outcomes.  Similarly, 
reliance on individual SSA 
countries’ ability to make them-
selves ‘the next Asia’ and the 
excessive faith of  Sinophiles in 
China’s ability to develop SSA 
are illusions.  China or India 
will not eliminate the organic 
causes of  SSA socioeconomic 
lag.  Unless people in SSA have 
resigned to their fate and have 
accepted at the outset that they 
will always occupy the last rank 
compared to all other develop-
ing regions, only SSA itself  can 
do so.  And the Unifederation 
is the way.   Unifederation is 
not a pipe dream because it 
squarely addresses SSA lagging 
outcomes and their organic 
causes.  It has the chances of  
fundamentally altering SSA status as the 
‘poorest region’ of  the world.  
There remains, of  course, the question 
of  how to actually implement the project. 
Proposing today that AU be dismantled 
would seem to be pure folly in the face 
of  the eforts deployed by Pan Africanists 
for the last 50 years.  Actually, it is not a 
folly.  AU has performed one major posi-
tive deed that facilitates its own demise 
in favor of  the Unifederation.   And this 
is the establishment of  constitutional 
norms in its Constitutive Act that are 
consistent with the two most power-
ful movements of  the post-1991 period: 
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globalization and democratization.   Indeed, 
under the aegis of  AU, all SSA countries have 
been sensitized to today’s international demo-
cratic norms.  Sensitization to the democratic 
norms serves, thus, as the necessary transi-
tional period before the implementation of  
the Unifederation.  It has provided the masses 
in SSA with enough incentives and means to 
redirect their eforts democratically toward 
implementing the Unifederation.  
Relying on the democratic gains of  the last 
20 years, the implementation should feature 
two concomitant strategies.  First, at the na-
tional level, where the popular masses ight 
for democracy.  Each SSA country organiz-
ing elections or other non-electoral actions 
should feature political parties and mass or-
ganizations that explain to 
the general populations why 
SSA lags socioeconomically 
behind its previously equal 
fellow ‘Third World’ regions; 
why the solutions proposed 
since independence by their 
national states and leaders 
have not worked; why China 
or India are not good sub-
stitutes for SSA own crea-
tive energy; and why AU, 
the organization aimed at 
solving the problem at the 
continental level, is inefec-
tive when compared to the 
SSA-based Unifederation. 
Second, at the AU elite level, 
where the AU ediice was 
built.  The frustrated elite 
and ‘intellectuals,’ who have 
worked within the AU bu-
reaucracy only to decry its 
inefectiveness, should join 
the masses in the ight for the 
dismantling of  AU and its 
transformation into a SSA 
Unifederation.  Their expert advice and clear 
understanding of  the causes of  their frustra-
tion and of  the unavoidable failure of  AU 
should strengthen the democratic process of  
liquidating AU in favor of  the Unifederation. 
We, thus, have both a bottom-up and a top-
down strategy of  implementing the Unifed-
eration project.   
The implementation process beneits greatly 
from globalization’s lower communication 
costs and breakdown of  trade and cultural 
barriers among countries.  By challenging the 
national state sovereignty, globalization facili-
tates the process of  territorial and sovereignty 
rearrangement dear to the Unifederation. 
Globalization allows people in SSA to chal-
lenge the ‘tyranny of  place’ associated with 
the current SSA state.  As one of  the legacies 
of  the Westphalia Treaty of  1648, state sover-
eignty is not as sacrosanct as believed.  USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany 
are examples of  altered sovereignty in two op-
posite directions.  South Sudan and Eritrea in 
SSA itself  are other examples.
As high as the hurdles faced by the implemen-
tation of  the Unifederation seem, they are by 
far more salutary for SSA than the ‘growing 
pains’ of  AU, which will never eliminate the 
gap between SSA and the other developing 
regions.  SSA faces two choices.  The irst is 
the status quo and its attendant perpetual 
lowest ranking for SSA.  And the second is 
the implementation of  a salutary intellec-
tual alternative for a positive transformation. 
The diference between these two options 
can be measured.  Ask the best statisticians 
in the world to gather all the available data. 
Let them calculate the human, economic, i-
nancial, political and psychological costs of  
maintaining the status quo represented by 
AU and SSA today.  Then look at the cost of  
implementing the alternative in the form of  
a Unifederation.  There is no doubt that the 
cost of  the status quo for SSA is exponentially 
higher than the cost of  implementing the sal-
utary alternative.  
Indeed, Unifederal broader
political coalitions and the attendant 
equilibrium of political forces deprive 
the political leadership of its three 
main allies in enacting inferiority 
complex-driven policies: 
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THE UNSUNG HEROISM 
OF THABO MBEKI
Dr Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng
Executive Director, ACTS
“In our world in which the generation of  new knowledge and its application to change the 
human condition is the engine which moves human society further away from barbarism, 
do we not have need to recall Africa’s hundreds of  thousands of  intellectuals back from 
their places of  emigration in Western Europe and North America, to rejoin those who 
remain still within our shores! I dream of  the day when these, the African mathematicians 
and computer specialists in Washington and New York, the African physicists, engineers, 
doctors, business managers and economists, will return from London and Manchester and 
Paris and Brussels to add to the African pool of  brain power, to enquire into and ind 
solutions to Africa’s problems and challenges, to open the African door to the world of  
knowledge, to elevate Africa’s place within the universe of  research the information of  new 
knowledge, education and information”. 
Thabo Mbeki, 1998
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either President Alassane 
Ouattara of  Cote D’Ivoire 
nor President Macky Sall of  
Senegal, two of  the Chief  
Guests on Day 1 were in attendance. 
The UNDP Administrator, Helen 
Clark, a former Prime Minister of  New 
Zealand, and another Chief  Guest from 
Day 1, had also left.
 
The Hotel Soitel Conference Centre, 
the posh venue of  this international 
conference had a decidedly anticlimac-
tic feel to it. Sure, the Prime Minister 
of  Cote D’Ivoire was still around, as 
were several high ranking current and 
former ministers for inance and eco-
nomic planning, heads of  central banks 
and distinguished academics from the 
African continent and beyond. The 
charismatic former Prime Minister of  
Burkina Faso, Tertius Zongo, would be 
moderating the day’s irst Plenary Ses-
sion.  Nevertheless, after the refresh-
ingly wonky High Level Panel Discus-
sion on Day 1, during which Allasane 
Ouattara (on total factor productivity), 
Thabo Mbeki (on illicit inancial lows 
in Africa), and Helen Clark (on inclusive 
growth and human development) had 
stolen the show, Day 2 felt a bit low key. 
This was clearly a day for technocrats: 
a keynote address by a representative 
of  the World Bank, followed by a panel 
discussion led by leading scholars on the 
development experiences of  South Ko-
rea, India, Mauritius and Brazil.
The camera panned across the room 
and beamed a picture of  a familiar 
looking face, seated nonchalantly deep 
in the audience. It was Thabo Mbeki, 
the former President of  South Africa, 
looking much younger than his 72 years. 
This is one of  the striking things about 
Thabo Mbeki. He appears not to have 
aged much since 1994 when much of  
the world got to know him for the irst 
time as he took the oath of  oice as 
Deputy President of  a democratic, non-
racist and non-sexist South Africa. 
The second most striking thing about 
Thabo Mbeki is his unsung heroism, es-
pecially in his native South Africa. This, 
despite a solid record of  monumental 
accomplishments. For the irst 14 years 
of  post-apartheid South Africa, he had 
been at the centre of  South Africa’s 
political and economic transformation 
– arguably the chief  architect of  post-
apartheid South Africa’s economic and 
social contract. For the inal 10 years of  
apartheid rule, he had led the negotia-
tions on the dismantling of  apartheid. 
He had spent 28 years in exile, lost a son 
and a brother in the struggle, survived 
an assassination plot, and watched his 
father spend 24 years in detention.
In a political movement blessed with 
extraordinary talent, he rose to become 
the trusted aide of  two of  the ANC’s 
most revered leaders (Oliver Tambo 
and Nelson Mandela) and proceeded to 
beat a formidable cast of  political rivals 
to become Deputy President, en-route 
to becoming post-apartheid South Af-
rica’s second democratically elected 
leader.
While his place in history is certainly as-
sured, his achievements are seldom cele-
brated. This architect of  South Africa’s 
transition to democratic rule; this au-
thor of  much of  post-apartheid South 
Africa’s economic, political and social 
policies; this successor and ‘comrade’ 
to Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and 
Govan Mbeki; this 21st century leader 
of  African rebirth; this originator of  
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development), was here in Abidjan, less 
than 7 years after leaving oice, and is 
hardly noticed by those who study and 
practice development in Africa. 
The camera hadn’t spent more than a 
few seconds on him. It wasn’t even clear 
that many of  the delegates had recog-
nised his presence. He was seated alone, 
no fawning fans crowding him to ask 
for autographs or ‘selies’. He also ap-
peared very much at ease and not an 
inch out of  place in this meeting of  low 
level technocrats. This is the third most 
striking thing about Thabo Mbeki. His 
‘bookish’ reputation is well deserved. 
He is an ideas man, an avid reader who 
genuinely enjoys rigorous intellectual 
exchange. Here he was, a 72 year old 
pensioner, formerly the most powerful 
man in Africa, happy to take ‘lessons’ 
on the development experiences of  
South Korea, India, Brazil and Mauri-
tius while the people currently in charge 
of  Africa’s destiny were nowhere to be 
seen.
The fourth most striking thing about 
Thabo Mbeki is his unsung Pan Afri-
canism. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in his contribution to the ‘New Af-
rican Renaissance’. Yes, he was talking 
about this and getting pummelled mer-
cilessly for it by the South African press 
long before the emergence of  the ‘Africa 
rising’ narrative. While he cannot claim 
all the credit for the ‘Africa rising’ nar-
rative, it is hard to deny his role in the 
continent’s economic and political gov-
ernance over the last two decades. His 
leadership on (a) good governance on 
the continent (b) African ownership of, 
and solutions to Africa’s problems, (c) 
redeinition of  African foreign policy 
(towards Afro-centric and non-con-
frontational diplomacy - a rejection of  
‘victimhood’ and Afro-pessimism in fa-
vour of  an Afro-centric, proactive, non-
confrontational African engagement in 
international afairs ), and (d) the ‘Afri-
can Renaissance Coalition’ (Olusegun 
Obasanjo of   Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade 
of  Senegal, Pedro Pires of  Cape Verde, 
Joachim Chissano of  Mozambique, 
Meles Zenawi of  Ethiopia and Paul 
Kagame of  Rwanda) combined to cre-
ate conditions favourable to the emer-
gence of  ‘Africa rising’ narrative.
I have lived in South Africa and I am 
aware that Thabo Mbeki remains a 
controversial igure in that country. 
Many South Africans consider him 
‘bookish’ and ‘detached’ or more con-
cerned with ‘Pan-African’ rather than 
‘South African’ problems. Notably, his 
focus on African Renaissance seemed 
to have rubbed many of  his compatri-
ots the wrong way. In the complex his-
tory of  race relations in South Africa, 
his work on the ‘African Renaissance’ 
It was Day 2 of  the International Conference on the Emergence of  Africa 
held in Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire (March 19th, 2015). All the pomp and ceremo-
ny of  the irst day was gone: the multi-coloured African lags; the red carpet; 
the traditional dancers; the uniformed security; the press corps. 
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has been misconstrued in some quarters 
as not being inclusive of  South Africa’s 
‘non-black races’. This perception is 
misguided but it hasn’t been helped by 
the airmative action policy with which 
Mbeki is also closely associated: Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE). Criti-
cism that beneits of  the BEE were nar-
rowly targeted at black South Africans 
instead of  all ‘races’ that had sufered 
marginalization under apartheid led to 
the revision of  the programme in 2007 
to something called Broad Based BEE. 
Broad Based BEE continues to sufer 
from much of  the original criticism lev-
elled against the original BEE.
There are as many legitimate critiques 
of  the BEE as there are of  Pan Afri-
canism. Why South Africans should 
single out Mbeki for particularly harsh 
judgement over the ‘sins’ of  BEE and 
African Renaissance, is the puzzle. After 
all, both African Renaissance and BEE 
were championed by the sainted Nelson 
Mandela and no one has ever accused 
him – post-apartheid - of  being insuf-
iciently invested in South African prob-
lems or of  being insuiciently inclusive 
in his ‘African Renaissance’. While it is 
true that Thabo Mbeki has given stir-
ring speeches on African Reinassance 
and dedicated much of  his life, before, 
during and after his presidency to this 
cause, it is also true however that no-
body has made a grander, more heart-
felt and policy focused speech on South 
Africa’s role in the ‘new African Renais-
sance’ than the much beloved ‘Madiba’:
“Where South Africa appears on the 
agenda again, let it be because we want 
to discuss what its contribution shall be 
to the making of  the new African Re-
naissance. Let it be because we want 
to discuss what materials it will sup-
ply for the rebuilding of  the African 
city of  Carthage. Africa cries out for a 
new birth, Carthage awaits the restora-
tion of  its glory. . . . Tribute is due to 
the great thinkers of  our continent who 
have been and are trying to move all 
of  us to understand the intimate inter-
connection between the great issues of  
our day of  peace, stability, democracy, 
human rights, cooperation and develop-
ment. . . . We know as a matter of  fact 
that we have it in ourselves as Africans 
to change all of  this. We must, in action, 
assert our will to do so. We must, in ac-
tion, say that there is no obstacle big 
enough to stop us from bringing about 
a new African Renaissance.” Nelson 
Mandela
For some reason, Thabo Mbeki tends 
to be judged more harshly than others. 
This is true of  three of  the most endur-
ing criticisms levelled against him: his 
response to the HIV/Aids epidemic, 
his ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe, 
and his obsession with ‘African Renais-
sance’. Let’s examine each in turn.
Mbeki and HIV/Aids: A damning 
and deserved criticism
The strongest criticism against Thabo 
Mbeki rests on his ‘enabling’ of  what 
can fairly be described as state-led 
‘HIV/Aids denialism’ in South Africa 
during his time as president. The gov-
ernment of  Thabo Mbeki’s approach 
to HIV/Aids can be characterized as 
follows:
• Oicial questioning of  the global 
scientiic consensus on the causes of  
HIV/Aids; 
• Oicial reluctance to embrace early 
implementation of  anti-retroviral 
drugs therapy;
• Government inaction, interference, 
pseudoscientiic wars, and outright 
antagonism towards the country’s 
leading scientists, professional medi-
cal societies and HIV/Aids organi-
zations. 
Mbeki personally questioned the sci-
entiic link between HIV and Aids. He 
expressed doubt that HIV caused Aids 
and suggested that Aids was caused by 
socio-economic factors (i.e. poverty) 
and lifestyle choices. His ministers ques-
tioned the eicacy and efectiveness of  
early anti-retroviral drugs (especially 
AZT and nevirapine) while indulging 
in pseudoscientiic arguments.  At the 
16th Global Aids Conference in To-
ronto, Canada, the South African De-
partment of  Health formally exhibited 
garlic, lemons and beetroot, alongside 
anti-retroviral drugs.
So let’s be clear. On HIV/Aids, Thabo 
Mbeki failed South Africa and Africa. 
He should have recognised the magni-
tude of  the scourge and provided timely 
and clear leadership in combating it. 
In fact, the ANC recognised the severe 
implications of  the HIV/Aids epidemic 
as early as 1990. That was four years 
before the party ascended to power. At 
the Fourth International Conference 
on Health in Southern Africa, held in 
Maputo, Mozambique,  then Head of  
the ANC’s armed wing and General 
Secretary of  the South African Com-
munist Party (SACP), Chris Hani, as-
serted: ‘‘We cannot aford to allow the 
Aids epidemic to ruin the realization of  
our dreams’’
 
Thabo Mbeki’s government should have 
done more to combat the disease. South 
Africa had the knowledge and where-
withal to do so. For a irm believer in 
African solutions to African problems, 
Mbeki failed his own African leadership 
test. A leading advocate of  harnessing 
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science, technology and innovation for 
accelerated development in Africa, his 
lirtation with HIV/Aids denialism and 
his indulgence of  HIV/Aids deniers is 
indefensible. 
Having said that, one might be tempted 
to think that Mbeki is an anomaly as 
far as global leadership on HIV/Aids 
is concerned. Unfortunately, the his-
tory of  HIV/Aids is characterized by 
‘denialism’, silence and failure of  politi-
cal leadership. The list of  leaders who 
failed in this respect is long and diverse. 
Arguably, the Reagan Administration 
takes the cake.
The irst cases of  HIV/Aids in the 
US were reported in 1981. President 
Reagan did not make a formal state-
ment on the disease – despite intense 
pressure from US medical and public 
health agencies - until May 31st 1987. 
By this time, the disease had spread to 
113 countries, killed more than 20,000 
in the US alone and infected another 
36,000. That same year, the US im-
posed a travel ban on those with HIV/
Aids from entering the United States, a 
policy that would remain in force un-
til late 2009, when it was lifted by the 
Obama Administration. The efect of  
the travel ban was to stigmatize the 
disease and to constrain US leadership 
in this ight. Dozens of  other countries 
would follow the US lead in imposing 
such travel bans. Some of  these remain 
in efect.
The process for lifting the ban was actu-
ally initiated in 2008 by a true hero in 
the ight against HIV/Aids:  George W. 
Bush. His PEPFAR (President’s Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief) initiative 
has saved many lives and fundamentally 
transformed African and global ap-
proach to HIV/Aids.
Reagan and Mbeki are not alone in 
their failure to lead on HIV/Aids. Many 
African leaders in the 1980s and 1990s 
were slow to recognise the gravity of  the 
epidemic. Some engaged in their own 
pseudo-scientiic analysis. For example, 
the idea that the disease was limited to 
gays, was a particularly widespread mis-
conception in the continent in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
Curiously, the failures of  many of  these 
leaders have either been forgotten or 
forgiven. Reagan was twice elected pres-
ident of  the United States and remains 
popular to this day. (Mbeki was twice 
elected too, although he is not exactly 
the most popular person in South Africa 
today). Today, 24.7 million people live 
with HIV in sub Saharan Africa – more 
than 70 percent of  all people living with 
HIV worldwide. Not a single African 
leader has ever lost his job because of  
inaction or inadequate response to 
HIV/Aids. None is even particularly 
remembered for their slow or inefective 
response to the epidemic. Yet, criticism 
of  Mbeki’s response to HIV/Aids re-
mains withering and unyielding.
As I have said, it is well deserved. My 
concern here relates only to why this 
is true of  Mbeki and not the others. 
Perhaps Mbeki engaged in his pseudo-
scientiic analysis much later than most 
(i.e. when the weight of  scientiic evi-
dence on the causes of  HIV/Aids was 
already considerable). Perhaps a lot was 
expected of  South Africa, a country 
with a long and proud history of  scien-
tiic excellence, especially in medicine. 
(It should be noted that the apartheid 
regime also failed South Africa here, 
wasting valuable time engaging in its 
own brand of  HIV/Aids conspiracy 
theorising and pseudoscience).  Perhaps 
a lot was expected of  Thabo Mbeki 
personally. He is a smart man, after all. 
Some tin pot dictator in some banana 
republic could get away with some cra-
zy, pseudo-scientiic ideas.  Perhaps the 
‘bookish’ Mbeki deserved a full blown 
intellectual pushback. He could do real 
damage, given his political legitimacy, 
moral authority and intellectual creden-
tials. Tinpot dictators of  banana repub-
lics are never taken seriously. They can 
cause real harm but only by coercion 
rather than persuasion, and there are 
limits to what coercion can achieve. Per-
suasion, as Mbeki very well knows, can 
be achieve unbelievable things. Perhaps. 
The point is, Mbeki appears to be sub-
ject to a double standard here.
Mbeki and Zimbabwe
Mbeki is also subject to a double stand-
ard when it comes to the question of  
Zimbabwe. It is a complex matter but 
the gist of  the criticism is relatively 
straightforward. On account of  ‘elec-
toral fraud and human rights viola-
tions’, the European Union and the US 
imposed targeted but restrictive sanc-
tions on Zimbabwe following the 2002 
presidential election. The idea was that 
the sanctions would force a change in 
the behaviour of  the government of  
Zimbabwe towards improved demo-
cratic and economic governance. When 
this didn’t appear to be happening, an 
argument arose that given the degree 
of  ‘integration’ between Zimbabwean 
and South African economies, the 
only efective sanctions would be those 
imposed by South Africa. True to his 
Afrocentric, proactive, non-confronta-
tional African diplomacy, Mbeki opted 
for ‘quite diplomacy’ instead: seeking a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis by talk-
ing directly to the government of  Zim-
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babwe. That ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zim-
babwe (and other African countries) has 
been roundly criticised.
Arguably, Mbeki bears some level of  re-
sponsibility for the trajectory of  events 
that took place in Zimbabwe between 
2002 and 2008. He was the OAU/
AU Chairman at the time of  the con-
troversial 2002 presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe. Many of  his critics consider 
his approach to the 2002 election as the 
embodiment of  the failure of  the ‘Quiet 
Diplomacy Approach’. Their Exhibit 
A? The Khampepe Report.
On the 14th of  November 2014, fol-
lowing a ruling of  the Constitutional 
Court, the South African government 
was forced to release the Khampepe 
Report on the 2002 Elections in Zim-
babwe.(http://cdn.mg.co.za/content/
documents/2014/11/14/reportonth-
e2002presidentialelectionsofzimbabwe.
pdf  .The Khampepe Report is a report 
of  a Judicial Observer Mission (JOM) 
appointed by President Mbeki on 12th 
February 2002 and sent to monitor the 
2002 presidential elections in Zimba-
bwe, held in March of  the same year. It 
was written by South Africa’s Constitu-
tional Court judges Dikgang Moseneke 
and Sisi Khampepe. 
The terms of  reference of  the JOM 
were to observe and to report to the 
President of  South Africa, on whether 
in the period before, during and shortly, 
after the elections, the Constitution, 
electoral laws and any other laws of  
Zimbabwe relevant to the elections 
could ensure credible and substantially 
free and fair elections. The JOM’s chief  
conclusion was as follows: 
‘‘It was principally the pre-polling, le-
gal and other environment, which in-
formed our assessment of  the conduct 
of  the elections. We recognise that op-
position parties fully participated in 
the electoral process to the end. We 
acknowledge that on polling days, no 
signiicant irregularities, save in Harare 
and Chitungwiza occurred. The count-
ing of  votes was completed regularly 
and timeously. Notably, the polling oc-
curred peacefully…However, having 
regard to all the circumstances, and in 
particular the cumulative substantial 
departures from international standards 
of  free and fair elections found in Zim-
babwe during the pre-election period, 
these elections, in our view, cannot be 
considered to be free and fair’’.
Critics of  Mbeki’s ‘quiet’ diplomacy, in-
cluding Freedom House, opine that had 
the report been made public at the time, 
it would have had far reaching conse-
quences on South Africa Zimbabwe re-
lations, with potentially democratic and 
human rights gains for Zimbabwe. 
Perhaps. Criticisms of  Mbeki’s quiet di-
plomacy miss several important things. 
The irst and most important is the 
central role that ‘quiet diplomacy’ has 
played in Mbeki’s life and his many suc-
cesses with this approach in South Af-
rica and elsewhere. ‘Quiet diplomacy’ is 
to Mbeki what ‘Realpolitik’ was to Otto 
Von Bismarck. Mbeki used ‘quiet diplo-
macy’ or secret channels to negotiate 
the end of  apartheid. He used quiet di-
plomacy to rally the support of  interna-
tional and domestic businesses against 
the apartheid regime long before many 
people believed that the system could 
fall. He had used quiet diplomacy to ral-
ly international public opinion against 
the apartheid regime. Finally, after he 
became president, Mbeki successfully 
used quiet diplomacy to encourage 
good governance and democratization 
on the African continent. Notably, he 
helped transform the old, backward 
looking Organization of  African Unity 
(OAU) into a new, relatively vibrant 
African Union (AU), with a potentially 
even more dynamic intellectual arm: 
New Partnership for Africa’s Develop-
ment (NEPAD).
Reaching out to parties he might disa-
gree with in order to extract something 
for the ‘greater good’ is an art Thabo 
Mbeki has perfected. Nobody has ever 
questioned his anti-apartheid creden-
tials, yet he opened and successfully 
concluded secret negotiations with that 
regime. To view Mbeki’s quiet diploma-
cy as tacit approval of  some of  the ac-
tions of  African leaders would be a fun-
damental misreading of  the politics and 
philosophy of  the man. Thabo Mbeki 
has no time for mediocre leadership in 
Africa. When it comes to political lead-
ership in Africa, he is probably the most 
frustrated man out there. Here he is in 
1998, enraged by political mediocrity 
on the continent:
‘‘Africa has no need for the criminals 
who would acquire political power by 
slaughtering the innocents as do the 
butchers of  the people of  Richmond 
in KwaZulu-Natal. Nor has she need 
for such as those who, because they 
did not accept that power is legitimate 
only because it serves the interests of  
the people, laid Somalia to waste and 
deprived its people of  a country which 
gave its citizens a sense of  being as well 
as the being to build themselves into a 
people. Neither has Africa need for the 
petty gangsters who would be our gov-
ernors by theft of  elective positions, as 
a result of  holding fraudulent elections, 
or by purchasing positions of  author-
ity through bribery and corruption…
The call for Africa’s renewal, for an Af-
rican Renaissance is a call to rebellion. 
We must rebel against the tyrants and 
the dictators, those who seek to cor-
rupt our societies and steal the wealth 
This struggle that we face now is more complicated. It 
is even dificult to see who is an enemy. I think because 
we are dealing with this complex situation, that’s when 
we need to raise the level of leadership. Surely we can’t 
lower the level of leadership.
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that belongs to the people. We must re-
bel against the ordinary criminals who 
murder, rape and rob…’’. Thabo Mbe-
ki SABC, Gallagher Estate, 13 August 
1998
Less than two years ago (December of  
2013) Thabo Mbeki used the occasion 
of  the memorial for Nelson Mandela (at 
Midrand’s Calvary Methodist Church) 
not to praise the man he reveres but to 
call for ‘quality’ leadership in Africa. 
“This struggle that we face now is more 
complicated. It is even di cult to see 
who is an enemy. I think because we 
are dealing with this complex situation, 
that’s when we need to raise the level 
of  leadership. Surely we can’t lower the 
level of  leadership.”
Those who are quick to criticise Mbeki’s 
quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe and else-
where in Africa might want to relect on 
his historical successes with this strategy 
and his personal commitment to ‘Af-
rican renaissance’. Of  course, simply 
because his quiet diplomacy succeeded 
elsewhere does not mean it is the right 
one for each and every circumstance. 
I am only saying that an appreciation 
of  his overall record with this strategy 
might help explain his preference for it 
in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa. 
The criticism of  Mbeki’s quiet diplo-
macy with reference to Zimbabwe also 
overlooks two critical points. One, alter-
native approaches (e.g. sanctions) were 
already being applied – to arguably no 
efect. Those who championed these 
‘failed’ approaches are not subject to 
the same level of  criticism directed at 
Thabo Mbeki.
Finally, why Mbeki gets a disproportion-
ate share of  the blame for the crisis in 
Zimbabwe is also a puzzle. Yes, he bears 
some blame. South Africa is one of  Zim-
babwe’s most important neighbours. 
And yes, he led a number of  diplomatic 
eforts to resolve the crisis there includ-
ing the 2008 Power Sharing Agreement. 
To the extent that all these are impor-
tant and/or problematic, he has his 
share of  responsibility. But what about 
political leaders in Zimbabwe? Other 
neighbours of  Zimbabwe? SADC? The 
African Union? The Commonwealth? 
The UK? The European Union?
Thabo Mbeki is also held to a difer-
ent standard with respect to his work 
on ‘African Renaissance’. While it 
might come as a surprise to modern 
day South Africans (partly because of  
the banning of  the ANC for much of  
the 20th century and the skewed na-
ture of  the apartheid education system), 
the idea of  an African ‘regeneration’, 
‘revival’ or ‘renaissance’ has been a 
bedrock ideology of  the ANC (African 
National Congress) since its formation. 
Successive leaders and leading thinkers 
of  the ANC have been ierce promoters 
of  this idea. This idea has evoked some 
of  the most stirring speeches or writings 
from the leadership of  the ANC. ANC 
co-founder and former President, Pixley 
Ka Isaka Seme gave one of  the earliest, 
most powerful speeches on the subject 
as an undergraduate student at Colum-
bia University in 1906.  His speech on 
the ‘Regeneration of  Africa’ won him 
the George William Curtis Medal, Co-
lumbia University’s highest oratorical 
award.
As can be seen from this passage from 
the ‘Regeneration of  Africa’,  Mbeki’s 
speeches and writing on the subject 
mirror Pixley Ka Isaka Seme’s: ‘‘The 
African people, although not a strictly 
homogeneous race, possess a common 
fundamental sentiment which is every-
where manifest, crystallizing itself  into 
one common controlling idea. Con-
licts and strife are rapidly disappearing 
before the fusing force of  this enlight-
ened perception of  the true intertribal 
relation, which relation should subsist 
among a people with a common destiny. 
Agencies of  a social, economic and reli-
gious advance tell of  a new spirit which, 
acting as a leavening ferment, shall raise 
the anxious and aspiring mass to the 
level of  their ancient glory’’. 
The idea of  the African renaissance 
is also to be found in the writings and 
speeches of  many of  the ANC’s lead-
ing lights including: Richard Victor 
Selope Thema, Zachariah Keodirelang 
Matthews, Ashby Peter Mda, Solomon 
T. Plaatje, John L. Dube and Nelson 
Mandela. Unlike many of  these people, 
Mbeki did get an opportunity – as Presi-
dent of  South Africa - to do more than 
speech making. As aforementioned, he 
helped foster the creation of  both the 
African Union and NEPAD in addi-
tion to shepherding numerous eforts to 
promote good governance on the conti-
nent. Perhaps this is why he gets much 
of  the criticism. That would be under-
standable but still problematic.
While his commitment to Africa’s re-
newal is directed at the overall well-
being of  the continent, it has been ben-
eicial to South Africa. It helped ease 
South Africa back into the community 
of  African nations. Today, South Afri-
can businesses and products litter the 
continent. A South African, a former 
South African minister for foreign and 
home afairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, is the current chairperson of  the 
African Union Commission. These are 
no mean accomplishments. Africa has 
a complex relationship with ‘big pow-
ers’. It took enormous skill to integrate 
South Africa smoothly into the rest of  
the continent. The fact that South Afri-
ca continues to enjoy considerable pres-
tige and popularity across the continent 
(despite the recent xenophobic attacks) 
is a testament not only to the power of  
its moral triumph over apartheid, but 
also to the diplomatic skills and vision 
of  its post- apartheid leadership, most 
notably, Nelson Mandela and Thabo 
Mbeki.
South Africans may owe a lot to Mbeki’s 
‘quiet diplomacy’ and ‘African renais-
sance’ than they realise. Yes, whether 
South Africa should have used its moral 
authority more aggressively to foster 
good governance across the continent 
remains a legitimate question. On the 
question of  HIV/Aids, Thabo Mbeki 
clearly failed the continent. His domes-
tic policy record, which we have not re-
viewed here, may also have its problems. 
However, after all is said and done, it 
seems to me that his work before, during 
and after his presidency, has a number 
of  transformative elements that should 
not only assure his place in African his-
tory but might be worth highlighting 
as the continent begins to grapple with 
many of  the questions that Mbeki has 
grappled with for decades. 
Thabo Mbeki is a leader of  21st cen-
tury Pan Africanism. He is a diferent 
kind of  Pan African leader: Afro-cen-
tric, democratic, pro-active, pragmatic 
and non-confrontational. He doesn’t 
play the African ‘victimhood’ or ‘pessi-
mism’ card. This alone constitutes real 
progress in the movement’s journey. A 
shared colonial experience has been the 
chief  unifying force of  the Pan African 
movement for decades. Mbeki is try-
ing to move the movement towards the 
creation of  a new galvanizing force: the 
creation of  a newly ‘emergent’ Africa: 
characterized by economic, social and 
political development as well as scien-
tiic and technological progress. There 
is one thing that Thabo Mbeki shares 
with 20th century Pan Africanists such 
as Kwame Nkrumah of  Ghana or Haile 
Sellassie of  Ethiopia:  not being particu-
larly adored at home. 
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When the scorching sun became unforgiving
And the parasitic worms in our intestines
Began to complain
When bile began to burn our duodenums
And the fats in our b odies began to disintegrate
Our bones clasped so tightly on our scaly skins
When we became ten pounds too thin
And our eyes turned grey with horror
Hunger turned into madness
When our fertile lands turned into a barren hell
A vast desert where no one could hear us yell
When we danced to the rhythmless tunes
Of  hot air slapping across our dry faces
And we sang to the everlasting songs of  tolerance
When our hipbones protruded
And our ribs became razor sharp
Hunger turned into madness
When our steps grew slower and our hearts heavier
And our dreams were illed with charging lions
When the secretary birds and the vultures
Began circling high above us with
Timeless ancient patience
We held on so tightly on to life
But the ravens could no longer tolerate
Hunger turned into madness
When the cries of  the vultures grew loud and impatient
And hunger became too much to bear
We lost consciousness
We drifted in the cities where they sat shamelessly
Eating and drinking deeply into satisfaction
Stufed their stomachs until there was no room for more
And when they heard the vultures had caved in on us
they rushed with their cameras to capture
As the vultures savagely tore our lesh
And ate us alive
We died when hunger turned into madness
POETS’ CORNER
WHEN HUNGER TURNED INTO MADNESS
By Evah Wanjiru
*EVAH WANJIRU
Evah Wanjiru is a 3rd year 
Law student at Moi Univer-
sity, Kenya. She is a poet, an 
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There are lonely spaces in the sky;
Spaces where I used to prance – deer-like
Like the sky was a prairie – evergreen
Un-robbed of  tufts spread lushly,
And bloom that I lay in, with emerald succulents
Sticking from the spaces in my teeth,
Here, I would ind slumber and I would dream
Of  un-choked breathing;
But when I, as an adult take in the air of  my age,
I am perturbed by a stinging
That retch my lungs,
My child’s memories are locked away
In paintings of  the ethereal
Where color is un-ashen and pools run clear,
But these paintings are fairy display,
There are holes developed in the illuminate of  
the sun,
Such that I see specks of  yawning
Whenever its blondeness spreads across the pe-
riphery
And covers the panes of  my windows,
It has been long since I heard the aves chirp,
A phantom’s dirge echoes in my ears
And I lay hope that maybe someday,
Someday,
The painters will have their brushes long enough
To place burning embers in them,
There is a haunting silence,
A gloom that the winds have embraced,
A stubbornness that the zephyr has come to 
choose
That keeps them at bay from ruling the treetops,
My memories as a child remember when
Nothing could fuel my glee
Like the whistle of  these distant traveller s,
Or the giggle of  the leaves
When they were tickled,
I would run with them,
My tiny feet eager to catch their stride,
And my lungs, yearning for their freshness,
SHADOWS IN THE CHILD’S MEMORIES
By Evah Wanjiru and Steve Otieno
A hunger rumbles the belly of  the sands
Beneath my feet,
They have become issured from underfeeding
And their lips have become parched from thirst,
My soles ind no comfort
In having them licked at the bare-feet of  them
Lest the motherliness of  the earth
Becomes too hungry and scalds them,
I yearn for when her sands were feather-cuddle;
Petal-pebble-cushion,
I, as an adult relish in these memories,
I seek to remember how the rain’s aroma
Smelt sweetly with every breath,
I seek to remember how I could dance in it,
Plodding in the puddles it formed,
I, as an adult relish in these memories,
I seek to engrave them
Past the painters’ canvas,
Past the dripping oils
Where the land is though fairy, alive,
I relish in these memories,
But I desire to have that childhood restored.
129THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
130 THE AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN
ACTS IN 
THE WORLD!
ACTS’ Executive Director Dr Cosmas M.O. Ochieng attended the 15th Delhi Sustainable Development Summit, 
in New Delhi, India. The Summit, convened by TERI (The Energy and Resources Institute), an ACTS Partner, 
and the Indian Ministry of  Environment, Forest and Climate Change, focused on ‘Sustainable Development Goals 
and Dealing with Climate Change’. It was attended by among others: Mary Robinson, Former President of  Ireland 
and UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Laurent Fabius, Minister of  Foreign Afairs and 
International Development France, Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, Former President Mexico and Chairman, Global 
Commission and Climate, Kevin Rudd, Former Prime Minister of  Australia and President, Asia Society Policy 
Institute, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, Former President Maldives and President, Progressive Party of  Maldives, 
Nobel Laureate, Jose Ramos Horta, Former President East Timor and Chair, High Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations, United Nations, Nobel Laureate, Prof  Yuan Tseh Lee, President Emeritus and Distinguished 
Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Nobel Laureate, Kailash Satyarthi, Founder, Bachpan Bachao Andolan 
and Chairperson, Global March Against Child Labour, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Former Governor California, 
Founding Chair, Regions of  Climate Action, Ruud Lubbers, Former Prime Minister, The Netherlands, Lord 
John Prescott, Former Deputy Prime Minister, UK and Laurence Tubiana, Special Representative of  the French 
Minister of  Foreign Afairs for the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP 21).
PICTORIALS
ACTS attends the 15th Delhi Sustainable 
Development Summit, New Delhi, February 5-7, 2015.
Arnold Schwarzenegger delivers 
Special Address at the 15th DSDS
Laurent Fabius addressing 
delegates at the Summit.
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Leadership Panel 1: From MDGs to SDGs and Addressing Climate Change. 
15th Delhi Sustainable Development Summit
ACTS Wins a BID Century International Quality ERA Award!
The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) won a BID Century International Quality ERA Award 
(Gold Category) for its ‘innovation’ in relation to its work on harnessing applications of  science, technology 
and innovation for sustainable development in Africa. The Award was presented to ACTS’ Executive 
Director, Dr Cosmas M. O. Ochieng at a ceremony in Geneva, on March 22, 2015. 
ACTS won the Century International Quality ERA Award in the Gold category in Geneva in the presence of  
leaders and representatives from 53 countries at the Century International Quality ERA Convention. From 
left to right: Prof  Dr Alfonso C. Casal, Scientiic Director of  BID, Jose E. Prieto, President and CEO of  BID, 
Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, Executive Director, ACTS, Craig Miller, President of  the QC100 and Norman 
Ingle, President of  the Quality Mix.
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ACTS Convenes the 2nd Kenya Climate Science, Technology and Policy Round 
Table, Nairobi, Kenya
ACTS convened the second Kenya Climate Science, Technology and Policy Roundtable at the 
Hilton Hotel in Nairobi on April 26th, 2015. The Roundtable is part of  a series of  national, multi-
stakeholder based dialogues that ACTS is convening to explore how Kenya can harness climate 
science, technology and policy to build a sustainable, green and climate resilient economy. The 
Roundtables are generously supported by INASP (International Network for the Advancement 
of  Scientiic Publications) through their Vakayiko Grant programme.
Dr Saleemul Huq, Senior Fellow, IIED and Director, 
International Centre for Climate Change and Devel-
opment speaks at the Roundtable. Looking on is Dr 
Richard Munang of  UNEP.
 Wangare Kirumba of  NEMA answers a question at 
the roundtable. Next to her is Mourine Cheruiyot of  
ACTS.
Dr Alice Kaudia, Environment Secretary, Minis-
try of  Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
(MEWNR) Kenya, addresses participants at the 
Roundtable
Prof  Shem Wandiga, University of  Nairobi/Egerton 
University speaks at the Roundtable.
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ACTS Co-Convenes the Cartagena Data Festival in Cartagena, Colombia
ACTS, together with its Partners (ODI, CEPEI, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WWF, Paris 21, Civicus, DATA 
Pop Alliance, Africa Gathering, Global Pulse, Data2X0, SocialTIC, GNDR, Colombia Ministry of  Foreign 
Afairs, among others ) co-convened a ‘data revolution festival’ in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2015. 
The conference sought to:
• Drive the changes that are needed to advance a data revolution by bringing together the people and organisations 
whose innovations, resources, expertise and inluence can make them happen
• Develop concrete solutions and practical tools to produce long term and sustainable progress through a data revolution
• Build the ideas, innovations and partnerships needed to monitor the sustainable development goals. A report launched 
at the conference can be found here: www.developmentprogress.org/datarevolution
ACTS co-hosts the 9th Conference on Community Based Adaptation in Kenya
ACTS, together with the Ministry of  Environment, Water and Natural Resources (Kenya), IIED (UK) and the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), co-convened the 9th Conference on Community Based Adaptation 
at the Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi in late April 2015. The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of  Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources, Kenya, Prof  Judi Wakhungu delivered the Keynote Address. The meeting was also addressed by: 
Ibrahim Thiaw, UNEP Deputy Executive Director and Assistant Secretary General of  the United Nations, Jean-
Pascal van Ypersele, Vice Chairman, IPCC, Irish Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O’Neill and Saleemul Huq, Senior 
fellow, IIED, and Director, ICCCAD. You can watch Dr Saleemul Huq read the outcome of  the Conference or the 
Nairobi Declaration here:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3v2Hs5B7DQM&app=desktop
Dr Bitange Ndemo, University of  Nairobi, speaks at the Cartagena 
Data Festival, Cartagena, Colombia.
Some delegates at the CBA9 Conference, Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya
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A section of ACTS staf in a planning meeting for the CBA9 Conference, April 2015.
ACTS attends the irst 3GF-Africa Regional Conference in Nairobi, Kenya
ACTS’ Executive Director attended the irst 3GF (Global Green Growth Forum) Africa Regional Conference held 
at UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi, 13th May, 2015.  The conference brought together more than 150 leaders and 
decision-makers from governments, cities, private sector, international organisations, universities and civil society to 
explore how to advance inclusive, green growth in Africa. Sustainable consumption, sustainable energy, sustainable 
water management, inancial innovations and growing urbanisation were some of  the key issues discussed. The 
meeting was attended by among others: William Ruto, Deputy President, Kenya, Judi Wakhungu, Cabinet Secretary, 
Environment, Water and Natural Resources, Kenya, Adan Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary, Industrialization, Kenya, 
David Bahati, Minister of  State for Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda,  Achim Steiner, 
Executive Director, UNEP, Geert Aagaard Andersen, Danish Ambassador to Kenya, Vimal Shah, Chairman, 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance / Bidco Oil Reineries, Samuel M. Nyantahe, Chairman, Confederation of  Tanzania 
Industries (CTI), Joshua Oigara, Group CEO, KCB (Kenya Commercial Bank).
Kenya’s Deputy President, William Ruto, is introduced to Dr Alice Kaudia, Ministry of  Environment, 
Water and Natural Resources, Kenya, on his arrival at the UNEP Headquarters for the 3GF Conference. 
Introducing them is Prof  Judi Wakhungu (Centre), Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of  Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources, Kenya.
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ACTS Joins NACOSTI at the 4th Kenya Science, Technology and Innovation Week!
The National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) in Kenya convened the 4th National 
Science, Technology and Innovation Week (May 11- 15th). ACTS, together with NACOSTI convened a Public 
Lecture on PhD Training for Science, Technology and Innovation in Africa. The Lecture was given by Prof  Mike 
Stewart, Professor in Neuroscience Department of  Life, Health & Chemical Science, The Open University, UK.
ACTS joins Kenya in raising awareness against 
wildlife poaching
On the World Wildlife Day (March 3) which also 
coincides with the Africa Environment Day and the 
Wangari Maathai Day, President Uhuru Kenyatta of  
Kenya set ablaze more than 15 tonnes of  elephant ivory 
tusks at a ceremony at the Nairobi National Park. The 
ceremony was hosted by the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS). It was meant to send a clear signal of  Kenya’s 
commitment to wildlife conservation. ACTS attended 
the ceremony.
Dr Cosmas M.O. Ochieng, ACTS (left), Prof  Mike Stewart, Open University (Centre) and Dr Moses Ru-
gutt, NACOSTI, during the Public Lecture on Doctoral Training in Science, Technology and Innovation 
at the 4th National Science, Technology and Innovation Week, at the University of  Nairobi
Charles Tonui of  ACTS at the 
Ivory Burning Site, Nairobi Na-
tional Park.
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Charles Tonui with Dr Paula Kahumbu, CEO of  Worldlife Direct 
and Campaign Leader, ‘Hands of Our Elephants’ Campaign. 
ACTS and Partners Launch the Africa 
Sustainability Hub!
ACTS together with the African Technology Policy 
Studies Network (ATPS), the Stockholm Environment 
Institute’s Africa Centre (SEI Africa) and the ESRC 
STEPS (Social, Technical and Environmental Pathways 
to Sustainability) Centre  - partnership between the 
Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University,  and 
the Institute for Development Studies,  launched a new 
Africa Sustainability Research Hub in Nairobi, on June 
10th, 2015.  The Africa Sustainability Research Hub will 
make a “huge contribution” to promoting low carbon 
economic development in Kenya and Africa, according 
to Hon. Henry Rotich, Cabinet Secretary of  the 
National Treasury, Kenya. The speech was delivered on 
behalf  of  Hon. Rotich by Prof. Judi Wakhungu, Cabinet 
Secretary, Ministry of  Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources, during the formal launch of  the Hub at a 
workshop on Low Carbon Development in Africa at 
Crown Plaza Hotel Nairobi, Kenya.  The launch was 
also attended by the High Commissioner of  Malawi 
to Kenya, Dr. Perks Ligoya, Ethiopia’s Ambassador 
to Kenya, Dina Mufti, Dr. Julius Kipngetich, Chief  
Operating Oicer, Equity Bank, Dr. Ari Hurtala, 
Climate and Development Knowledge Network, Dr. 
Virinder Sharma, DFID East Africa, Dr. Ahmed 
Hamdy, African Union, Dr. Mohammed Kyari, African 
Union. Dr. Heinz Kopetz, World Bioenergy Association, 
Mr. Julius Korir, Industrialisation Secretary, Kenya, 
Hon. Evans Ondieki, Nairobi County Government, Dr. 
Dozie Ezigbalike of  the UNECA and Dr. Evans Kituyi 
of  the IDRC, among others. 
The participatory workshop deined the agenda with 
which the hub will now engage. They articulated a clear 
mandate for the Africa Sustainability Hub to initially 
pursue three key activities:
1. A pan-African programme of  comparative research 
addressing a range of  existing knowledge gaps on 
low carbon energy access. In particular, demand was 
expressed for research that looks beyond the usual 
focus on engineering and inance to encompass 
socio-cultural considerations, the self-deined needs 
of  poor people and the politics of  low carbon energy 
transitions.
2. Training for inance ministries on accessing 
international climate inance.
3. Training for African negotiators on strategies for 
engaging with the UN climate negotiations in Paris 
in December 2015. 
Participants to the workshop lamented the lack of  any 
pan-African platform through which research users 
can articulate priority research needs – a role that the 
workshop had fulilled for those present and one that 
they would like to see sustained. As well as conducting 
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world class research, the Africa Sustainability Hub will also work to fulill this role. The Africa 
Sustainability Hub forms one of  six regional hubs that make up the Pathways to Sustainability 
Global Consortium. It is hosted at the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) in 
partnership with the African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS), the Stockholm 
Environment Institute’s Africa Centre (SEI Africa) and the ESRC STEPS (Social, Technical 
and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) Centre (STEPS is a partnership between Sussex 
University and the Institute for Development Studies, IDS).
Hon. Prof  Judi Wakhungu, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of  Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources, Kenya, delivers a Keynote Address on behalf  of  Hon. Henry Rotich, Cabinet 
Secretary, National Treasury, at the Launch of  the Africa Sustainability Hub in Nairobi. 
H.E Dr Perks Likoya, High Commisioner of  
Malawi to Kenya speaks. Looking on is H.E Dina 
Mufti, Ethiopian ambassador to Kenya
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Prof  Ian Scoones, Institute of  Development Studies, 
University of  Sussex, and Director STEPS Centre/
Co-convenor Future Agricultures Consortium at the 
Launch of  the Africa Sustainability Hub
ACTS participates in a Special Session at 
2015 Water World Congress
 The International Water Resources Association held the XVth World Water Congress from the 25th 
to 29th May 2015 at the Edinburgh International Conference Centre (EICC), Edinburgh, Scotland. Dr 
Joel Houdet, Senior Research Fellow and Head of  ACTS South Africa Oice ACTS was involved in the 
Special Session: Ten Years since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessments: A global perspective on water 
ecosystems services. Key speakers included Prof  Bob Ferrier, Dr Julia Martin-Ortega, Prof  Iain Gordon, 
Dr Kirsty Blackstock, all from The James Hutton Institute; Dr Rebecca Badger, Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency, Dr Mark Mulligan, King’s College London, Dr Stephen Turner, Lincoln University 
and  Dr Samantha Capon,  Gri th University.
Peter Odhengo, National Treasury Kenya, address-
ing delegates at the Launch of  the Africa Sustain-
ability Hub
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Suresh Patel,
Kenya Private Sector Alliance
3rd Kenya Climate Roundtable at the Intercontinnetal, Nairobi
Participants in a discussion during one of
the sessions.
Dr. Wilbur Ottichilo in a 
discussion with delegates.
Dr. George Ruthathi of  ACTS 
follows proceedings. 
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HUMAN RESOURCES
By Susan Murunga, Human Resources Manager, ACTS
Two New Members Join the ACTS Governing Council
In its meeting in January 2015, the ACTS Governing Council admitted two new 
members to the Council:  Prof  Norman Clark and Dr Simon Bransield-Garth.
Prof. Norman Clark
Norman Clark is Emeritus Professor at the Open University 
UK and a research fellow at the INNOGEN Institute 
(Edinburgh University). Previously he was Vice Chancellor 
of  Kabarak University, Kenya, and before that Professor of  
Environmental Studies and Director of  the Graduate School 
of  Environmental Studies at the University of  Strathclyde 
where he is also now an Emeritus Professor.
He is a development economist specialising in science, 
technology and innovation policy issues with particular 
relevance to Third World problems, a ield in which he has 
published extensively. He has lived and worked in many 
countries including Kenya, Nigeria and India. Previously 
he held academic posts at the Universities of  Glasgow and 
Sussex. While at Sussex he acted as the Founding Director of  
Graduate Studies at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
where he worked for some 15 years and now holds the post 
of  Honorary Professor. He has also acted as Founding 
Director of  the Technology Planning and Development 
Unit, University of  Ife, Nigeria; Visiting Professor, Institute 
for Advanced Studies, University of  Sao Paulo, Brazil; and 
Director of  the Capacity Development Programme at the 
African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS). He was a 
member of  the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Task 
Force Team 10 on Science, Technology and Innovation and 
has acted as an adviser to the NEPAD secretariat in Pretoria, 
to ILRI in Nairobi and to the World Bank.
Dr Simon Bransield-Garth
Dr Simon Bransield-Garth is the Chief  Executive Oicer, 
Azuri Technologies and a World Economic Forum 
Technology Pioneer, delivering pay-as-you-go solar power 
on a commercial basis to rural communities in sub-Saharan 
Africa. He holds a BA and Ph.D in Engineering from St 
John’s College, Cambridge UK. He is a former Fellow 
of  Cambridge University and a former Industrial Fellow 
of  the Royal Society. He has over 25 years’ experience in 
building rapid growth, technology-based businesses in sectors 
including semiconductors, automotive equipment and mobile 
phones. His career includes 7 years at Symbian, the phone 
OS maker, where he was a member of  the Leadership Team 
and VP Global Marketing.
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ACTS Welcomes Two New Research Fellows
Dr Aschalew Demeke Tigabu, Postdoctoral Fellow
Dr Aschalew Tigabu joined ACTS in January 2015 
as a Postdoctoral Fellow, Climate Resilience Economy 
Programme. He is also a Researcher with the Africalics 
(African Network for the Economics of  Learning, Innovation, 
and Competence Building Systems) project. Dr Tigabu holds 
a PhD in Economics from the VU University Amsterdam. 
His research interests are in energy, innovation and climate 
policy.
Mr Simon Wanda, Junior Research Fellow, 
Information Economy
Simon Wanda joined ACTS in January 2015 as a Junior 
Research Fellow, Information Economy Programme. He 
holds an MSc in African Studies from the University of  
Oxford, UK. 
Visiting Research Student
Research Interns
Lukhona Mnguni joined ACTS as a Visiting Research Student in May 2015.  He is currently an MSc student in African 
and International Development at the University of  Edinburgh. At ACTS, Lukhona is attached to the Responsible Natural 
Resource Economy Programme.
Nereah Adhiambo, Carol Njoroge Alicia Olago joined ACTS as research interns in March 2015. Alicia is currently studying for 
a Masters in Environmental Security and Governance Climate Change Specialization at the University of  Peace in Costa Rica. 
Carole is studying for a Master’s degree in Project Management at the University of  Nairobi, Kenya. Nereah is a Part Time 
Project Assistant at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP), University of  Nairobi. At 
ACTS, they are all attached to the Climate Resilience Economy Programme.
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The African Technopolitan is open to policy and research 
insights, analysis, commentary, opinions and other forms of  
relevant submission by scholars, policymakers, technocrats, 
bureaucrats and members of  the public. 
The African Technopolitan welcomes contributions that ofer 
constructive, provocative and original ideas, analysis and 
commentary on how applications of  science, technology and 
innovation can be harnessed to address Africa’s fundamental 
development challenges: enhancing agricultural productivity 
and food security; sustainable energy access for all; universal 
clean water access; sustainable biodiversity conservation and 
use;  climate change adaptation and mitigation; industrial 
development; infrastructure and human resource development. 
We invite submissions of  not more than 3000 words from across 
academic disciplines and policy spheres. We are particularly 
interested in submissions that are multi or interdisciplinary, based 
on empirical work, advance original or alternative theories; and 
challenge conventional schools of  thought on contemporary 
issues in science, technology and innovation policy research and 
practice in Africa.
Please send your submissions to:
Executive.director@acts-net.org
SUBMIT AN ARTICLE TO THE 
AFRICAN TECHNOPOLITAN!
We look forward to publishing your 
article in the next Issue of  the African 
Technopolitan!
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ACTS DONORS AND 
PARTNERS
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